Bond v. Ferguson Enterprises, Inc.
Filing
56
DRAFT MEMORANDUM DECISION for review by the parties. The parties shall review the attorneys fees calculations and adjustments presented on pages 28-34 of this draft memorandum decision and shall inform the Court of any errors by 4:00 pm on 6/22/11. Corrections may be suggested as electronic comments to this.pdf file or in a separate document, and should be both electronically filed and emailed to lisacoffman@caed.uscourts.gov. (Coffman, Lisa)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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LEE BOND, and RICHARD JAMES,
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Plaintiff,
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1:09-cv-1662 OWW MJS
v.
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[DRAFT] MEMORANDUM
DECISION RE UNOPPOSED
MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL
OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
(DOC. 41) AND FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
(DOC. 48)
FERGUSON ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Defendants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
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This is a wage-and-hour class action brought on
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behalf of truck drivers employed by Ferguson Enterprises
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Inc., in Kern County, California. Declaration of Craig
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Ackermann, Doc. 44 ¶ 12; see also First Amended Complaint
filed July 30, 2010. The action is brought on behalf of
Plaintiffs and approximately 548 current and former
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employees of Defendants’ from July 17, 2005 for alleged
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violations of state wage-and-hour laws. Id.
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The parties have entered into a Joint Stipulation of
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Settlement Agreement. See Ackermann Decl., Doc. 30 at Ex.
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1. A January 25, 2011 memorandum decision: (1)
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conditionally certified a Settlement Class; (2)
preliminarily approved the Class Settlement; (3) Class
Counsel; (4) appointed Class Representatives; (5)
appointed a settlement administrator, (6) approved the
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class Notice and related materials for distribution; and
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(7) required plaintiffs to submit a form of order
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consistent with the decision within five (5) days
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following electronic service. Doc. 35. Plaintiffs have
filed a motion for final approval of the settlement,
Docs. 41-42, along with numerous supporting declarations,
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Docs. 43-46. Plaintiffs have also moved for approval of
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their request for attorneys’ fees and costs, Docs. 48-49,
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and filed the supporting declaration of Melissa M.
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Harnett, Doc. 50. No objections to approval have been
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received.
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II. BACKGROUND
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Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to provide
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timely off-duty meal periods; failed to pay for missed,
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on-duty and untimely meal periods; failed to provide
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accurate itemized wage statements; and failed to pay all
wages due upon termination or separation of employment.
Plaintiffs sought to certify a class composed of
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themselves and similarly situated individuals, and sought
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declaratory relief and recovery of back wages, interest,
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penalties, attorneys’ fees, and costs. See First Amended
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Complaint (“FAC”), Doc. 21-1.
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From November 2009 through the day of the settlement,
the Plaintiffs conducted substantial formal and informal
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discovery concerning the Defendant’s policy and
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practices. Harnett Decl., Doc. 43 at ¶ 42. Among other
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discovery, Plaintiffs served document requests seeking
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information on the size of the Class and identity of each
of the Class members, and on Defendant’s meal break
policies, including the persons responsible for
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developing, implementing and monitoring Defendant’s meal
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break policies. Id. at ¶ 45. Defendants produced a
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variety of responsive documents including all of its meal
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and rest period policies and several other categories of
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responsive documents, but objected to most of the class
discovery on the grounds that it violated the Class
Members’ rights to privacy, and was premature and
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irrelevant to a ruling on a class certification. Harnett
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Decl., Doc. 31 at ¶ 46. Plaintiff’s counsel reviewed the
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information amassed during discovery including: analysis
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of thousands of documents produced by Defendant,
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including time records and payroll data for 34 class
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members and Defendant’s employment records; (2) analysis
of Defendant’s legal arguments; (3) obtaining more than
thirty sworn declarations from former and current truck
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drivers of Defendant; (4) taking the Rule 30(b)(6)
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deposition of Defendant’s corporate representative; (5)
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analysis of class-wide violation rates on the automatic
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3
1
deduction and meal break claims on the basis of a sample
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of thirty-four (34) class members; (6) analysis of class-
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wide violations and damages on derivative claims; and (7)
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research of the applicable law with respect to
Plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at ¶ 4.
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III. SUMMARY OF THE SETTLEMENT
The case was resolved with the aid of a mediator, Gig
Kyraicou. The Settlement covers approximately 548 current
and former truck drivers employed by Defendant in
California from July 17, 2005 to the date the court
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enters an Order of Preliminary Approval (“Class Period”),
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excluding new truck drivers hired after November 3, 2010
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and 46 truck drivers who previously signed severance
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release agreements prior to the filing of the lawsuit
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(“Class Members”). See Settlement, Doc. 30-1, Exhibit 1,
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§ 6. There will be no reversion of the Gross Settlement
Amount to Defendant; see also Declaration of Craig J.
Ackermannn, Doc. 30 at ¶ 48.
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A.
Gross Settlement Amount.
Under
$2,500,000
the
Settlement,
(“Gross
Defendant
Settlement
will cover:
4
will
Amount”).
This
pay
up
total
to
sum
1
•
2
settlement
awards
to
be
paid
to
Class
Members
who
timely submit valid claims (“Settlement Awards”);
3
•
5
any payroll withholding on the Settlement Awards;
•
4
the Settlement Administrator’s reasonable fees and
expenses (no more than $18,000);
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7
•
(subject to court approval) payments to Plaintiffs,
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in addition to their Settlement Awards, of $11,250
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each in compensation of their services as Class
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Representatives;
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•
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and (also subject to court approval) payments to
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Class Counsel of no more than 30% of the Gross
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Settlement Amount, or $675,000, for their reasonable
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attorneys’ fees, as well as litigation costs, up to
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$10,000.
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See Settlement, § 6. There will be no reversion of the
Gross Settlement Amount to Defendant.
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B.
Payment of Settlement Awards.
