Quezada v. Lindsey et al

Filing 100

ORDER DENYING 98 Motion for Reconsideration, signed by District Judge Dale A. Drozd on 8/1/2016. (Rosales, O)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ALVARO QUEZADA,

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No. 1:10-cv-01402-DAD-SAB

Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

R. LINDSEY, et al.,
(Doc. No. 98)
Defendants.

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On April 27, 2016, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the undersigned’s

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order adopting the findings and recommendations which recommended the denial of defendants’

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motion for summary judgment as to defendants Lindsey and Gonzalez and the granting of that

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motion as to defendant Doran. (See Doc. Nos. 97–98.) The motion seeks reconsideration of the

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magistrate judge’s recommendation that defendants Lindsey and Gonzalez were not entitled to

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summary judgment in their favor on qualified immunity grounds. (Doc. No. 98.) Though the

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undersigned disagreed in part with the magistrate judge’s reasoning in part the undersigned

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adopted the magistrate judge’s qualified immunity analysis in full. (See Doc. No. 97.)

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District courts “possess[] the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify

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an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.” City of L.A., Harbor Div. v. Santa

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Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks

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omitted). A motion for reconsideration, however, “should not be granted, . . . unless the district
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court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an

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intervening change in the controlling law.” 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665

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(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)).

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Reconsideration of a prior order is an extraordinary remedy “to be used sparingly in the interests

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of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229

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F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel,

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882 F.2d 364, 369 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he orderly administration of lengthy and complex

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litigation such as this requires the finality of orders be reasonably certain.”).

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Here, the defendants do not suggest there is newly-discovered evidence or an intervening

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change in the controlling law. Rather, they argue the court committed “clear error” because it

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found the constitutional right at issue to be “clearly established” at the time of the defendants’

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alleged conduct. (Doc. No. 98.) Defendants believe there is clear error here because one of the

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cases cited by the magistrate judge as establishing that the right in question was clearly

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established, Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006), is factually

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distinguishable, according to defendants, “because [in Morgan] the prison official took no steps to

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address the printing press and had no reasonable basis to believe that the risk of inmate injury had

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been addressed.” (Doc. No. 98 at 7–8.) Defendants’ argument in support of their motion for

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reconsideration is unpersuasive.
In Morgan, the prison official warned plaintiff to “just be very careful,” but to continue

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working in the dangerous condition. 465 F.3d at 1044. In the instant case, the defendants

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purportedly told inmates to keep working, but “to take appropriate precautions until the Plant

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Operations could address the issue, including being watchful of ice, breaking up the ice

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formations, and holding onto the handles of the pallet jacks in the event of a fall on the ice.”

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(Doc. No. 98 at 6.) These are essentially the same warning: that the respective plaintiffs should

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try to be careful, despite the presence of a dangerous condition. The court is not convinced it

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committed a clear error by concluding that the situation here and that confronted by the Ninth

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Circuit in Morgan were factually indistinguishable.

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/////
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For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion for reconsideration (Doc. No. 98) is

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denied.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

August 1, 2016
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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