Singleton, Sr. v. Jones et al

Filing 23

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS recommending that this Action Proceed on the First Amended Complaint Against Defendants Paz and Jones; Defendants James, Alcazar and Byer be DISMISSED; and Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Medical Claim be DISMISSED re 20 First Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint, signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 11/7/2011. Referred to Judge Ishii. Objections to F&R due within thirty (30) days. (Jessen, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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LEMAR SINGLETON, SR.,

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Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. 1:10-cv–00953-AWI-BAM PC
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING DISMISSING CERTAIN
CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS

v.
JONES, et al.,

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(ECF No. 20)
Defendants.

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS
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I.

Screening Requirement

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Plaintiff LeMar Singleton, Sr. is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in

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this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On March 17, 2011, Plaintiff’s complaint was

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dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 13.) Currently before the

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Court is the first amended complaint, filed August 18, 2011. (ECF No. 20.)

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks

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monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court looks to the pleading standard

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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

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“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it
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demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

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544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)).

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II.

Complaint Allegations

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Plaintiff is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

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(“CDCR”) and is incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison. Plaintiff brings this action against

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Defendants Jones, Paz, and Byers for violations of the Eighth Amendment and is seeking monetary

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damages.

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Plaintiff alleges that around April 8, 2010, while housed at the Substance Abuse Treatment

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Facility, Defendants Paz and Jones approached his cell with his ex-cell mate, Robinson. Robinson

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had just returned to the custody of CDCR from an unrelated case in Florida. Plaintiff informed

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Defendants Paz and Jones that he could not be housed with Robinson. Defendants told Plaintiff to

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cuff up and accept Robinson as a cell mate or they would take his belongings. Shortly after being

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placed in the cell, Robinson knocked Plaintiff against the cell door and began kicking, hitting, and

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stomping on him.

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After about four hours, Defendant Paz came to the cell and told Plaintiff to cuff up because

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a mistake had been made. Defendant Pax informed Plaintiff that he should appeal the decision

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because Defendant Jones had ordered the move. Plaintiff states that on “7-10" he provided

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information to staff that Robinson was going to stab another inmate. On that day he was told that

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he would not be housed at the same facility with Robinson as long as he was in the custody of

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CDCR. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Paz and Jones should have known that he was at a

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substantial risk of harm because he had informed on Robinson and he had a right to be protected

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from assault.

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Plaintiff alleges that after being treated the first time for his injuries, he informed Defendant

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Byers that he was in so much pain that he was unable to sleep. Defendant Byers refused to treat

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Plaintiff for a torn rotator cuff and back and neck pain because he was told by Defendant Jones and

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staff that no altercation had occurred. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Byers scratched him from the

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medical line requiring Plaintiff to go to emergency medical to get his steroid injections for his hip
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and shoulder pain.

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III.

Discussion

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A.

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Prison officials are required “to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical

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abuse.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982) (abrogated on other grounds by

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Sandin v. O’Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995)). To state a claim the plaintiff must show

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that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th

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Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Deliberate indifference requires a showing that “prison officials were

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aware of a “substantial risk of serious harm” to an inmates health or safety and that there was no

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“reasonable justification for the deprivation, in spite of that risk.” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,

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511 U.S. 825, 837, 844, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979, 1982 (1994)).

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Failure to Protect

Liberally construed Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable claim for failure to protect
against Defendants Jones and Paz.

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B.

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“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate

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must show “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096

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(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976)). The two

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part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by

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demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or

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the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was

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deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference is shown where the official

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is aware of a serious medical need and fails to adequately respond. Simmons v. Navajo County,

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Arizona, 609 F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 2010).

Medical Care

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Plaintiff fails to set forth sufficient allegations to show that Defendant Byer was aware of a

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serious medical need and failed to respond. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”

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Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1019; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). The prison

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official must be aware of facts from which he could make an inference that “a substantial risk of

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serious harm exists” and he must make the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114
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S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). According to the allegations in the complaint, Defendant Byer did not

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believe that Plaintiff had been in an altercation or that he had been injured. An allegation by a

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prisoner that a physician has been merely indifferent or negligent or has committed medical

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malpractice in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a constitutional claim.

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Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057.

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Even assuming that Defendant Byer was aware of Plaintiff’s medical needs and failed to

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respond, Plaintiff fails to set forth facts that there was anything more than a delay in treatment. As

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alleged, Plaintiff received steroid injections for his hip and shoulder through emergency medical.

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Plaintiff’s allegations do not show that he suffered substantial harm due to any delay in treatment.

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Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 746 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335

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(9th Cir. 1990); Shapley v. Nevada Board of State Prison Commissioners, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th

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Cir. 1984).

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Finally, Plaintiff may not pursue multiple, unrelated claims in this action. Pursuant to the

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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [a] party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party

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claim may join, as independent or alternate claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing

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party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). “Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate law

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suits, not only ‘to prevent the sort of morass’ produced by multi- claim, multi- defendant suits like

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this one, but also to ensure that prisoners pay all fees required under the Prison Litigation Reform

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Act, [ ] 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting George

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v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)).

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Plaintiff’s allegations regarding lack of medical care by Defendant Byer are unrelated to the

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his failure to protect claims that have been found cognizable in this action. If Plaintiff wishes to

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pursue his claims against Defendant Byer he must file a separate action.

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C.

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Plaintiff also alleges a claim for negligence under California law. A public employee is liable

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for injury “proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful act or omission.” Cal. Gov’t Code §

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844.6(d) (West 2009). Under California law “[t]he elements of a negligence cause of action are: (1)

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a legal duty to use due care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the breach was the proximate or legal cause

Negligence

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of the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the breach of the duty of care.”

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Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 534 (Ct. App. 2009). At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s

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allegations are sufficient to state a claim for negligence against Defendants Paz and Jones.

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VI.

Conclusion and Recommendation

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The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint states a claim against Defendants Paz and Jones

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for failure to protect in violation of the Eighth Amendment, but fails to state any other claims upon

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which relief can be granted under § 1983. Because Plaintiff has previously been notified of the

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deficiencies and given leave to amend, the Court recommends that the non-cognizable claims be

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dismissed. Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448-49. Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED

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that:
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This action proceed on the first amended complaint, filed August 18, 2011, against

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Defendants Paz and Jones for failure to protect in violation of the Eighth Amendment

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and negligence under state law;

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2.

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Defendants James, Alcazar, and Byer be dismissed from this action for Plaintiff’s
failure to state a cognizable claim against them; and

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3.

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These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

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days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written

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objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

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Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

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specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

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1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment medical claim be dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
10c20k

November 7, 2011

/s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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