Reyes v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 30

ORDER Granting Motion for Attorneys' Fees Under 42 U.S.C. 406(b) 27 , signed by Magistrate Judge Sandra M. Snyder on 5/11/2011. (Herman, H)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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APRIL D. REYES,

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Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. 1:09-cv-00088-SMS
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES UNDER
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,

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Defendant.
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(Doc. 27)
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Plaintiff Linda Taylor moves the Court to grant attorneys’ fees of $9155.75 under 42
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U.S.C. § 406(b). Defendant Commissioner has filed a statement of non-opposition to Plaintiff’s
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request. Having reviewed the motion and its supporting documentation, as well as the case file,
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this Court awards the requested attorneys’ fees.
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I.

Legal and Factual Background

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On December 8, 2008, Plaintiff and the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, entered a
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contingent fee agreement, providing payment to attorneys of twenty-five per cent of Plaintiff’s
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past due benefits in the event the case was won. On January 8, 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint
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in this Court appealing Defendant’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits.
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On July 2, 2010, this Court entered judgment in favor of Defendant.
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Twenty-five per cent of Plaintiff’s past due benefit total of $36,623.00 equals $9155.75.

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Plaintiff was not previously awarded any attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act

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(EAJA).

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II.

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Discussion

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Whenever a court renders judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter
who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and
allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in
excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is
entitled by reason of such judgment . . . . .

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42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1(A).

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The Court must review contingent-fee arrangements “as an independent check, to assure

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that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807

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(2002). Section 406(b) “instructs courts to review for reasonableness” fees yielded under

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contingent fee agreements, taking into account both the character of the representation and the

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results achieved. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. Congress has provided a single guideline:

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Contingency agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees in excess of

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twenty-five per cent of past-due benefits. Id. at 807. Within the twenty-five percent corridor, the

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attorney for a successful claimant must demonstrate that the fee is reasonable for the services that

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he or she provided. Id.

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“[D]istrict courts generally have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts

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in § 406 (b) cases.” Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D.Cal. 2003). Attorneys

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who agree to represent claimants pursuant to a contingent fee agreement assume the risk of

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receiving no compensation for their time and effort if the action does not succeed. Id. Here, the

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Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing accepted substantial risk of loss in representing Plaintiff,

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whose application had already been denied at the administrative level. Plaintiff agreed to the

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contingent fee. Working efficiently and effectively, the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing

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appealed the determinations of the Commissioner and ultimately, secured a reversal and remand,

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yielding the award of substantial benefits to Plaintiff.

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III.

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Conclusion and Order
Accordingly, this Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s petition for attorneys’ fees of

$9155.75.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:
icido3

May 11, 2011

/s/ Sandra M. Snyder
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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