Morales et al v. City of Delano et al

Filing 80

ORDER Discharging Order to Show Cause signed by Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on 12/15/2011. (Leon-Guerrero, A)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MANUELA CANCINO CONTRERAS
MORALES, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
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vs.
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CITY OF DELANO, et al.
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Defendants.
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__________________________________ )

Case No. 1:10-cv-1203-AWI-JLT
ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE
(Doc. 74)

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I.

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Background
On November 4, 2011, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to show cause why sanctions should

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not be imposed for their failure to comply with the Court’s protective order. (Doc. 74) In

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particular, Plaintiffs filed documents into the public record that were covered the protective order

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issued by the Court on February 23, 2011. (Doc. 39) At the same time, the Court required

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Defendants to provide clarification as to whether an address contained on one of the documents

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that was publicly filed by Plaintiffs, actually was a defendant’s correct address. (Doc. 74) On

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November 18, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their response. (Doc. 79) Likewise on this same date,

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Defendants lodged their response.

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///

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II.

The Court has the inherent authority to impose sanctions for a party’s failure to

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comply with its orders.

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District courts may impose sanctions as part of their “inherent powers that are governed

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not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs

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so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v.

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Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir. 1992). Moreover, this Court’s Local

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Rules provide, “Failure of counsel or of a party to comply with . . . any order of the Court may be

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grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . within the inherent power of

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the Court.” LR 110.

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Plaintiffs argue that sanctions should not be imposed for several reasons. Plaintiffs

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explain that they mistakenly filed the documents, apparently as a result of negligence. (Doc. 79

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at 2) They provide no further details about how this mistaken filing occurred and the Court can

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only surmise that counsel simply forgot that certain documents produced in this litigation have

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been ordered to be maintained as confidential.

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Notably, in their stipulated protective order, counsel agreed that they would “take all

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reasonable and necessary steps to assure the security of any Confidential Information and will

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limit access to Confidential Information to only those persons authorized by the Protective

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Order.” (Doc. at 5) Thus, the parties anticipated that negligence was a risk and sought to

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mitigate against it. The suggestion that “all reasonable and necessary efforts” would not include

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something as basic as creating a segregated file of “confidential” evidence or marking these

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documents in such a way as to prevent their inadvertent disclosure seems unlikely.

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On the other hand, Plaintiffs imply that they have a limited obligation under the

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protective order and that, instead, the true burden is on Defendants to be vigilant as to any breach

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of the order. They argue also that the misfiled documents were not really all that confidential

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because Defendants did not immediately act to have them removed from the docket. In doing so,

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they seem to argue that the Court’s order requiring that they maintain the documents as

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confidential can be ignored in certain instances; clearly not. Each party was ordered to maintain

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the confidentiality of all protected records irrespective of the conduct of other parties and to do so

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until the Court excuses compliance with the protective order. Without doubt, counsel's

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obligation to comply with the Court’s orders is absolute.

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Moreover, Plaintiffs' seem unfazed by the imposition placed on the Court due to their

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failing to request that the documents be sealed before they were filed. Rather than allowing a

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reasonable amount of time for the Court to act, this after-the-fact motion required the Court to

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immediately turn its attention from the pressing matters before it and, instead, focus the Court’s

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efforts on their request. The burden this placed on the Court, cannot be ignored.

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Nevertheless, the Court acknowledges Plaintiffs’ immediate response once their error had

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been made known to them. The Court recognizes that this response supports Plaintiffs’ claims

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here that they did not willfully flout the Court’s order but, instead, acted negligently. The Court

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finds this a mitigating factor when evaluating whether sanctions should be imposed.

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On the other hand, like Plaintiffs, the Court is at a loss to understand why Defendants did

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not act more quickly to address the situation caused by Plaintiffs' disclosure. Had Defendants

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immediately contacted Plaintiffs or sought the immediate intervention of the Court, any risks

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posed by the disclosure could have been minimized. The Court presumes that this failure was

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not tactically motivated.

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Indisputably, the purpose of the protective order issued in this case, was to protect certain

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information from entering the public domain. Some of the information was deemed confidential

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because its release could subject those involved to harassment or embarrassment. Some was

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protected because release could pose a risk of physical danger to the parties. The Court cannot

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emphasize strongly enough the obligation of all parties to treat all protected information

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produced in this case in the manner agreed to by counsel and ordered by the Court.

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Nevertheless, the Court does not issue monetary sanctions at this time. To be clear, had
the Court not learned that the address reflected on a protected document was not a current

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address for any named Defendant, the Court would not have hesitated to impose hefty sanctions.

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However, given the Court’s finding that the disclosure here was due to great negligence rather

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than purposeful conduct, and in light of Defendants’ mistake in not taking immediate action to

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address the wrongful publication, there appears to be enough blame to go around. In taking this

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course, the Court does not minimize the risk posed to the current residents at the address listed

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on the protected document. More importantly, the Court does not condone Plaintiffs’ conduct

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and will not tolerate it in the future.

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Plaintiffs and their counsel are admonished that any further violation of the protective
SHALL result in the imposition of sanctions.

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ORDER
For the reasons stated, the order to show cause is hereby DISCHARGED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: December 15, 2011
9j7khi

/s/ Jennifer L. Thurston
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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