Lynch v. Doe, et al

Filing 40

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS, Recommending That This Case be Dismissed, With Prejudice, for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted re 38 , signed by Magistrate Judge Gary S. Austin on 4/22/13. Referred to Judge Ishii. Objections, If Any, Due in Thirty Days. (Gonzalez, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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1:09-cv-02097-AWI-GSA-PC

ANTHONEY LYNCH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE BE
vs.
DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR
FAIILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON
WARDEN OF PLEASANT VALLEY STATE WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED
PRISON, et al.,
(Doc. 38.)
Defendants.

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE IN THIRTY
DAYS

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I.

BACKGROUND

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Anthoney Lynch (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

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pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On December 2, 2009,

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Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action. (Doc. 1.) On April 14, 2011, the Court

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dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend.

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October 12, 2011, Plaintiff and two co-plaintiffs, Sterling Thibodeaux and Willie Jones, filed

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the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 22.) On May 1, 2012, the Court severed the claims of the

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three plaintiffs and dismissed the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, with

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leave for the three plaintiffs to each file a Second Amended Complaint in their own cases.

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(Doc. 28.) Plaintiff now proceeds as the sole plaintiff in this action. On October 15, 2012,

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(Doc. 13.) On

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Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint, which is now before the Court for screening.

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(Doc. 38.)

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II.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a).

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The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

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legally Afrivolous or malicious,@ that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

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that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

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' 1915A(b)(1),(2). ANotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

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paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or

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appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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A complaint is required to contain Aa short and plain statement of the claim showing

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that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

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are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

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mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct.

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1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955

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(2007)). While a plaintiff=s allegations are taken as true, courts Aare not required to indulge

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unwarranted inferences,@ Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009)

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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual

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matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal 556 U.S.

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at 678. While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

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To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual allegations to

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state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969

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(9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility

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standard. Id.

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III.

SUMMARY OF SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

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Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at California State Prison-Los Angeles County in

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Lancaster, California. The events at issue in the Second Amended Complaint occurred at
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Pleasant Valley State Prison (PVSP) in Coalinga, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated

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there. Plaintiff names as defendants Gail Lewis (Warden, PVSP), Doe #1 (Assistant Warden,

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PVSP), Doe #2 (Chief Medical Officer, PVSP), Doe #3 (Regional Medical Director, PVSP),

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Doe #4 (Secretary of Corrections, PVSP), and the City of Coalinga.

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allegations follow.

Plaintiff factual

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Plaintiff was transferred to PVSP in March 2000. Defendants knew, sometime before

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his arrival, about the outbreak of the disease known as Valley Fever among inmates and staff at

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PVSP where the disease was prevalent, yet they continued to house inmates, including Plaintiff,

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without telling them they were being exposed to Valley Fever, and failed to monitor their

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health. Plaintiff was at PVSP for three years and his health was never monitored for Valley

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Fever. Plaintiff’s lack of knowledge that he was being exposed to Valley Fever impeded him

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from filing an inmate grievance or § 1983 complaint about these conditions of his confinement.

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Plaintiff contracted Valley Fever upon his arrival at PVSP. Due to the delay in his diagnosis

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and treatment, Plaintiff suffered multiple surgeries, unnecessary pain, mental suffering,

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headaches, joint pain, chest pain, loss of appetite, and months of hospitalization.

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Plaintiff requests monetary damages as relief.
IV.

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.

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42 U.S.C. ' 1983. ASection 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

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Constitution and laws.@ Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

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(internal quotations omitted). ATo the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

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deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal

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Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.@ Id.

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To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted

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under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the

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Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.

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2006). AA person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

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meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another=s affirmative acts,

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or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of

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which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). AThe

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requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal

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participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which

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the actors knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional

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injury.@ Id. at 743-44.

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A.

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Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Due Process

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“To establish a violation of substantive due process ..., a plaintiff is ordinarily required to prove

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that a challenged government action was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no

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substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Where a particular

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amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular

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sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive

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due process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff's claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d

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868, 874 (9th Cir.1996) (citations, internal quotations, and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117

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S.Ct. 1845 (1997); see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). In this case,

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the Eighth Amendment “provides [the] explicit textual source of constitutional protection ....“

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Patel, 103 F.3d at 874. Therefore, the Eighth Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause

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of the Fourteenth Amendment governs Plaintiff's claims.
Valley Fever Claim – Eighth Amendment

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B.

