Moria Rogers v. Seibert Family Trust 1995, et al.

Filing 70

ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's 59 Motion to Amend the Complaint signed by Magistrate Judge Sandra M. Snyder on 1/23/2012. (Sant Agata, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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MORIA ROGERS,

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CASE NO. 1:10-cv-00589-SMS
Plaintiff,

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

v.

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LESLIE C. SEIBERT, et al.,
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Defendants.
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(Doc. 59)
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Plaintiff Moria Rogers moves this Court for an order amending the complaint to add as

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defendants Sierra Hide-Away LLC and the Leslie C. Seibert Revocable Trust. Rogers contends

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that joinder of these parties is necessary because of the existing defendants’ recent transfer of

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ownership of the Sierra Hide-Away Mobile Home Park to them. Defendants reply that the

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proper parties are those already joined as defendants since liability for violations of the Fair

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Housing Act is properly allocated to the owners at the time of the alleged violation, not to the

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property itself. Having considered the motion on the papers, the Court agrees that amendment is

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inappropriate and denies Plaintiff’s motion.

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I.

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Procedural and Factual Background
On April 5, 2010, Moria Rogers, the plaintiff in this action, filed the complaint in this

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case, alleging claims for violation of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)), the California

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Fair Employment and Housing Act (California Government Code § 12955(b)), and the Unruh

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Civil Rights Act (California Civil Code § 51 et seq.); unfair business practices (California

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Business & Professions Code § 17204); negligence; negligent interference with prospective

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economic advantage; intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; and invasion

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of privacy. Plaintiff’s claims arise from her rental of a space in Sierra Hide-Away Mobile Home

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Park, which was owned as a trust or partnership by Defendants Marilyn Seibert and her former

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husband, Leslie Seibert, who also acted as the park’s manager.

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On February 11, 2011, Defendants Leslie C. Seibert and Marilyn J. Seibert, as Trustees of

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the Seibert Family Trust 1995, transferred the property to themselves as tenants in common. On

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April 18, 2011, Leslie Seibert transferred his interest in the property as well as his interest in

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another property to himself as trustee for the Leslie C. Seibert Revocable Trust. On July 13,

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2011, Leslie C. Seibert and Marilyn J. Seibert transferred the property to Sierra Hide-Away,

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LLC, a California Limited Liability Company.1

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Plaintiff brought her motion to amend on December 9, 2011, while her motion for

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summary judgment was pending. Discovery closed in September 2011. Trial was to have begun

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on January 23, 2012.

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II.

Discussion

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Under F.R.C.P. 15(a)(2), the court should freely give leave to amend when justice

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requires. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). This policy should “‘be applied with

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extreme liberality.’” Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir.

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2001), quoting Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990).

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“If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of

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relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claims on the merits. In the absence of

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apparent or declared reason–such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the

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movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice

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to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.–the

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Leslie Seibert made the July transfer as an individual, not as trustee of the Leslie C. Seibert Revocable

Trust.

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leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’” Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. A court

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must be guided by the purpose of Rule 15, which is facilitating decisions on their merits. United

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States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981).

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“[A] district court may deny leave to amend where there is any apparent or declared

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reason for doing so, including undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party or futility of

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the amendment.” Lockman Foundation v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 772 (9th

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Cir. 1991), quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Not all of the

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factors merit equal consideration,” however; “it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing

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party that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048,

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1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Leave to amend is within the trial court’s discretion. Swanson v. U.S.

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Forest Service, 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. County of San Diego, 53 F.3d

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965, 969 n. 6 (9th Cir.); cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995).

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No new claims. No reasonable basis exists to add Sierra Hide-Away LLC and the Leslie

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C. Seibert Revocable Trust as defendants. The amended complaint includes no new substantive

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claims against them. Plaintiff reasons that these defendants are nonetheless necessary as “true

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owners of the property.”

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Plaintiff provides no authority for her objective of holding the current property owners

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liable for the prior owners’ violations. Under the Fair Housing Act, a respondent is the person or

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entity accused of an unfair housing practice. 42 U.S.C. § 3602. Although a property owner may

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be the person or entity accused of an unfair practice, subsequent owners are not automatically

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liable for the discriminatory actions of prior owners or their agents. The amended complaint

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includes no factual allegations linking either Sierra Hide-Away LLC nor the Leslie C. Seibert

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Revocable Trust to any discriminatory actions against Plaintiff. Nor can the property itself

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engage in an unfair housing practice.

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In the motion, Plaintiff contends that the transfers appear to be attempts to escape liability

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or to hide Defendants’ assets, and indicates that she may subsequently amend the complaint

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further to incorporate allegations of fraud based on what she believes are Defendants’ attempts to

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remove assets from her reach. Plaintiff alleges no factual basis for this proposition other than her

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own suspicions. In addition, Plaintiff does not yet have a judgment or other enforceable claim on

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Defendants’ assets, or any other legitimate basis to question the Defendants’ determination to

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modify their form of ownership. Despite Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants’ property

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transactions were somehow hidden or deceptive, the transactions were all openly recorded with

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the appropriate government agency.

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Untimeliness and Prejudice. As previously noted, the most important factor in a court’s

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denying a motion to amend is prejudice to the opposing party. Granting leave to amend at this

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late stage of litigating this case would prejudice Defendants.

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Undue delay is delay that prejudices the nonmoving party or imposes unwarranted

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burdens on the court. Mayreaux v. Louisiana Health Service and Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 427

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(5th Cir. 2004). Prejudice results when an amendment would unnecessarily increase costs or

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would diminish the opposing party’s ability to respond to the amended pleading. Morongo Band,

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893 F.2d at 1079. “Prejudice and undue delay are inherent in an amendment asserted after the

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close of discovery and after dispositive motions have been filed, briefed, and decided.”

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Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 1999). Here, Plaintiff brought her

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motion to amend after discovery had closed.

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Delay is prejudicial. “A need to reopen discovery and therefore delay the proceedings

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supports a district court’s finding of prejudice from a delayed motion to amend.” Lockheed

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Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Elite

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Entertainment, Inc. v. Khela Brothers Entertainment, 227 F.R.D. 444, 448 (E.D. Va. 2005)

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(finding the defendants’ motion to file amended counterclaims that would expand scope and

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theory of liability just before the expiration of the previously extended discovery period and

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weeks before trial to be untimely and prejudicial). Delay is the prejudicial by-product of

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Plaintiff’s proposed amendment here. In the absence of any cognizable claims against the new

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entities, there is simply no reason to further delay resolution of this aging case.

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III.

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Conclusion and Order
No reasonable basis exists to add Defendants’ successors in title to this discrimination

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action. Further delay of the progress of this case is prejudicial to Defendants and wasteful of this

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Court’s time and other resources. Plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint is hereby DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:
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January 23, 2012

/s/ Sandra M. Snyder
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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