Garcia v. Clark, et al.

Filing 151

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS Regarding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 132 , signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck on 12/25/14: Fifteen (15) Day Deadline. (Hellings, J)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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WILLIAM P. GARCIA,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

Case No. 1:10-cv-00447 LJO DLB PC
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION

KEN CLARK, et al.,
[ECF No. 132]

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff Wiiliam P. Garcia (“Plaintiff”) is a California state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

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forma pauperis in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his initial complaint

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on March 12, 2010. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint against

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Defendants Allison, Diaz, Ibarra, Knight, Palmer, Santos, Tolson, Turner, and Walters for violation

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of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the

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Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”).

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On October 14, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 132. On November

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21, 2013, the Court issued a Findings and Recommendation which recommended the motion be

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denied as untimely. On December 5, 2013, Defendants filed objections to the Findings and

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Recommendation. Plaintiff filed a reply on December 18, 2013. By separate order, the Court has

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withdrawn the Findings and Recommendation issued on November 21, 2013. Accordingly, pending

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before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
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I.

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Plaintiff was incarcerated at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility
(“CSATF”) in Corcoran, California, at the time he filed this action, and where the events giving rise
to this action occurred.

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Summary of Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that while housed at CSATF, he participated in the Kosher Meal Program.
Plaintiff complains that Defendants at CSATF took away his “reasonable accommodation” by
refusing to allow him to take his meals back to his cell. He claims this change in procedure deprived
him of the ability to perform his religious Jewish orthodox practices relative to food and prayers. He
further claims that Defendants Walter and Santos served food that was opened, had foreign objects,
or was rotten.
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Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), any party may move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. The issue of whether a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by
a party at any state in the litigation. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506-07 (2006); see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the action”). “Because . . . mootness . . . pertain[s] to a federal court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction under Article III, [mootness is] properly raised in a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) . . . .” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).
“Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or factual.” Id. Facial attacks are based
solely on the allegations presented in the complaint. Id. Factual attacks, like the one presented here,
challenge the truth of the allegations based on evidence beyond the complaint. Safe Air for
Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). The court may look beyond the complaint
without having to convert the motion into one of summary judgment. White, 227 F.3d at 1242.
“The court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations” in his complaint, and
“[o]nce the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting
affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must
furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter
jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039 (citations omitted); see also Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731,
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735 n. 4 (1947) (“[W]hen a question of the District Court's jurisdiction is raised, either by a party or
by the court on its own motion, ... the court may inquire, by affidavits or otherwise, into the facts as
they exist.”). Nevertheless, all disputes of fact are resolved in favor of the non-movant. Dreier v.
United States, 106 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended (Feb. 4, 1997).
In this case, Defendants state that Plaintiff has been transferred from CSATF to Centinela
State Prison (“CSP”). Defendants state that CSP General Population has been converted to a Level
III Sensitive Needs Yard. Defendants state that prison authorities held a hearing with Plaintiff and
determined that Plaintiff was eligible for a non-adverse transfer to CSP. In June of 2013, Plaintiff
was transferred to the Sensitive Needs Yard at CSP. Upon his transfer, Defendants state, Plaintiff
was placed in the Kosher Meal Program. Defendants state Plaintiff no longer suffers from the
alleged constitutional violations for which he seeks relief in his complaint. In support, Defendants
submit the declaration of Lt. Masters, an employee of the CDCR, who spoke to Plaintiff on
September 26, 2013. Masters Decl., at ¶ 2. According to Masters, Plaintiff informed him then that
he had experienced no issues regarding his Kosher meals since his arrival at CSP. Id. Therefore,
Defendants argue, the case has become moot insofar as Plaintiff’s issues at CSATF are no longer
justiciable.
Plaintiff counters that Defendants caused him to be transferred in retaliation and in order to
make this action moot. Defendants dispute this, contending that the transfer was non-adverse in
nature. Defendants have submitted evidence that the transfer was effected because CSP had been
converted into a Level III SNY and Plaintiff was selected among approximately 75 other inmates at
CSATF Facility-E pursuant to a March 8, 2013, memorandum authored by K. Dickinson, Director of
Division of Adult Institutions. Defs.’ Reply, Exs. A, B. Plaintiff does not state he has suffered any
negative consequences as a result of the transfer. In addition, inmates do not have a constitutional
right to be incarcerated at a particular correctional facility or to be transferred from one facility to
another. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25, 96 S.Ct. 2532 (1976); see also Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-45, 103 S.Ct. 1741 (1983). Regardless, the fact remains that due to
the transfer, Plaintiff received his Kosher meals upon transfer to CSP and placement into the Kosher
Meal Program. Masters Decl., at 2; Defs.’ Reply, Ex. B. Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and
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declaratory relief have become moot and his claim of retaliation is not properly before the court.
A federal court has no authority to issue opinions upon moot issues. See County of Los
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S.Ct. 1379 (1979); Aguirre v. S.S. Sohio Intrepid, 801 F.2d 1185
(9th Cir. 1986). When an inmate seeks injunctive or declaratory relief concerning the prison where
he is incarcerated, his claims for such relief become moot when he is no longer subjected to those
conditions. Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2012); Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891,
897 (9th Cir. 2001); Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Moore, 948
F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991).
A prisoner’s transfer away from the institution at which the challenged conduct is occurring
will generally moot any claims for injunctive relief relating to the prison’s policies, unless the suit is
certified as a class action. Dilley, 64 F.3d at 1368; see also Nelson, 271 F.3d at 897; Johnson, 948
F.2d at 519. The claim is not moot, however, if there is a likelihood of recurrence. Demery v.
Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). The capable-of-repetitionyet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine applies when (1) the duration of the
challenged action is too short to be litigated prior to cessation, and (2) there is a reasonable
expectation that the same party will be subjected to the same offending conduct. Id. (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Here, there is no demonstrated probability or reasonable expectation that Plaintiff will be
transferred back CSATF. Demery, 378 F.3d at 1027 (quotation marks and citations omitted). See
Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 93 (2009) (exception to mootness doctrine not warranted where
nothing in record suggested the individual plaintiffs would likely be again subjected to forfeiture
proceedings); Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2002) (no
indication in complaint that the plaintiff would be subjected to the same situation again); Dilley, 64
F.3d at 1369 (no reasonable expectation inmate would be transferred back to Calipatria where he had
been a level IV inmate at Calipatria when he filed suit, but he was later transferred to a lowersecurity prison and reclassified as a level III inmate); Johnson, 948 F.2d at 519 (inmate’s claim
against state prison warden moot where inmate had been transferred to a federal prison in a different
state and was no longer subject to the state facility’s no smoking policy). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims do
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not meet the mootness exception.

