Singmounthong v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 72

ORDER regarding 70 Motion for Attorney Fees, signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck on 12/6/2012. (Figueroa, O)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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KHAM SINGMOUNGTHONG,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Defendant.

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1:09cv01328 DLB
ORDER REGARDING MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
(Documents 68 and 70)

Petitioner Sengthiene Bosavanh (“Counsel”), attorney for Plaintiff Kham

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Singmoungthong, filed the instant Motion for Fees on August 15, 2012. After Defendant pointed
out an error in the original Motion, Counsel filed an Amended Motion on August 29, 2012.
Counsel requests fees in the amount of $14,040.25 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1).
In Defendant’s August 20, 2012, filing calling attention to Counsel’s error, Defendant

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indicated that because he was not a party to the contingent fee agreement, he is not in a position

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to analyze the fee request.

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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action on July 9, 2009. On September 17, 2010, the Court granted the
appeal and remanded the action for further proceedings.

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On July 13, 2011, the Court granted attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to

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Justice Act (“EAJA”) in the amount of $8,236.38. After additional litigation on the fee issue, the
Court granted an additional $2,692.65 in EAJA fees on November 16, 2011, for a total EAJA
award of $10,929.03.
On June 16, 2012, the Commissioner issued a notice indicating that Plaintiff’s retroactive

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benefits totaled $56,161.00. Exhibit 3, attached to Motion.

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By this motion, Counsel seeks an award of $14,040.25 for 59 hours of attorney time.1

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This amount is equal to 25 percent of the past-due benefit award. After crediting $10,929.03

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received previously pursuant to the EAJA, Counsel requests a net fee of $3,111.22 from the past-

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due award.

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DISCUSSION

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42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides in relevant part:

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Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who
was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as
part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent
of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such
judgment . . .

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In Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002), the Supreme Court explained that a

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district court reviews a petition for section 406(b) fees “as an independent check” to assure that

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contingency fee agreements between claimants and their attorneys will “yield reasonable results

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in particular cases.” The Court must respect “the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee
agreements,” id. at 793, “looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for
reasonableness.” Id. at 808; see also Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2009).
Agreements are not enforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of

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Both Sengthiene Bosavanh and Ralph Wilborn performed work on the action, though under their agreement, Mr.
Wilborn is not entitled to any 406(b) fees. Declaration of Sengthiene Bosavanh, ¶ 5.

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the past-due benefits. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. “Within the 25 percent boundary. . . the

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attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services
rendered.” Id.
In determining the reasonableness of an award, the district court should consider the

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character of the representation and the results achieved. Id. at 808. Ultimately, an award of

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section 406(b) fees is offset by an award of attorney’s fees granted under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. §

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2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.

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In Crawford v. Astrue, the Ninth Circuit recently suggested factors that a district court

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should examine under Gisbrecht in determining whether the fee was reasonable. In determining

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whether counsel met their burden to demonstrate that their requested fees were reasonable, the

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Court noted that (1) no reduction in fees due to substandard performance was warranted, and the
evidence suggested that counsels’ performance was nothing other than excellent; (2) no
reduction in fees for dilatory conduct was warranted, as the attorneys in these cases caused no

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excessive delay which resulted in an undue accumulation of past-due benefits; and (3) the
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requested fees, which were significantly lower than the fees bargained for in the contingent-fee
agreements, were not excessively large in relation to the benefits achieved and when taking into
consideration the risk assumed in these cases. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-1152.
Here, there is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted for substandard

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performance. Counsel is an experienced, competent attorney who secured an extremely

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favorable result for Plaintiff. There is no indication that Counsel engaged in any dilatory

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conduct resulting in excessive delay. Finally, Counsel requests an amount equal to the 25

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percent contingent-fee that Plaintiff agreed to at the outset of the representation. Exhibit 1,

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attached to Motion. The $14,040.25 fee ($3,111.22 net fee after subtracting the previously

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awarded EAJA fee) is not excessively large in relation to the past-due award of $56,161.00. In
making this determination, the Court recognizes the contingent nature of this case and Counsel’s

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assumption of the risk of going uncompensated. Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037
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(N.D. Cal. 2003).
Ms. Bosavanh and Mr. Wilborn submitted detailed billing statements in support of this

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fee request. Exhibit 4, attached to Motion.

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ORDER

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Based on the foregoing, Counsel’s section 406(b) Application is GRANTED in the

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amount of $14,040.25.2 This amount should be payable directly to Counsel. Upon payment,

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Counsel is directed to refund $10,929.03 to Plaintiff.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

/s/ Dennis

December 6, 2012

L. Beck

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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DEAC_Signature-END:

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3b142a

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The Court notes that Plaintiff appealed the November 16, 2011, Order awarding $2,692.65 in supplemental EAJA
fees. If the appeal is granted and the Court reevaluates the supplemental EAJA award, the Court will revisit the
406(b) award.

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