After the other amounts are deducted, the balance of
the Gross Settlement Amount, approximately $1,524,500
(the “Net Settlement Amount”) will be distributed to all
Class Members who timely submit valid claims
(“Claimants”), based upon the following allocation
formula:
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The dollar amount payable to each member of the Class
will be calculated by taking the “Potential Gross
Individual Settlement Proceeds”, i.e., the “Net
Settlement Amount” (estimated to be slightly more
than $1,500,000) divided by the total number of weeks
worked by all members of the Class during the Class
Period, and then multiplied by the total number of
weeks worked by each individual member of the
Settlement Class.
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Settlement, § 7(a). A Claim Form, which will be mailed to
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Class Members with the Notice of Proposed Class Action
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Settlement and Fairness Hearing (“Notice”), will include
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for each Class Member the number of weeks actively worked
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during the Class Period and the Class Member’s estimated
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Settlement Amount. Ackermannn Decl., Doc. 31 at ¶ 52.
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For tax purposes, one-third (1/3) of each Settlement
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15
Award will be deemed wages and two-thirds (2/3) will be
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treated as penalties and interest. Settlement Awards will
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be subject to applicable tax withholding and reporting.
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Settlement, § 7(c).
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The formula relies upon objective evidence of the
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number of weeks worked during the Class Period. Class
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Members can review and confirm this information, and the
Claim Form permits Class Members to challenge the number
of weeks worked. Settlement, § 7(e).
C.
Distribution of Unclaimed Funds and Uncashed Checks.
If less than 60% of the Gross Settlement Amount is
claimed and distributed to all Claimants, then each
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1
Claimant’s Settlement Award will be proportionately
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increased, up to a maximum of 1.5 times their original
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Settlement Award, until the total individual Settlement
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Awards equals 60% of the Net Settlement Amount. If the
combined total of all Claimants’ Settlement Awards at 1.5
times the original amount is still less than 60% of the
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Gross Settlement Amount, the balance of the funds will be
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paid to a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, to be agreed
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upon by the parties and approved by the court.
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Settlement, § 6(a).
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D.
Scope of the Release.
The Settlement provides that all Class Members other
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than those who elect not to participate in the Settlement
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shall have released the “Released Parties” from the
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“Released Claims.” The Notice contains the following
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release:
For purposes of this Notice and the Settlement
Agreement, the “Released Claims” of the Settlement
Class are defined as: All claims, demands, rights,
liabilities, and causes of action, whether brought
directly, representatively, or in any capacity, that
were or could have been asserted in the Lawsuit based
upon the facts alleged therein, whether in tort,
contract, statute, rule, ordinance, order,
regulation, or otherwise, including state, federal,
and local laws, whether for economic damages, noneconomic damages, restitution, penalties, punitive
damages, wages, premium payments, liquidated damages,
attorneys’ fees, or any other type of recovery
thereon, arising out of any act, omission,
transaction, or event that occurred or is alleged to
have occurred up to the date of this Agreement.
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Claims specifically included in this release without
limitation are those for alleged failure to provide
meal or rest breaks, alleged failure to pay for all
hours worked based on the application of an
“automatic lunch deduction” (including claims for
unpaid overtime, whether known or unknown, arising
during the Class Period for the Class Members based
on the claims reasonably related to those alleged in
the Lawsuit), alleged failure to provide accurate
itemized wage statements, alleged failure to provide
timely pay upon termination, alleged unfair
competition by means of the foregoing, and any other
claims arising out of alleged failure to pay wages or
penalties or for any other claims asserted in the
Lawsuit. This release shall be in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any release previously executed by
any member of the Settlement Class.
With respect to the Released Claims, Plaintiffs and
the members of the Settlement Class stipulate and
agree that, upon the effective date of the
settlement, all of them shall be deemed to have, and
by operation of the Final Judgment shall have,
expressly waived and relinquished, to the fullest
extent permitted by law, the provisions, rights and
benefits of Section 1542 of the California Civil
Code, or any other similar provision under federal or
state law that purports to limit the scope of a
general release. Section 1542 provides:
A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS
WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO
EXIST IN HIS OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF
EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM OR
HER MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR HER
SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR.
Settlement Class Members shall fully and finally
release and discharge Ferguson, and each of their
past, present, or future officers, directors, owners,
shareholders, employees, agents, principals, heirs,
representatives, accountants, auditors, attorneys,
consultants, insurers, and reinsurers, and their
respective successors and predecessors in interest,
subsidiaries, affiliates, parents, and each of their
company-sponsored employee benefit plans, and all of
their respective officers, directors, employees,
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administrators, fiduciaries, trustees, and agents
(“Released Parties”), from the Released Claims.
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See Notice, Doc. 30, Ex. 1-A, § 5.
E.
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Any Class Member who so wishes may object or elect
not to participate in the Settlement. The Notice fully
explains the objection and opt-out procedures. See
Notice, § 3.
F.
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Objections and Opt-Out Process
Class Representative Payments; Class Counsel
Attorneys’ Fees Payment and Class Counsel Litigation
Expenses Payment.
The settlement also permits Plaintiffs and their
counsel to seek by separate motion:
• payments to Plaintiffs, in addition to their
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Settlement Awards, of $11,250 each in
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compensation of their services as Class
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Representatives; and
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• payments to Class Counsel of no more than 30% of
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the Gross Settlement Amount, or $675,000, for
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their reasonable attorneys’ fees, as well as
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litigation costs, up to $10,000.
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See Settlement, § 6(b), (d).
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III. DISCUSSION
A.
Certification of a Class for Settlement
As the Class has only been conditionally certified,
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final certification is required and is governed by
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23.
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1.
Rule 23(a) Requirements.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) states in
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pertinent part that “[o]ne or more members of a class may
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sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
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all.” As a threshold matter, in order to certify a class,
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a court must be satisfied that
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(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable (the "numerosity"
requirement); (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class (the "commonality"
requirement); (3) the claims or defenses of
representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class (the "typicality"
requirement); and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class (the "adequacy of representation"
requirement).
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In re Intel Secs. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 112 (N.D. Cal.
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1981)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)).
