Tracy Taylor v. Hubbard et al

Filing 23

ORDER DISMISSING Certain Claims and Defendants for Failure to State a Claim and ORDER DENYING AS MOOT 22 Plaintiff's Motion for a Copy of the Complaint, signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 11/14/2011. Defendant Susan Hubbard terminated. (Jessen, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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TRACY TAYLOR,

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CASE NO. 1:10-cv–00404-BAM PC
Plaintiff,

ORDER DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS
AND DEFENDANTS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM

v.
SUSAN HUBBARD, et al.,

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(ECF Nos. 20, 21)

Defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR A COPY OF THE COMPLAINT AS
MOOT

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(ECF No. 22)
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Plaintiff Tracy Taylor is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil

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rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (the Religious Land Use and

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Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000) (“RLUIPA”). On October 26, 2011, the Court screened

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Plaintiff’s complaint, and found that it states a claim against Defendants Harrington and Wegman

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for violation of the First Amendment and RLUIPA, but does not state any other claims for relief

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under section 1983. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff was ordered to either file an amended complaint

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or notify the Court of his willingness to proceed only on the claims found to be cognizable. On

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November 9, 2011, Plaintiff filed a notice stating that he does not wish to amend his complaint and

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is willing to proceed only on his cognizable First Amendment and RLUIPA claims and a motion for

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a copy of the complaint. Concurrently with this order, an order is being issued sending a copy of the

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complaint to Plaintiff.

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In the order requiring Plaintiff to file an amended complaint or notify the Court that he
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wished to proceed on the claims found to be cognizable, the Court found a claim under RLUIPA

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against Defendant Harrington in his individual and official capacity and Defendant Wegman in her

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individual capacity. The Court has rescreened the complaint and now provides clarification of the

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RLUIPA claims which the Court finds cognizable and which may proceed. “Notwithstanding any

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filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any

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time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief

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may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).

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Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) an individual may assert a claim under RLUIPA “and

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obtain appropriate relief against a government.” The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit for damages

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under RLUIPA against defendants in their official capacity. Sossamon v. Texas, __ U.S. __, 131 S.

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Ct. 1651, 1655 (2011); Holley v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 599 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir.

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2010). The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on whether RLUIPA provides an action for damages against

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prison officials in individual capacity suits. Florer, 639 F.3d at 922 n.3. However the Fifth, Seventh,

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and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that Congress enacted RLUIPA pursuant to the Spending

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Clause and did not indicate with sufficient clarity an intent to create an individual capacity action

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for damages, moreover, such a reading of the statute would raise serious constitutional concerns

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regarding the extent of Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause. See Sossamon v. Lone Star

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State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 329 (5th Cir. 2009) (Congressional enactments pursuant to the

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spending clause do not impose direct liability on an individual who is not a party to the contract

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between the state and federal government); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 889 (7th Cir. 2009)

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(“Construing RLUIPA to provide for damages actions against officials in their individual capacities

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would raise serious questions regarding whether Congress had exceeded its authority under the

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Spending Clause”); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ection 3 of RLUIPA-a

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provision that derives from Congress’ Spending Power-cannot be construed as creating a private

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action against individual defendants for monetary damages”), abrogated on other grounds,

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Sossamon, __ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1651. The Fourth Circuit has also held that no individual

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capacity claim can be brought under RLUIPA. Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 189 (4th Cir.

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2009) (“[I]t would be a novel use of the spending clause to condition the receipt of federal funds on
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the creation of an individual capacity damages action”).

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The Ninth Circuit has found that RLUIPA is constitutional as an enactment under the

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Spending Clause. Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). Implicit in the

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Ninth Circuit’s holding is recognition of limits on Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause.

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Thus, the Court finds the reasoning of the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits persuasive

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and concludes that RLUIPA does not create a suit for damages against defendants in their individual

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capacities. See also Williams v. Book, No.2:10-cv-0423, 2011 WL 2173743, *2 n.2 (E.D. Cal. June

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2, 2011); Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1045 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2010); Hypolite v. CDCR, No.

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2:05-cv-0428, 2010 WL 1729736, *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2010). Accordingly, Plaintiff may not

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recover damages against Defendants Harrington and Wegman in their individual or official

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capacities under RLUIPA and may only seek injunctive relief. Therefore, this action shall proceed

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against Defendant Harrington, in his official capacity for injunctive relief, and Plaintiff’s RLUIPA

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claims against Defendant Wegman shall be dismissed.

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Based on the foregoing and on Plaintiff’s notice, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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This action shall proceed on the first amended complaint, filed July 16, 2010, against

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Defendant Harrington, in his individual and official capacities, and Defendant

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Wegman, in her individual capacity, for violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the

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First Amendment, and against Defendant Harrington, in his official capacity, seeking

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injunctive relief for violation of RLUIPA;

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2.

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Plaintiff’s failure to state a cognizable claim against her;
3.

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Plaintiff’s official capacity and RLUIPA claims against Defendant Wegman are
dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim; and

4.

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Defendant Hubbard is dismissed from this action, with prejudice, based upon

Plaintiff’s motion for a copy of the complaint, filed November 9, 2011, is DENIED
as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
10c20k

November 14, 2011

/s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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