Royal v. Knight et al

Filing 17

ORDER Dismissing Certain Clailms for Failure to State a Cognizable Claim, signed by Magistrate Judge Sandra M. Snyder on 9/6/11. (Verduzco, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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MARLIN LATTEREAL ROYAL,

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CASE NO. 1:09-cv-01407-SMS PC

Plaintiff,

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ORDER DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM

v.
(ECF No. 15)

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S. KNIGHT, et al.,

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Defendants.
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I.

Screening Requirement

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Plaintiff Marlin Lattereal Royal (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

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pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed this action on August 12, 2009.

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Currently pending before the Court is the First Amended Complaint, filed August 19, 2010. (ECF

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No. 15.)

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks

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monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court looks to the pleading standard

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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

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“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it
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demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

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Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555

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(2007)).

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Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated

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in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires

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the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

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at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint [that]

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pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line

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between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as true all factual allegations

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contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 129

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S. Ct. at 1949. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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II.

Complaint Allegations

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Plaintiff is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

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Rehabilitation and is incarcerated at California State Prison, Lancaster. The incidents alleged in the

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complaint occurred while Plaintiff was housed at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility,

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Corcoran. Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants S. Knight, K. Turner, Gardner, and Adams

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in their individual and official capacities seeking declaratory relief and nominal, compensatory, and

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punitive damages. (First Amended Compl. 3, ECF No. 15.1)

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On January 28, 2009, Defendant Knight was verbally abusive to Plaintiff and after a verbal

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altercation, grabbed Plaintiff by his right shoulder and pushed him into his cell. Instantly, Plaintiff

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felt pain to his shoulder, neck, head, and back. (Id.) Defendant Gardner watched while Defendant

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Knight slammed Plaintiff into the cell frame twice, and Defendant Gardner did not press his alarm,

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call for back-up, or attempt to stop Defendant Knight. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff was seen by medical and

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prescribed Naproxen for his shoulder which now pops in and out of place. (Id. at 3.)

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All references to pagination of specific documents pertain to those as indicated on the upper right corners
via the CM/ECF electronic court docketing system.

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On March 25, 2009, Defendant Knight told Plaintiff that he would be placed in

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administrative segregation if he did not withdraw his complaints. On April 1, 2009, Defendant

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Knight filed a false rule violation report.

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Defendant Knight told Plaintiff that he had Plaintiff’s special purchase television set, Plaintiff would

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never see it, then punched Plaintiff in the eye. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff was left in the cage for five to

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six and one half hours and was denied food and a bathroom by Defendants Knight and Turner. (Id.

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at 5.)

While Plaintiff was in a stand up cage in a side room,

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Defendant Turner had told Plaintiff, “Correctional Officer’s stick together over inmates. And

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if I do not want any problems in the future to drop my complaint.” (Id. at 6.) In February and March

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2009, Plaintiff filed a staff complaint, and in March 2009, he sent a letter to Defendant Clark

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informing him that Defendant Turner offered to order the officer to issue Plaintiff’s television set

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and keep Defendant Knight away from Plaintiff. (Id. at 6, 8.) Plaintiff’s mother contacted Defendant

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Clark by telephone and was assured that threats and future assaults would stop. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff

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alleges that Defendants Turner and Knight conspired to convict him of a false rule violation in

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violation of his due process rights to deprive him of program, visits, phone calls, and religious

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materials. (Id. at 6.)

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Plaintiff’s first amended complaint states claims against Defendant Knight for excessive

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force and retaliation; Defendants Gardner and Adams for failure to protect; and Defendants Knight

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and Turner for conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment, however, for the

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reasons set forth below Plaintiff allegations fail to state any additional claims under section 1983.

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III.

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Discussion
A.

Eight Amendment
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Excessive Force

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To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

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conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

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U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The inquiry as to whether a prison official’s use of force constitutes cruel and

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unusual punishment is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore

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discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7
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(1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (312). Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Knight

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pushed him into the cell frame and punched him in the face are sufficient to state a cognizable claim.

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2.

Failure to Protect

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Prison officials are required “to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical

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abuse.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982) (abrogated on other grounds by

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Sandin v. O’Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)). Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants Adams and

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Gardner were aware of the threat of harm from Defendant Knight and failed to act is sufficient to

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state a cognizable claim.

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3.

Conditions of Confinement

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To prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment the plaintiff must “objectively show that he

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was deprived of something ‘sufficiently serious,’ and make a subjective showing that the deprivation

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occurred with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety.” Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d

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1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The circumstances, nature, and duration of the

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deprivations are critical in determining whether the conditions complained of are grave enough to

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form the basis of a viable Eighth Amendment claim.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir.