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a.
Numerosity.
Here, the proposed class is comprised of all
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individuals who have been employed by Defendant in
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California as truck drivers from July 17, 2005 to January
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25, 2011, excluding new truck drivers from November 3,
2010 and 46 drivers who previously signed severance
release agreements prior to the filing of this lawsuit.
There are approximately 548 Class Members. Courts have
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routinely found the numerosity requirement satisfied when
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the class comprises 40 or more members. Ansari v. New
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York Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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Numerosity is also satisfied where joining all Class
members would serve only to impose financial burdens and
clog the court’s docket. In re Intel Secs. Litig., 89
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F.R.D. at 112. Here, the joinder of approximately 548
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individual former employees would only further clog this
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court’s already overburdened docket.
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b.
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Common Questions of Fact and Law.
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Commonality exists when there is either a common
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legal issue stemming from divergent factual predicates or
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a common nucleus of facts resulting in divergent legal
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theories. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019
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(9th Cir. 1998). It does not require that all questions
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of law or fact be common to every single member of the
class. To satisfy the commonality requirement, plaintiffs
need only point to a single issue common to the class.
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Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir.
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2007); Slaven v. BP Am., Inc., 190 F.R.D. 649, 655 (C.D.
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Cal. 2000).
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Here, Class Members share the following legal and
factual questions:
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•
Whether Defendant automatically deducted thirty
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minutes worth of working time on the basis of
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the unverified assumption that truck drivers
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always took a half-hour, off-duty meal break and
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in lieu of keeping contemporaneous or accurate
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meal break records;
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•
Whether Defendant failed to compensate truck
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drivers for missed or untimely meal breaks with
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an extra hour of premium pay;
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•
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systematic daily method of relieving Class
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Members of their duties for meal breaks;
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•
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Whether Defendant failed to pay former employees
all wages due at termination; and
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Whether Defendant failed to implement a
•
Whether the above practices violate the Labor
Code and Wage Orders.
Every Class Member was paid under the same pay
practices as every other class members. The commonality
requirement is satisfied.
c.
Typicality.
Typicality is satisfied if the representatives’
claims arise from the same course of conduct as the class
claims and are based on the same legal theory. See, e.g.,
Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1463 (9th Cir.
1995)(claims are typical where named plaintiffs have the
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same claims as other members of the class and are not
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subject to unique defenses). Because every class member
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was paid under the same pay practices as every other
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class member, the Class Representatives’ claims are
typical of those of the other Class Members. The
typicality requirement is satisfied.
d.
Fair and Adequate Representation.
The final Rule 23(a) requirement is that the class
representative fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “The
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proper resolution of this issue requires that two
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questions be addressed: (a) do the named plaintiffs and
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their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other
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class members and (b) will the named plaintiffs and their
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counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the
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class?” In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454,
462 (9th Cir. 2000).
Both requirements are satisfied here. Class counsel,
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Craig J. Ackermann, Esq., of Ackermann & Tilajef, P.C.,
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and Melissa M. Harnett, Esq., of Wassermand, Comden,
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Casselmand & Esensten, L.L.P, have significant experience
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litigating class actions, serving as class counsel,
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representing plaintiffs in wage and hour litigation. See
Harnett Decl., Doc. 31, ¶¶13-32. Ackermann Decl., Doc.
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30, ¶¶70-71. Class counsel have no conflicts with the
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class, Harnett Decl., Doc. 31, ¶¶ 5, 7, and have devoted
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a significant amount of time to the lawsuit, Ackermann
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Decl., Doc. 30, ¶ 72; Harnett Decl., Doc. 31, ¶ 11.
In addition, the Class Representatives’ interests are
completely aligned with those of the class. The Class
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Representatives’ interest is in maximizing their
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recovery. Although they will each receive an additional
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$11,250, this amount is reasonable compensation for their
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time and expense they devoted to pursuing this case. See
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Harnett Decl., Doc. 31, ¶ 9.
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2.
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Once the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a) are
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satisfied, a class may be certified only if the class
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action satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(b)(1),
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Certification of a Class under Rule 23(b)(3).
(b)(2), and/or (b)(3). Here, the parties agree for
purposes of the Settlement only that certification of the
Class is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) because
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“questions of law or fact common to the members of the
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class predominate over any questions affecting only
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individual members, and ... a class action is superior to
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other available methods for the fair adjudication of the
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controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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B.
The Terms of the Preliminary Approval Have Been
Satisfied.
The January 25, 2011 preliminary approval of the
Settlement and conditional certification of the Class
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ordered that the Class be sent notice of the Settlement,
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approved the form of notice proposed by the parties,
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approved the forms of claims for settlement share and
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election not to participate, and set the hearing for
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final approval. Doc. 35. The Settlement Administrator,
Simpluris, has carried out the preliminary approval order
to the extent possible. See generally Bui Declaration,
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Doc. 40. On February 14, 2011, Class Notice Packets were
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mailed to class members to all five hundred and fifty-two
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(552) Class Members. Id. at ¶ 7. On March 11, 2011, the
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Settlement Administrator mailed a reminder to class
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members who had not yet submitted a Claim form or an Opt
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Out and to do so by the March 21, 2011 deadline. Bui
Decl., Doc. 40, at ¶ 8. By April 21, 2011, one hundred
and sixteen (116) Class Notice Packets were returned by
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U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable. Id. at ¶ 12. The
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Settlement Administrator remailed two-hundred and ninety-
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two (292) Class Notice Packets to either a newfound
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address, a forwarding address provided by the U.S. Postal
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Service, or to an address at the request of the Class
Member. Id. Despite the Settlement Administrator’s best
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efforts, fifty-nine (59) Class Notice Packets remain
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undeliverable because the administrator was unable to
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find a deliverable address. Id.
