Rodrigo Flores v. Merced Irrigation District et al
Filing
67
ORDER GRANTING plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order for the limited purpose of seeking relief from the deemed admissions and, FURTHER GRANTING plaintiff's Motion Seeking to Withdraw Responses to Request for Admissions, documents 59 and 60 . Plaintiff's counsel is directed to pay defendants' fees and costs incurred re same and also for preparing the portion of the summary judgment motion related to the deemed admissions; case management deadline set for12/3/201 0 for receipt of declaration of defense counsel outlining the hours, fees, and costs pertinent to the previously outlined; plaintiff has seven days from receipt of said declaration to file objections; order signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck on 11/23/2010. (Rooney, M)
<(3) was self-executing. However, counsel's belief that Defendants had to apply for an order to deem the responses admitted is not well taken. At a minimum, MID's request for admissions cites Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 and clearly states: YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT IF YOU FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 36 WITH RESPECT TO THIS REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, EACH OF THE MATTERS OF WHICH AN ADMISSION IS REQUESTED WILL BE DEEMED ADMITTED. Exhibit 3 to Declaration of Robert Strickland in Support of Plaintiff's Motion Seeking Leave of Court to Withdraw His Responses to Requests for Admissions. Further, even if Plaintiff's counsel presumably learned of the deemed admissions when reviewing Defendants' motion for summary judgment, there is no explanation for the delay in filing a motion to withdraw the deemed admissions. Defendants' summary judgment motion was filed on September 15, 2010, and Plaintiff waited more than two weeks to file the instant application. Order Denying Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application, p. 2. Plaintiff asserts that "to diligently fix the problem," he filed the motion to withdraw admissions the day following the Court's denial of the ex parte application. Plaintiff contends that 4
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this "is not a situation in which Plaintiff treated the scheduling order as a `frivolous piece of paper'" and he was diligent in applying to the Court once a problem was discovered. Motion, p. 5; see, e.g., Masterpiece Leaded Windows Corporation v. Joslin, 2009 WL 1456418, *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2009) (district court found good cause to amend scheduling order where counsel presented evidence of mistake in calendaring dates). Plaintiff concludes that Defendants will not be prejudiced and that he should not be prevented from presenting his case due to clerical and attorney error. Defendants counter that Plaintiff's argument focuses on the third factor identified in Jackson v. Laureate, which considers whether the movant was diligent in seeking amendment of the scheduling order once it became apparent that he could not comply with the order. Defendants assert that this factor only makes sense under circumstances in which the moving party could have complied with the Court's order. Defendants note that Plaintiff was aware that his responses were untimely as early as April 2, 2010. Defendants contend that had he been diligent, Plaintiff would have filed his motion to withdraw admissions at that time or, at the very least, before the nondispositive motion cut-off date. Defendants further counter that counsel's mistake regarding the Federal Rules is no excuse and constitutes "utter carelessness." Defendants indicate that Rule 36 has remained substantially the same since 1970 and the Scheduling Order includes the expectation that counsel familiarize themselves with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants also point to the language in MID's request for admissions, which the Court cited in its order on the ex parte application, notifying counsel of the risk of failing to timely respond. The Court agrees that Plaintiff's counsel was not diligent and his mistake constitutes, at the very least, carelessness. Generally, the lack of diligence by counsel would be dispositive of the matter, but the Court is mindful that the procedural rules governing civil actions are to be construed to achieve the just determination of every action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Indeed, it is well settled that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be "liberally construed to effectuate the general purpose of seeing that cases are tried on the merits and to dispense with technical procedural problems." Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 459 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Staren v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust 5
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Co. of Chicago, 529 F.2d 1257, 1263(7th Cir. 1976). Thus, the Court considers the request to amend the scheduling order in conjunction with the relief he is seeking, i.e. withdrawal of his deemed admissions. B. Motion for Relief from Deemed Admissions 1. Legal Standard - Fed. Rule Civ. P. 36
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3) provides, in part, that "[a] matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter." Here, plaintiff failed to respond timely to the request for admissions ("RFA") propounded by MID. Failure to respond to the requests is deemed an automatic admission. Rule 36 permits a party to request relief from the admissions. Rule 36(b) further provides that "[a] matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended." Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). Whether a party is entitled to relief in the form of withdrawal or amendment of responses to requests for admissions lies within the discretion of the district court. Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court determination of whether such relief is appropriate is governed by a two-pronged test: a "court may permit withdrawal or amendment if it would (1) promote the presentation of the merits of the action, and (2) if the court is not persuaded that it would prejudice the requesting party in maintaining or defending the action on the merits." Rule 36(b). The Court must consider both prongs to determine whether to permit relief: Admissions are sought, first, to facilitate proof with respect to issues that cannot be eliminated from the case and, second, to narrow the issues by eliminating those that can be. The rule is not to be used in an effort to `harass the other side' or in the hope that a party's adversary will simply concede essential elements. Rather, the rule seeks to serve two important goals: truth-seeking in litigation and efficiency in dispensing justice. Thus, a district court must specifically consider both factors under the rule before deciding a motion to withdraw or amend admissions. Conlon, 474 F.3d at 622.
