Rosales et al v. El Rancho Farms

Filing 80

ORDER Denying 64 Motion to Compel, and ORDER Vacating Hearing date of 4/9/2012 signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 4/3/2012. (Leon-Guerrero, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MARGARITA ROSALES, and ANGELICA)
ROSALES, on behalf of themselves and all )
others similarly situated,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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EL RANCHO FARMS,
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Defendant.
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)

1:09-cv-00707-AWI-JLT
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS WITHOUT PREJUDICE
(Doc. 64)
ORDER VACATING HEARING DATE OF
APRIL 9, 2012

Plaintiffs Margarita Rosales and Angelica Rosales (“Plaintiffs”) filed a notice of motion

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and motion seeking to compel production of documents and electronic records from Garza

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Contracting, a third-party, on February 17, 2012. (Doc. 64). The Court issued a minute order on

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February 29, 2012, setting the matter for a hearing on April 9, 2012. (Doc. 68).

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Apparently, unfamiliar with the requirement that such a motion must proceed under Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 451 rather than Rule 37, Plaintiffs filed their notice of motion to compel compliance

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with a subpoena issued to the third-party pursuant to Local Rule 251. (Doc. 64) In it, Plaintiffs

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asserted they would provide a “Joint Statement re: Discovery Dispute” prior to the hearing as

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 governs the filing of a motion to compel a response from a non-party who has been
served with a subpoena duces tecum. (Doc. 75 at 5); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B) (providing that when a
non-party has objected to a subpoena duces tecum, “the serving party may move the issuing court for an order
compelling production or inspection”).

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required by Local Rule 251. Id. However, because, of course, Local Rule 251 is applicable only

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“to motion[s] pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 through 37,” the motion should have been filed

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pursuant to Local Rule 230, which sets forth the procedure for setting a motion before the Court.

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Local Rule 230 provides that when filing a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 through

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37, “[t]he moving party shall file a notice of motion, motion, accompanying briefs,2 affidavits, if

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appropriate, and copies of all documentary evidence that the moving party intends to submit in

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support of the motion.” LR 230. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to provide a memorandum of points

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and authorities in support of their motion. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion is procedurally defective

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and fails to comply with the provisions of the Local Rules.

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Despite that no memorandum was filed, Garza timely filed written opposition to the

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motion. (Doc. 75) Then, apparently realizing that they had not filed either a memorandum or a

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joint statement, Plaintiffs filed a “reply” a mere one week before the hearing on the motion.

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(Doc. 76) In the “reply, for the first time, Plaintiffs provide substantive argument as to the merits

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of the motion.

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In doing so, Plaintiffs offer little explanation of why they believe that Garza’s due process

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rights have not been trampled and instead, pooh-pooh Garza’s complaints that it has not been

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allowed to address any of Plaintiffs arguments because, of course, none had been made by the

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time their opposition was due. Plaintiffs’ cavalierly suggest that, even though only three court

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days remain before the hearing, the Court should cure this problem by allowing Garza to file a

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sur-reply despite the cost this imposes on Garza and despite the burden this places on the Court.

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The Court is assured that Plaintiffs are aware that this Court has one of the highest

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caseloads in the entire country. In order to expeditiously address their cases, and those of all of

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the other litigants, it cannot allow itself to be placed in a situation in which it has, literally, no

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time to evaluate or consider the arguments in opposition to a substantive motion before a

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calendared hearing on the motion. The Court does not find that Plaintiffs’ purposefully

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sandbagged Garza. However, through their lack of diligence, the result is the same.

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///

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“Briefs include memoranda, points and authorities, and other written arguments . . .” LR 101.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
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Plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery from third-party Garza Contracting
(Doc. 64) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and

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The hearing on the motion set for April 9, 2012 at 10:00 a.m. is
VACATED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: April 3, 2012
9j7khi

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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