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Despite these difficulties, three-hundred and fortytwo (342)(61.96%) claim forms were received and accepted
by the Settlement Administrator. Id. at ¶ 14. As of April
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22, 2011, the Settlement Administrator has received one
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(1) deficient Claim Form because they did not sign their
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form; two (2) untimely Claim Forms; and fifteen (15) opt-
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outs. Id. at ¶¶ 17-19. Additionally, no class member has
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submitted to an objection to the Settlement. Id. at ¶ 21.
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C.
Approval of the Settlement.
“The court must approve any settlement ... of the
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claims ... of a certified class.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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23(e)(1)(A). A settlement may be approved only after a
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hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C). Such approval is
required to make sure that any settlement reached is
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consistent with plaintiffs’ fiduciary obligations to the
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class. See Ficalora v. Lockheed Cal. Co., 751 F.2d 995,
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996 (9th Cir. 1985). The court also serves as guardian
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for the absent class members who will be bound by the
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settlement, and therefore must independently determine
the fairness of any settlement. Id. However, the district
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court’s role in intruding upon what is otherwise a
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private consensual agreement is limited to the extent
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necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement
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is not the product of fraud or collusion between the
negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a
whole, is fair, reasonable, and adequate to all
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concerned. FDIC v. Alshuler, 92 F.3d 1503, 1506 (9th Cir.
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1996). Therefore, the settlement hearing is not to be
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turned into a trial or rehearsal for trial on the merits.
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Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Com., 688 F.2d 615,
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625 (9th Cir. 1982). Ultimately, the district court's
determination is nothing more than an amalgam of delicate
balancing, gross approximations, and rough justice. Id.
In determining whether a settlement agreement is
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fair, adequate, and reasonable to all concerned, a
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district court may consider some or all of the following
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factors: (1) the strength of the Plaintiff's case (2) the
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risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
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litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action
status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in
settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed; (6)
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the stage of the proceedings; (7) the views and
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experience of counsel; (8) any opposition by class
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members; (9) the presence of a governmental participant.
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Linney v. Cellular Alaska Pshp., 151 F.3d 1234,1242 (9th
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Cir. 1998). This list of factors is not exclusive and the
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court may balance and weigh different factors depending
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on the circumstances of each case. Torrisi v. Tucson
Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir. 1993).
1.
The Relative Strengths of the Parties’ Cases
Supports Approval of the Settlement.
If the litigation proceeds, Plaintiffs would face
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significant risks. Ackermann Decl. at ¶¶ 66-9. For
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example, the primary issue in this case revolves around
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the provision of meal periods. However, the meaning of an
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employer’s obligation to provide meal periods under
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California law is currently before the California Supreme
Court (see Brinkley v. Public Storage, Inc., 198 P.3d
1087, 87 Cal.Rptr 674 (Jan. 14, 2009) (review granted)
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and Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 196 P.3d
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216, 85 Cal.Rptr 388 (Oct. 22, 2008)(review granted). A
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defense ruling in Brinker could impair Plaintiff’s
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ability to proceed on these causes of action.
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Plaintiffs also face the risk that the class may not
be certified. The issue of whether missed meal break
claims for truckers may be certified is currently pending
before the California Supreme Court in Brinker. If the
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Court adopts the Brinker standard, then class
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certification of Plaintiffs’ missed meal break claims
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would be more difficult. See Brown v. Federal Express,
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249 FRD 580, 585 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (denying class
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certification of employees alleging employers denied them
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meal breaks and rest breaks, and failed to pay additional
one hour of pay to employees who missed meal breaks.)
In light of these risks, the significant recovery is
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fair, reasonable, and adequate, and is in the best
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interest of the Settlement Class in light of all known
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facts and circumstances.
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2.
The Settlement Amount is Fair and Reasonable.
The Settlement provides for a payment of up to
$2,250,000 by Defendants. The average settlement share is
$2,781.93 per employee. Ackermann Decl., Doc. 44 at ¶ 71.
17
All Settlement shares will be distributed to each
18
Claimant on the basis of the number of weeks actively
19
worked by each Claimant during the Class Period. Harnett
20
Decl., Doc. 43 at ¶ 60.
21
22
23
24
25
The Class Representative Payments and the Class
Counsel Attorneys’ Fees Payment are appropriate, and are
separately approved below.
Finally, the expected Settlement Administrator’s fees
26
and costs of approximately $18,000 are reasonable in
27
light of the amount of work achieved. Id. at ¶ 64.
28
19
1
3.
The Release is Appropriate.
2
3
As part of the Settlement, Class Members release the
4
following claims: “all wage and hour related claims,
5
demands, rights, liabilities and causes of action,
6
whether brought directly, representatively, derivatively,
7
or in any capacity that were or could have been asserted
8
9
10
11
in the Lawsuit based upon the facts alleged therein”
“arising out of any act, omission, transaction, or event
affecting wage and hour related rights that occurred or
12
is alleged to have occurred up to the date of this
13
Agreement.” See Ackermann Decl., Doc. 44 at Exhibit A.
14
These released claims appropriately track the breadth of
15
Plaintiffs’ allegations in the action and the settlement
16
does not release unrelated claims that class members may
17
have against defendants.
18
19
20
21
22
4.
The Settlement Was the Product of Informed,
Arm’s Length Negotiations.
The Settlement was reached after informed, arm’s
length negotiations between the parties. See Ackermann
23
Decl., Doc. 44 at ¶¶ 63-4. Plaintiffs’ counsel had access
24
to documents including all of the Defendant’s meal and
25
rest period policies, their database of timekeeping
26
entries, and names and addresses of members of the class.
27
28
Id. at ¶¶ 27, 31. Plaintiffs’ counsel reviewed and
20
1
analyzed thousands of pages of material. Id. at ¶ 31.
2
Counsel was also informed by numerous interviews with
3
witnesses to the allegations. Id. at ¶ 32, 34. In
4
addition, there is no evidence of collusion.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
5.
Reaction of the Class Members.
“The reactions of the members of a class to a
proposed settlement is a proper consideration for the
trial court.” Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, 266 F.R.D.