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AThe Eighth Amendment=s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects

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prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions

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of confinement.@ Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). A[W]hile
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conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they >must not involve

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the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.=@ Id. at 1045 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

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U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981)).

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Whether Plaintiff is claiming that the presence or prevalence of Valley Fever at PVSP

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constituted a danger to his health, that his medical needs were disregarded, or both, he must

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allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison officials knew of and disregarded a

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substantial risk of serious harm to him. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct.

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1970 (1994); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2009); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d

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1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004).

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In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that Defendants knew about the

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outbreak of Valley Fever at PVSP but continued to imprison inmates, including Plaintiff,

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without warning them or adequately monitoring their health. However, Plaintiff has not set

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forth sufficient factual matter to state a claim against any of the Defendants. The Second

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Amended Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations supporting a claim that any of the

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individual prison officials knowingly disregarded a substantial risk of harm to his health or

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safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Neither mere negligence, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

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106, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1977); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled

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on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc);

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Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005), nor the bare fact that Plaintiff

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contracted Valley Fever gives rise to a cognizable claim, Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060; and

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Plaintiff=s reliance upon legal conclusions does not support a plausible claim for relief, Iqbal,

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556 U.S. at 678.

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participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.

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2002) (emphasis added). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated any viable Eighth

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Amendment claims under section 1983.

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that any individual defendant personally

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C.

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Plaintiff alleges he was denied access to the courts under the First and Fourteenth

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Amendments because he was not warned he was being exposed to Valley Fever and therefore

Denial of Access to Courts

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was unable to utilize the prison grievance process or file a § 1983 complaint concerning his

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exposure.

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Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey,

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518 U.S. 343, 346, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2177 (1996); Phillips v. Hust , 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir.

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2009). The right of access to the courts is merely the right to bring to court a grievance the

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inmate wishes to present, and is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil

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rights actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. To bring a claim, the plaintiff must have suffered an

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actual injury by being shut out of court. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415, 122 S.Ct.

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2179, 2185-87 (2002); Lewis at 351; Phillips, 588 F.3d at 655.

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Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for

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denial of access to the courts upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. Plaintiff

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does not allege facts showing that he suffered an actual injury by being shut out of court.

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Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ failure to warn him caused a delay in the filing of a court

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action against prison officials, but plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that he was shut

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out of court as a result of defendants= actions.

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D.

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To the extent that Plaintiff alleges liability based on Defendants' roles as supervisory

Supervisory Liability

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officials, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the term “supervisory liability,” loosely and

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commonly used by both courts and litigants alike, is a misnomer. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

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“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their

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subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Id. at 676. Rather, each government

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official, regardless of his or her title, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id. at 677.

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Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any of the Defendants in their supervisory

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capacities.

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E.

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to train and supervise staff to effectively respond

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Failure to Train and Supervise

to the Valley Fever outbreak at PVSP.

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State tort law, such as negligent failure to train and supervise, is not sufficient to state a

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claim for relief under ' 1983. To state a claim under ' 1983, there must be a deprivation of

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federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Although the

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court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff must first have a

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cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1367. In this instance, the Court

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fails to find any cognizable federal claims in the Second Amended Complaint. Therefore,

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Plaintiff=s claim for failure to train and supervise fails.

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V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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The Court finds that Plaintiff=s Second Amended Complaint fails to state any claims

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upon which relief can be granted under ' 1983 against any of the Defendants. In this action,

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the Court previously granted Plaintiff two opportunities to amend the complaint, with ample

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guidance by the Court. Plaintiff has now filed three complaints without alleging facts against

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any of the Defendants which state a claim under ' 1983. The Court finds that the deficiencies

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outlined above are not capable of being cured by amendment, and therefore further leave to

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amend should not be granted. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,

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1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A and 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e), this action be

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DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under

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' 1983; and

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2.

This dismissal be subject to the Athree-strikes@ provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. '

1915(g). Silva v. Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011).

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(l). Within

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thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may

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file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned AObjections to

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Magistrate Judge=s Findings and Recommendations.@ Plaintiff is advised that failure to file

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objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court=s order.

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Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

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April 22, 2013

/s/ Gary S. Austin
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DEAC_Signature-END:

6i0kij8d

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