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2.
Analysis
Presentation on the Merits Here, the first prong is met. Withdrawal of the requests for admissions would promote presentation of the case on the merits. The RFA admitted the absence of key elements of the complaint. Plaintiff's failure to respond to the RFA resulted in admissions including the following: (1) that he never personally witnessed an incident of harassment on the basis of race at MID; (2) that he has no facts supporting the assertion that Vanessa Lara, Ramiro Ceja, Andre Urquidez, and Cynthia Ardison, as members of the interview panel, discriminated again him on the basis of his race; (3) that certain persons were more qualified than he was for specific positions at MID; and (4) that Defendants Dan Pope and Robert Blum were not personally involved in any of the unlawful conduct alleged in the complaint. If the Court upheld these admissions, Plaintiff would be prevented from presenting the merits of his case. Thus, the first prong of the test is met because relief from the admissions would promote presentation of the merits. Prejudice to Defendants As to the prejudice prong, the Court focuses on the "the prejudice that the nonmoving party would suffer at trial." Conlon, 474 F.3d at 623-24 (stating additionally that "prejudice must relate to the difficulty a party may face in proving its case at trial"). The party who relies upon the deemed admissions has the burden of proving prejudice. Id. at 622. Defendants argue that they will be prejudiced from the withdrawal of the admissions. They claim that they have relied on Plaintiff's admissions for over six months, through the entire discovery and dispositive motion cut-off dates, with no indication that Plaintiff ever intended to file a motion to withdraw his admissions. However, Defendants have had Plaintiff's responses to the RFA since April 2010, along with receiving answers to interrogatories and other discovery from Plaintiff. Defense counsel also has forthrightly admitted that Defendants did not forbear conducting any discovery in reliance on Plaintiff's deemed admissions. Defendants also cannot establish prejudice by reliance on a deemed admission in preparing their summary judgment motion. Plaintiff responded to the summary judgment motion as if the 7
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Court had granted leave to withdraw the deemed admissions and Defendants operated under the same assumption in their reply. Thus, there is no prejudice resulting from reliance on the deemed admissions at the summary judgment stage. Further, the Ninth Circuit has been reluctant to find that reliance on deemed admissions in preparing a motion for summary judgment and in foregoing other discovery, without more, constitutes sufficient prejudice to uphold deemed admissions. See Conlon, 474 F.3d at 624; Hadley v. United States, 45 F.3d 1345,1349 (9th Cir. 1995). Defendants also have not demonstrated that they would experience prejudice at trial from withdrawal of the admissions. Conlon, 474 F.3d at 624. In light of the minimal prejudice to Defendants and to effectuate presentation of the case on its merits, the motion for relief from the deemed admitted RFAs will be granted. Nonetheless, the circumstances of this case demonstrate that Defendants have been required to expend time, effort and expense from what is clearly the fault of Plaintiff's counsel. Therefore, the Court finds it appropriate to require Plaintiff's counsel to pay Defendants' fees and costs incurred in responding to Plaintiff's motions to withdraw deemed admissions and motion to amend the scheduling order, and in preparing the portion of the summary judgment motion related to such admissions. CONCLUSION Based on the above, the Court orders as follows: 1. Plaintiff's motion to amend the scheduling order is GRANTED for the limited purpose of seeking relief from deemed admissions; 2. 3. Plaintiff's motion seeking relief from deemed admissions is GRANTED. Plaintiff's counsel shall be required to pay Defendants' fees and costs incurred in responding to Plaintiff's motions to withdraw deemed admissions, motion to amend the scheduling order, and in preparing the portion of the summary judgment motion related to the deemed admissions. a. On or before December 3, 2010, Defendants' counsel shall submit a declaration setting forth the hours, fees and costs for defending against the motions and in preparing the relevant portion of the summary 8
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judgment motion. After being served with the declaration, Plaintiff shall have seven (7) days to file objections. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: 3b142a
November 23, 2010
/s/ Dennis L. Beck UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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