482 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing 5 Moore’s Fed. Practice §
23.85[2][d]). Class Representative’s opinion of the
13
settlement are especially important as “[t]he
14
representatives' views may be important in shaping the
15
agreement and will usually be presented at the fairness
16
hearing; they may be entitled to special weight because
17
the representatives may have a better understanding of
18
19
20
21
the case than most members of the class.” Manual for
Complex Litigation, Third, § 30.44 (1995).
Here, the Class Representatives strongly support the
22
settlement. See Declaration of Lee Bond, Doc. 45, at ¶ 8-
23
9; Declaration of James Burkhart, Doc. 46, at ¶ 8-9. Each
24
of these Class Representatives and their attorneys have
25
extensive understanding of the merits of this settlement
26
27
28
having participated extensively in the strategy,
formulation, filing, litigation and negotiation process.
21
1
See Bond Decl. at ¶ 3-8; Burkhart Decl. at ¶ 3-8. There
2
have been no objections to the Settlement by Class
3
Members or any other members of the public.
4
The settlement is fair and reasonable.
5
6
D.
Class Counsel’s Requested Fees and Costs.
7
By separate motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel also requests
8
approval of payments for attorneys’ fees and costs in the
9
10
11
12
amount of $675,000 and $10,000, respectively.
Courts
have long recognized the “common fund” or “common
benefit” doctrine, under which attorneys who create a
13
common fund or benefit for a group of persons may be
14
awarded their fees and costs to be paid out of the fund.
15
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir.
16
1998). “[A] lawyer who recovers a common fund for the
17
benefit of persons other than himself or his client is
18
19
20
21
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as
a whole.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 972 (9th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S.
22
472, 478 (1980)). Awarding a percentage of the common
23
fund is particularly appropriate “‘when each member of a
24
certified class has an undisputed and mathematically
25
ascertainable claim to part of a lump-sum judgment
26
27
28
recovered on his behalf.’” Id. (quoting Boeing Co., 444
U.S. at 478-79).
22
1
Here, where the Settlement requires lump sum
2
allocations to each Settlement Class and applies
3
distribution formulas pursuant to which each Class Member
4
5
6
7
8
who submits a valid claim will receive a mathematically
ascertainable payment, application of the percentage of
common fund doctrine is appropriate.
The typical range of acceptable attorneys' fees in
9
the Ninth Circuit is 20% to 33 1/3% of the total
10
settlement value, with 25% considered the benchmark.
11
Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 2000);
12
13
14
15
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1029; Staton, 327 F.3d at 952.
However, the exact percentage varies depending on the
facts of the case, and in “most common fund cases, the
16
award exceeds that benchmark.” Knight v. Red Door Salons,
17
Inc., 2009 WL 248367 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also In re
18
Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1377-78 (N.D.
19
Cal. 1989) (“nearly all common fund awards range around
20
30%”).
21
22
23
24
Class Counsel seeks an attorney’s fee award of
$675,000, or thirty percent (30%), of the Maximum
Settlement Value. When assessing whether the percentage
25
requested is reasonable, courts look to factors such as:
26
(a) the results achieved; (b) the risk of litigation; (c)
27
the skill required, (d) the quality of work; (e) the
28
23
1
contingent nature of the fee and the financial burden;
2
and (f) the awards made in similar cases. Vizcaino v.
3
Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir.2002); Six
4
5
6
Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301
(9th Cir.1990).
7
1.
8
The individual claims in this case concerned
9
10
11
12
The Results Achieved.
defendants’ failure to pay class members for missed, onduty and untimely meal periods; unpaid wages on days when
no off-duty meal break was taken; failure to pay all
13
wages due upon termination or separation of employment;
14
and failure to provide proper rest and meal periods. Such
15
claims would not ordinarily produce large recoveries per
16
claimant. Here, the recovery of up to $2,250,000 will
17
provide the 383 claimants with an average recover of
18
19
20
approximately $2,781.93 per claimant. Ackermann Decl.,
Doc. 44 at ¶ 71.
21
2.
22
There was some risk in pursuing this case. One of the
23
24
25
26
27
28
The Risks Involved.
primary issues involved in this case has to do with the
timely provision of rest and meal periods – an issue that
is currently before the California Supreme Court in the
Brinker and Brinkley cases. It is unknown what the
outcome of the Supreme Court’s decision will be an
24
1
adverse decision that could be prejudicial to the
2
recovery in this case.
3
4
5
6
7
The Defendants also posed serious defenses to the
claims. And defense counsel demonstrated that they were
competent in defense of their client.
Plaintiffs’ Counsel invested $587,315, in lodestar
8
time and $10,000 in costs in litigating this case with no
9
guarantee of recovery.
10
11
12
3.
The Skill Required.
This is a garden-variety wage and hour class action,
13
focused primarily on meal breaks, which required more
14
accounting analysis than actual legal resources.
15
case required locating and contacting over 500 members of
16
the class, communicating with over 250 class members to
17
ensure they received appropriate forms, obtaining new
18
19
20
21
The
contact information for some members of the class,
directing the work of the settlement administrator and
litigating cutting-edge legal theories surrounding rest
22
and meal periods. Harnett Decl., Doc. 43 at ¶ 87. This is
23
entirely administrative work that could be accomplished
24
by paralegals. Class Counsel has extensive experience in
25
class action wage and hour litigation of this nature. See
26
id. at ¶¶ 5-28; Ackermann Decl., Doc. 44 at ¶¶ 4-11.
27
28
25
1
4.
2
This case was conducted on a contingent fee basis
3
4
The Contingent Nature of the Fee and the
Financial Burden.
against a well-represented Defendant. Counsel has
5
received no money from plaintiffs or any other source to
6
litigate this case. See Ackermann Decl. Doc., 43 at ¶¶
7
78-89. The plaintiffs are all low-wage workers who could
8
not meaningfully contribute to any such expenses.
9
10
11
Plaintiffs’ counsel accepted this risk. Class Counsel was
effective in effectuating a $2,250,000 settlement.
12
5.