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Plaintiff further complains about the quality of his Kosher meals at CSP. He claims that the
Kosher meals consist of foods containing too much soybean. He claims he cannot eat his Kosher
meals because he cannot stomach the soybean vegetarian meals anymore. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s
complaints about the quality of the Kosher meals at CSP are not properly before this court. In
addition, Plaintiff’s constitutional rights are not violated if he is receiving “food that is adequate to
maintain health; it need not be tasty or aesthetically pleading.” LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444,
1456 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff admits that he is receiving his Kosher meals and Defendants have
submitted evidence that Plaintiff is not on a hunger strike or being starved, and he is being fed
adequately. Defs.’ Reply, Ex. B.

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Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are
clearly foreclosed due to his transfer to CSP, his placement into CSP’s Kosher Meals Program upon
his arrival, and Defendants’ evidence that Plaintiff was receiving his Kosher meals at CSP according
to his claimed rights under the Constitution. The Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction be GRANTED.

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RECOMMENDATION

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For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction be GRANTED, and the First Amended Complaint be
DISMISSED thereby terminating the case.

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge
assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen (15)
days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written
objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned “Objections to
Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections must be filed
within fifteen (15) days from the date of service of the objections. Local Rule 304(d). The parties
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are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the
District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Dennis

December 25, 2014

L. Beck

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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