Stewart v. Tilton et al
Filing
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ORDER DISMISSING Complaint, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, For Failure to State Any Claims; Thirty-Day Deadline, signed by Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto on 5/18/11. (Attachments: # 1 Complaint (blank form))(Hellings, J)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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CHARLES STEWART,
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CASE NO. 1:10-cv-00985-AWI-SKO PC
Plaintiff,
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v.
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ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO
STATE ANY CLAIMS
J. TILTON, et al.,
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(Doc. 1)
Defendants.
THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE
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Screening Order
I.
Screening Requirement and Standard
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Plaintiff Charles Stewart, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this
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civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 3, 2010. The Court is required to screen
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complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or
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employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or
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portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to
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state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who
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is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any
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portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
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determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
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is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but
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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
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do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell
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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts “are not required
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to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir.
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2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true,
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legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
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To state a claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in
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the deprivation of his rights. Id. at 1949. This requires the presentation of factual allegations
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sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret
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Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of
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meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
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II.
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claims
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A.
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Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility
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(SATF) in Corcoran, brings this action against prison officials for violating his rights under the
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Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution during the time he was incarcerated at SATF
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and at the California Correctional Institution (CCI) in Tehachapi.
Summary of Allegations
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On June 26, 2005, while at CCI, Plaintiff had a seizure and fell down a steel staircase to the
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concrete floor below. Plaintiff injured his shoulder, hip, and lower back. At that time, Plaintiff had
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a medical chrono for lower tier, lower bunk housing based on his severe seizure disorder and a hole
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in the right side of his head from a gunshot wound. However, Plaintiff had been moved to an upper
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tier on June 16, 2005.
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After Plaintiff’s fall, he was taken to the prison’s hospital and doctors determined that he
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needed x-rays, an MRI, and a CT scan. Plaintiff received x-rays, which ruled out broken bones, but
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he never received the MRI or CT scan.
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In May 2006, Plaintiff was transported to Mercy Hospital and diagnosed with osteomyelitis
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caused by a staph infection. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered from this condition because prison
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officials at CCI failed to treat his preexisting head injury from the gunshot. A plate was placed in
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Plaintiff’s head and he alleges that doctors at the hospital told him that simple antibiotics could have
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prevented the issue.
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On February 12, 2009, Plaintiff was transferred to SATF. Plaintiff alleges that he is being
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denied adequate medical care and a referral to a neurologist for removal of the metal plate, which
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is causing a dent near his eyes. Medical staff keep informing Plaintiff that there is no money to pay
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for his skull surgery.
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B.
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To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison
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conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
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U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise
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to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner
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of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with
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deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)
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(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official
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does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an
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excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970
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(1994).
Legal Standard
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Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally
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interfere with medical treatment,” or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical
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care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX
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Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging
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a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the
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prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d
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at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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C.
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“[T]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor would find important and worthy of
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comment or treatment, . . . the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an
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individual’s daily activities, and . . . the existence of chronic or substantial pain” are indications of
Linkage Deficiencies
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a serious medical need. Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing
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McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX
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Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
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1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that he had serious medical needs.
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However, Plaintiff has not linked any of the named defendants to actions or omissions that support
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his claims of deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
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Plaintiff names California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Secretary J. Tilton,
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SATF Warden Kathleen Allison, Chief Healthcare Officer Enenmoh, and a Doe Chief Healthcare
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Officer as defendants. It does not appear that any of those prison officials were personally involved
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in Plaintiff’s medical care. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d
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1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009);
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Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Liability may not be imposed on supervisory
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or administrative personnel under the theory of respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable
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for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235. Supervisors
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or administrators may only be held liable if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew
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of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
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1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 633 F.3d 1191, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d
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554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark County School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175,
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1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).
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The existence of a policy that directly led to the violation of Plaintiff’s rights may provide
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a basis for the imposition of liability on those who created, enacted, or enforced the policy, Starr, 633
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F.3d at 1194-97; Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989), and treatment decisions based
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on budgetary concerns do not shield prison officials from liability for deliberate indifference, Jones
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v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986). However, Plaintiff’s very conclusory allegation that
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staff at SATF denied him medical care based on the orders and policies of Defendants Allison and
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Enenmoh falls well short of the specificity needed to state a plausible claim against Allison and
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Enenmoh for violating Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572
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F.3d at 969.
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Further, there is no linkage at all between any named defendants and the alleged failure to
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provide appropriate medical care to Plaintiff at CCI. Plaintiff will be provided with the opportunity
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to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in this order, subject to the following
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restriction.
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D.
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Plaintiff may not bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action. Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 18(a); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Owens v. Hinsley, 635
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F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011) (unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate suits
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and complaints violating that principle should be rejected). In this instance, Plaintiff appears to be
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raising three separate claims. The failure to treat Plaintiff’s gunshot wound, the failure to honor
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Plaintiff’s upper tier chrono, and the failure to provide Plaintiff with medical treatment for his
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current problems involving the plate in his head do not appear to be related such that they are
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appropriately litigated in the same action.
Rule 18
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For the reasons set forth in the preceding subsection, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any
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claims under section 1983 and his complaint shall be dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff must
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determine which claim he wants to litigate in this action and he should set forth that claim in his
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amended complaint. If Plaintiff re-alleges all three claims but fails to satisfy Rule 18, the Court will
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determine which claim will proceed and it will dismiss the unrelated claims.
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III.
Conclusion and Order
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Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any claims upon which relief may be granted under section
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1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the
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deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir.
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2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature
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of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d
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605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).
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Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what
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each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 129
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S.Ct. at 1948-49. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise
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a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
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Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the prior complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114
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F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and it must be
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“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220.
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Therefore, “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an
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amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand,
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644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.
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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
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1.
The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;
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2.
Plaintiff’s complaint, filed June 3, 2010, is dismissed for failure to state any claims
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upon which relief may be granted;
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3.
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Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an
amended complaint; and
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4.
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If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this
action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated:
ie14hj
May 18, 2011
/s/ Sheila K. Oberto
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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