13
The requested fee is comparable to similar wage and
14
15
hour cases litigated in the Central Valley. For example,
this court has awarded the following fees:
16
17
•
•
20
21
33.3% in Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, 266 F.R.D.
482 (E.D. Cal. 2010), Case No. 1:07-cv-00227 OWW DLB;
18
19
Awards in Similar Cases.
30% in Vasquez v. Aartman, E.D. Cal. Case No. 1:02CV05624 AWI LJO;
•
22
31.25% in Baganha v. California Milk Transport, Case
No. 1:01-cv-05729 AWI LJO;
23
24
•
33.3% in Randall Willis et al. v. Cal Western
25
Transport, and Earl Baron et al. v. Cal Western
26
Transport, Coordinated Case No. 1:00-cv-05695 AWI
27
LJO;
28
26
1
•
2
3
4
5
33.3% in Benitez, et al. v. Jeff Wilbur and Lisa
Wilbur, Case No. 1:08-cv-01122 LJO GSA;
•
33.3% in Chavez, at al. v. Petrissans, Case No. 1:08cv-00122 LJO GSA.
6
Based on the overall success, skill employed, legal
7
risks associated with Plaintiffs’ claims, the financial
8
risks borne by Plaintiffs’ Counsel, and similar awards
9
made in similar cases, under a percentage-of-fund
10
approach the requested attorney’s fee award of 30% of the
11
12
13
total recovery (or $675,000) is reasonable under the
circumstances.
14
6.
15
Calculation of the lodestar amount may be used as a
16
17
18
19
20
Lodestar Cross-Check.
cross-check to assess the reasonableness of the
percentage award. Fernandez v. Victoria Secret Stores,
2008 WL 8150856 (C.D. Cal 2008); Vizacaino v. Microsoft
Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2002). First, the
21
court must calculate the lodestar amount by multiplying
22
the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
23
by a reasonable hourly rate. Cunningham v. County of Los
24
Angeles, 879 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1988). Next, the court
25
26
27
28
may increase or reduce the presumptively reasonable
lodestar fee. Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d 537, 539 (9th
Cir. 1998) (citing City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S.
27
1
561 (1986)).
2
The billing records of Class Counsel Wasserman,
3
Comden, Casselman & Esensten, L.L.P and Ackermann &
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Tilajef, P.C. reveal the following hours billed by
thirteen lawyers and three paralegals:
NAME
Wasserman, Comden, Casselman &
Esensten, L.L.P.
Steven Wasserman, partner
Melissa Harnett, partner
Cathy Garcia, associate
Jesse Levin, associate
Scarlett, associate
Jordan Esensten, associate
Alan Juavan, paralegal
Andreas Nielsen, paralegal
Dale Gordon, paralegal
Susan House,
Ackermann & Tilajef, P.C.
Craig Ackermann, partner
Tatiana Hernandez, associate
Barry Goldstein, consultant
Rachelle Tsarovsky, associate
Charlie Stein, associate
Pablo Orozco, associate
Devin Coyle, associate
Akiva Feinstein, legal assistant
Rosie Salinas, paralegal
Jonathan Melmed
Total
HOURS
RATE
TOTAL
1.6
109.2
52.4
229.2
21.5
8
181.4
90.9
78.6
9
$750
$670
$600
$290
$500
$290
$180
$180
$180
$180
$1,200.00
$73,164.00
$31,440.00
$66,468.00
$10,750.00
$2,320.00
$32,652.00
$16,362.00
$14,148.00
$1,620.00
123.5
355.12
16.2
70.9
49.49
236.33
7.7
152.6
96.3
40
1929.94
$550
$325
$725
$325
$225
$225
$225
$175
$150
$150
$67,925
$115,414
$17,617.50
$23,043.50
$11,135.25
$53,174.25
$1,732.50
$26,705
$14,445
$6,000
$587,316.00
20
See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
21
Attorney’s Fees and Costs, Doc. 49 at 11.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
The number of hours billed in this case will not be
approved. Although considerable discovery took place and
preparation for mediation was required, similar cases
have reached settlement with fewer than 500 billed hours
of attorney time.
See Alvarado v. Nederend, 1:08-cv-
01099 OWW DLB (wage and hour class action involving
28
1
unsettled issues related to meal and rest breaks with
2
approximately 150 class members reached settlement after
3
Class Counsel expended fewer than 350 hours). No two
4
5
6
7
cases have the exact same litigation requirements, but
nothing in the record justifies more than five times the
effort expended in Alvarado.
Likewise, the hourly rates presented by counsel are
8
9
higher than normally permitted under federal law. 1
10
Prevailing hourly rates in the Eastern District of
11
California are in the $400/hour range. One more general
12
13
14
15
way to examine the reasonableness of hourly rates is to
compare them to the Laffey Matrix, a widely recognized
compilation of attorney and paralegal rate data used in
16
the District of Columbia, frequently used in fee awards
17
cases. The Laffey Matrix reflects a paralegal rate of
18
$161, a 1-3 year lawyer rate of $294, a 4-7 year lawyer
19
rate of $361, an 8-10 year lawyer rate of $522, an 11-19
20
year lawyer rate of $589, and a 20+ year lawyer rate of
21
22
23
24
$709. The district court in Fernandex v. Victoria Secret
Stores, LLC
2008 WL 8150856, *15 increased the Laffey
Matrix amounts by the difference between the cost of
25
1
26
27
28
These hourly rates were apparently approved without a written
decision in Padilla et al v. Young’s Market Company, LLC, 2:09-cv08730 DMG RC (C.D. Cal. 2010) and separately in state court in
Williams v. BioTab Nutraceuticals, Inc., et al., LASC Case No. BC
414808 (2011). These cases have no precedential value, especially
in a different District, where prevailing rates are lower.