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2006).

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Plaintiff’s allegation that he was denied the use of the bathroom and drinking water is
sufficient to state a cognizable claim against Defendants Knight and Turner.

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B.

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Turner carried out his previous threats. Neither a verbal

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threat nor verbal harassment constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Keenan v. Hall, 83

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F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1987); Gaut

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v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th 1987). Plaintiff’s complaint characterizes the statement made by

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Defendant Turner as a threat; however, as alleged the statement fails to state a plausible claim that

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Defendant Turner threatened Plaintiff and acted on the threat.

Threats

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While Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Turner and Knight conspired to deprive him of his

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rights, Plaintiff’s conclusory statement that Defendant Turner knew the rule violation submitted by

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Defendant Turner was false fails to state a plausible claim that there was“‘an agreement or meeting
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of the minds to violate constitutional rights,’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001)

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(quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir.

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1989) (citation omitted)). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting the existence of a conspiracy

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between Defendants.

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C.

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Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim that Defendant Knight violated the First Amendment

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by filing a false rule violation report in retaliation for Plaintiff filing a grievance. Rhodes v.

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Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir.

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2009). However, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for retaliation against any other named

First Amendment

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defendant.

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D.

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The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

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law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). In order to state a cause of action for a

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deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first identify a liberty interest for which the protection

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is sought. Id. The Due Process Clause does not confer a liberty interest in freedom from state action

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taken within a prisoner’s imposed sentence. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995). However,

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a state may “create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin, 515

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U.S. at 483-84. A prisoner has a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause only where the

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restraint “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents

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of prison life.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at

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484). Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cognizable due process claim.

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Due Process

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Administrative Segregation

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The Due Process Clause does not “create a liberty interest in freedom from administrative

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segregation.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091 (9th Cir. 1985), abrogated in part on

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other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Administrative segregation is the type of

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confinement that should be reasonably anticipated by inmates at some point in their incarceration.

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Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1091 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S.460, 468 (1983)). The Ninth Circuit

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has concluded that prisoners have no liberty interest in remaining free from administrative
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segregation or solitary confinement. See May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir.1997).

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Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a liberty interest in freedom from

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administrative segregation.

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2.

Deprivation of Personal Property

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Knight refused to release his television. A property

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deprivation that is intentional and unauthorized does not violate Due Process if there is a meaningful

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post-deprivation remedy available for the loss. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Quick

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v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1984). Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. Plaintiff has an adequate

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post-deprivation remedy available under California law. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17

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(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a

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cognizable claim.

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3.

Rule Violation Report

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Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the submission of false reports against him fails to state a

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cognizable claim for relief. The Due Process Clause itself does not contain any language that grants

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a broad right to be free from false accusations, but guarantees certain procedural protections to

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defend against false accusations. Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir. 1986). However,

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“prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights

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due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556

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(1974).

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E.

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In addition to money damages, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that his rights were violated. “A

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declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of

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judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest.” Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village,

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333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948). “Declaratory relief should be denied when it will neither serve a useful

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purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and afford

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relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.” United States v. Washington, 759

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F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985). In the event that this action reaches trial and the jury returns a

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verdict in favor of Plaintiff, that verdict will be a finding that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were

Declaratory Relief

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violated. Accordingly, a declaration that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights is unnecessary, and

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this action shall proceed as one for money damages only.

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F.

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Plaintiff may not bring suit against Defendants in their official capacity. “The Eleventh

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Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state

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officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147

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(9th Cir. 2007). However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages from public

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officials acting in their personal capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991).

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IV.

Official Capacity

Conclusion and Order

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Plaintiff’s first amended complaint states a cognizable claim against Defendant Knight for

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excessive force and retaliation; Defendants Gardner and Adams for failure to protect; and

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Defendants Knight and Turner for conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment,

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however, Plaintiff allegations fail to state any additional claims under section 1983. Plaintiff was

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previously notified of the deficiencies in his claims and provided with the opportunity to amend, but

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was unable to cure the deficiencies. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987).

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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This action for damages shall proceed on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed

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August 19, 2010, against Defendant Knight for excessive force and retaliation;

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Defendants Gardner and Adams for failure to protect; and Defendants Knight and

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Turner for conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment for

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damages; and

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2.

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Plaintiff’s due process, official capacity and declaratory relief claims are dismissed
for failure to state a claim.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:
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September 6, 2011

/s/ Sandra M. Snyder
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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