29
1
living increase provided to Judicial branch employees in
2
the Washington D.C. area and that provided to employees
3
in the Los Angeles area. That difference is 2.94 percent
4
5
6
7
as of the 2011 pay tables. Taking the top bracket as an
example, the adjusted Laffey Rate for a 20+ year lawyer
is $729 ($709 * 1.0294). Mr. Wasserman’s rate of $750 is
8
slightly higher than the adjudged Laffey Matrix for an
9
attorney with 20+ years in practice. The $670 billed by
10
Ms. Harnett is approximately 10 percent higher than the
11
11-19 year attorney rate of $606. The other employees of
12
13
14
15
Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Esensten, L.L.P. appear to
be billing at similarly inflated rates. The hourly rates
billed by Ackermann & Tilajef, P.C. seem more reasonable,
16
although the $175/hour rate for a “legal assistant” is
17
unjustified.
18
Because the lodestar is being used here as a cross-
19
check, the court may use a “rough calculation of the
20
lodestar,” Fernandez, 2008 WL 8150856, it is appropriate
21
22
23
24
to roughly haircut the lodestar. The hourly rates of the
Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Esensten, L.L.P. are least
10% over the appropriate Laffey Matrix levels, and are
25
reasonably subject to a 10% haircut on that basis.
26
Ackermann & Tilajef, P.C.’s rate billed for their legal
27
assistant will be lowered to $100. This results in the
28
30
1
following recalculation of the lodestar.
2
NAME
3
Wasserman, Comden, Casselman
& Esensten, L.L.P.
Steven Wasserman, partner
Melissa Harnett, partner
Cathy Garcia, associate
Jesse Levin, associate
Scarlett, associate
Jordan Esensten, associate
Alan Juavan, paralegal
Andreas Nielsen, paralegal
Dale Gordon, paralegal
Susan House,
Ackermann & Tilajef, P.C.
Craig Ackermann, partner
Tatiana Hernandez, associate
Barry Goldstein, consultant
Rachelle Tsarovsky,
associate
Charlie Stein, associate
Pablo Orozco, associate
Devin Coyle, associate
Akiva Feinstein, legal
assistant
Rosie Salinas, paralegal
Jonathan Melmed
Total
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
HOURS
RATE
ADJUSTED
RATE
TOTAL
1.6
109.2
52.4
229.2
21.5
8
181.4
90.9
78.6
9
$750
$670
$600
$290
$500
$290
$180
$180
$180
$180
$675
$603
$540
$261
$450
$261
$162
$162
$162
$162
$1,080
$65,848
$28,296
$59,821
$9,675
$2,088
$29,387
$14,726
$12,733
$1,458
123.5
355.12
16.2
70.9
$550
$325
$725
$325
$550
$325
$725
$325
$67,925
$115,414
$17,617.50
$23,043.50
49.49
236.33
7.7
152.6
$225
$225
$225
$175
$225
$225
$225
$100
$11,135.25
$53,174.25
$1,732.50
$15,260.00
96.3
40
1929.9
4
$150
$150
$150
$150
$14,445.00
$6,000.00
$550,859.00
17
18
The lodestar with adjusted hourly rates is
19
$550,859.00. In addition, the hours billed are excessive
20
and are reasonably subject to a 30% haircut, resulting in
21
22
23
24
a total lodestar of $385,601.00
The amount requested by Class Counsel of $675,000.00
is greater than its lodestar amount of $385,601.00.
25
However, adjustments to increase or decrease the lodestar
26
amount are sometimes appropriate to justify use of a
27
“lodestar multiplier.” Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 803
28
31
1
F.2d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Fischel v.
2
Equitable Life Assur. Society of U.S., 307 F.3d 997, 1008
3
(9th Cir. 2002). “It is an established practice in the
4
5
6
7
private legal market to reward attorneys for taking the
risk of non-payment by paying them a premium over their
normal hourly rates for winning contingency cases.”
8
Fischel, 307 F.3d at 1008 (citing In re Washington Public
9
Power Supply System Securities Litig. v. Continental Ins.
10
Co., 19 F.3d 1291, 1299 (9th Cir. 2002)). Generally, a
11
district court has discretion to apply a multiplier to
12
13
14
15
the attorney’s fees calculation to compensate for the
risk of nonpayment. Fischel, 307 F.3d at 1008; see also
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum
16
Products Antitrust Litig. v. Exxon Corp., 109 F.3d 602
17
(9th Cir. 1997).
18
The “lodestar multiplier” is calculated by dividing
19
the percentage fee award by the lodestar calculation.
20
Fischel, 307 F.3d at 1008. Here, the multiplier of 1.75
21
22
23
24
is calculated by dividing $675,000.00 by $385,601.00. To
determine whether the lodestar multiplier is reasonable
the following factors may be considered: (1) the amount
25
involved and the results obtained, (2) the novelty and
26
difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill
27
requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the
28
32
1
preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
2
acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6)
3
whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time
4
5
6
7
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances,
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys,
8
(10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case, (11) the nature
9
and length of the professional relationship with the
10
client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Id. (citing
11
Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 6 (9th Cir.
12
13
14
15
1975)).
First, Class Counsel achieved a good result and
generated a significant benefit for the class amounting
16
to the Maximum Settlement Amount of $2,250,000 for the
17
benefit of a class of approximately 553 members. Based on
18
the claims rate, the 342 Class Members who submitted
19
claims will receive $952,018.56 in the aggregate, an
20
average of $2,783.68. See Bui Decl., Doc. 40.
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Second, Plaintiff’s meal break claims presented
arguable questions for Class Counsel because California’s
meal break law is currently in flux with Brinker
currently pending before the California Supreme Court.
Third, Class Counsel competently performed. Class
Counsel avoided protracted litigation by conducting
33
1
significant investigation of the class claims, and
2
efficiently communicating and exchanging information with
3
Defense counsel so that the parties could successfully
4
5
6
7
mediate the case. In preparation for this case, Class
Counsel investigated the potential claims and class
members; comprehensively reviewed thousands of pages of
8
documents; interviewed a number of current and former
9
drivers of the Defendant; and deposed Defendant’s
10
corporate representative about a number of important
11
topics. See Ackermann Decl., Doc. 44 at ¶ 36; Harnett
12
13
14
15
Decl., Doc. 43 at ¶ 55.
Lastly, Class Counsel undertook considerable
financial risks in this litigation by accepting this case
16
on a contingency basis. Harnett Decl., Doc. 43 at ¶ 92.
17
There was no guarantee they would recoup their fees or
18
costs. Id. Class Counsel has not received any payment for
19
their time or their expenses, which they began incurring
20
over two years ago. Id. Additionally, Class Counsel had
21
22
23
24
to forego other work in order to maintain this case. Id.
Based on the overall success, the skill with which
the case was prosecuted, the substantial legal risks
25
associated with Plaintiffs’ claims, and the financial
26
risks borne by Plaintiffs’ Counsel, Plaintiff’s request
27
for a multiplier of 1.75 of its lodestar is reasonable.
28
34
1
See, e.g. Steiner v. Am. Broadcasting Co., Inc., 248 Fed.
2
Appx. 780, 783 (9th Cir. 2007)(approving multiplier of
3
6.85 and citing cases with comparable or higher
4
5
6
7
multipliers); Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1051 (finding no
abuse of discretion in awarding a multiplier of 3.65).
E.
8
9
10
11
12
Class Counsel’s Request for Costs.
Class Counsel incurred out-of-pocket costs totaling
approximately $11,364.46. The bulk of the incurred costs
included Settlement Administrator fees for notice costs,
payment to court reporters for depositions, mediation
13
costs, legal research, and in-house copies of documents.
14
See Acerkmen Decl., Doc. 44 at Exhibit 13. Such costs are
15
routinely reimbursed in these types of cases. See, In re
16
United Energy Corp. Sec. Litig., 1989 WL 73211, at *6
17
(C.D. Cal. 1989) (quoting Newberg, Attorney Fee Awards, §
18
19
20
21
2.19 (1987)); see e.g. Vasquez, 266 F.R.D. at 493 (Class
Counsel litigation expenses payment of approximately
$9,000 was fair and reasonable in similar case).
Here, the actual costs incurred are greater than the
22
23
estimated $10,000, which was included in the Class Notice
24
and to which no Class Member objected. Plaintiff’s
25
request, which is capped at $10,000 is reasonable.
26
27
28
F.
Class Representative Enhancement.
Pursuant to the Settlement, Plaintiff seeks an
35
1
enhancement in the amount of $7,500 to the named
2
Plaintiffs Lee Bond and Richard James Burkhart. Ackermann
3
Decl., Doc. 44 at ¶ 47. This payment is intended to
4
5
6
7
8
9
recognize the time and efforts that the named Plaintiffs
spent on behalf of the Class Members. Id.; see also
Declarations of Lee Bond and Richard James Burkhart,
Docs. 45-46.
“Courts routinely approve incentive awards to
10
compensate named plaintiffs for the services they provide
11
and the risks they incurred during the course of the
12
13
14
15
class action litigation.” Ingram v. The Coca-Cola
Company, 200 F.R.D. 685, 694 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). In Coca-Cola, the
16
Court approved service awards of $300,000 to each named
17
plaintiff in recognition of the services they provided to
18
the class by responding to discovery, participating in
19
the mediation process, and taking the risk of stepping
20
forward on behalf of the class. Coca-Cola, 200 F.R.D. at
21
22
23
24
694; see, e.g., Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F.
Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (approving $50,000
participation award to plaintiffs); Glass v. UBS
25
Financial Services, Inc., 2007 WL 221862, at *17 (N.D.
26
Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) (approving $25,000 enhancement to
27
each named plaintiff).
28
36
1
In this case, among other things, the named
2
Plaintiffs: (1) provided significant assistance to Class
3
Counsel; (2) endured lengthy interviews; (3) provided
4
5
6
7
written declarations; (4) searched for and produced
relevant documents; (5) and prepared and evaluated the
case for mediation, which was a full day session
8
requiring very careful consideration, evaluation and
9
approval of the terms of the Settlement Agreement on
10
behalf of the Class. See Declarations of Lee Bond and
11
Richard James Burkhart, Docs. 45-46. Moreover, as with
12
13
14
15
any plaintiff who files a civil action, Plaintiffs
undertook the financial risk that, in the event of a
judgment in favor of Defendant in this action, they could
16
have been personally responsible for the costs awarded in
17
favor of the Defendant. See, e.g., Whiteway v. Fed Ex
18
Kinkos Office & Print Services, Inc., No. C 08-2320 SBA,
19
2007 WL 4531783, at **2-4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2007).
20
21
G.
Claims Administrator Fee.
22
The Class Notice provided that the Claims
23
Administrator would receive a few of up to $18,000
24
Plaintiffs request that the full amount of $18,000 be
25
approved as Simpluris’ fee. Doc. 41. The Declaration of
26
27
28
Michael Bui, a Case Manager at Simpluris, explains the
tasks undertaken by Simpluris to accomplish notify the
37
1
Class of the settlement and administer its terms. Mr. Bui
2
estimates administration costs of $18,000, taking into
3
consideration both costs incurred to date and those
4
5
6
7
anticipated to be incurred in the future. This request is
substantially lower than previous administrator fees
awarded in this District. See Vasquez, 266 F.R.D.at 483-
8
84 ($25,000 administrator fee awarded in wage and hour
9
case involving 177 potential class members).
10
IV. CONCLUSION
11
12
For all the reasons set forth above:
13
(1) The Settlement Class is CERTIFIED;
14
(2) The Class Settlement is APPROVED;
15
(3) The payment of $675,000 in attorney’s fees (30%
16
of the Maximum Settlement Value and $10,000 in costs is
17
APPROVED;
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
(4) The payment of
$11,250 enhancement to each of
the named Plaintiffs Lee Bond and Richard James Burkhart
is APPROVED;
(5) The payment of $18,000 to the Settlement
Administrator is APPROVED;
Plaintiffs shall submit a form of order consistent
with this decision within five (5) days following
electronic service.
27
28
38
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