Siler v. State of California et al

Filing 12

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATION for Dismissal of Complaint 1 , signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 10/30/11. Thirty-Day Deadline. Referred to Judge Ishii. (Gonzalez, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL ANTHONY SILER,

CASE NO.

1:10-cv-1548-LJO-MJS (PC)

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Plaintiff,

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION FOR
DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

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v.
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(ECF No. 1)
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

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Defendants.
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/
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Plaintiff Michael Anthony Siler (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

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in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is civilly committed to

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Coalinga State Hospital as a sexually violent predator. Plaintiff initiated this action on

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August 19, 2010. (ECF No. 1.) The case is now before the Court for screening.

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I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has

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raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which

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relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

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such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

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thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

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determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an

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arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

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not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

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mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct.

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1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

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Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is

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plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Facial

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plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed

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misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not.

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Id. at 1949-50.

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II.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

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Plaintiff, housed at the Coalinga State Hospital, has named the following individuals

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as defendants: 1) State of California (“California”); 2) Department of Corrections and

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Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), 3) Department of Mental Health, 4) 100 Jane Does, and ) 100

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John Does, in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth

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Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his rights under the

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due process and equal protection clauses under the Fourteenth Amendment have been

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violated. Plaintiff also alleges violation of an unspecified section of the state penal code.

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More specifically, Plaintiff alleges:

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Plaintiff has been subject to non-consensual psychosurgery in which electrical

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devices have been implanted in his body. (Compl. at 5.) These devices are “being used

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to administer ‘therapies’ which are defined legally and clinically as ‘Organic Therapy.’” (Id.)

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The therapy is administered by Defendants California and CDCR, and is done

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“secretly/covertly by employing the use of computerized wireless technology;

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electromagnetically charged directed energy beam devices; in combination with implanted

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electrical devices; all resulting in the ability to remotely administer organic therapy.”

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(emphasis in original) (Id. at 5-6.)

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“permanently mounted devices at remote locations within the secured perimeter of the

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state facility.” (Id. at 6.) The energy targets a surgically implanted device, called a

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“dielectric disk.” (Id.) A computer is used to locate the targeted disk with the “aid of an

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electronic tracking device.” (Id.) When the disk is targeted with directed energy, it allows

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the transference of the energy to an array of surgically implanted electrodes which enables

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“the administering of this wireless, enforced therapy, without detection.” (Id.) This energy

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torments and tortures the individual the disc, due to the pain and suffering resulting from

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this “remotely administered lobotomy...and shock therapy.” (Id. at 7.) The individual with

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the disc is also inflicted with physical pain and suffering “in a program of aversive of

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operant conditioning.” (Id.)

The energy directed at the devices come from

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Plaintiff also has been harassed through the use of sound he hears through

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cochlear implants. (Compl. at 7-8.) The sound impedes Plaintiff’s ability to concentrate

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or complete a thought; it causes him to lose track of the topic of thought or conversation.

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(Id. at 7) This treatment has resulted in “mental anguish, anxiety, and severe mental

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suffering.” (Id.) This action violates the state’s penal code. (Id.) When the individual

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complains about the sound, it is diagnosed as an auditory hallucination, which then results

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in the individual being classified as “clinically depressed” or “delusional.” (Id. at 8.) A

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cochlear implant can stimulate the auditory nerves to create the perception of sound in the

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brain. (Id.) The use of this device from a remote position can result in the simulation of

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a mental illness. (Id.) This has happened to Plaintiff, who due to the organic therapy

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process he is undergoing, has been diagnosed as mentally ill. (Id. at 8-9.)

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Plaintiff asks for compensatory damages for his mental suffering and punitive

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damages for Defendants’ malicious and reckless actions.

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III.

ANALYSIS

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Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges,

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or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia
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Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not

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itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal

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rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

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To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that

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a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that

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the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See

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West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245

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(9th Cir.1987).

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Based upon the pleading before it, this Court can conclude only that Plaintiff’s

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claims are legally frivolous. A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis in

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either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Plaintiff’s claims lack an

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arguable basis in fact. The following allegations are fantastic:

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1.

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electrical devices have been implanted in his body. (Compl. at 5.)
2.

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Plaintiff has been subject to non-consensual psychosurgery in which

The electrical devices are “being used to administer ‘therapies’ which are
defined legally and clinically as ‘Organic Therapy.’” (Id.)

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The therapy is administered by Defendants California and CDCR

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“secretly/covertly by employing the use of computerized wireless technology;

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electromagnetically charged directed energy beam devices; in combination

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with implanted electrical devices; all resulting in the ability to remotely

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administer organic therapy.” (emphasis in original) (Id. at 5-6.)

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4.

The energy directed at the electrical devices come from “permanently

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mounted devices at remote locations within the secured perimeter of the

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state facility.” (Id. at 6.)

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5.

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The energy targets a surgically implanted device, called a “dielectric disk.”
(Id.)

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When the dielectric disk is targeted with directed energy, it allows the
transference of the energy to an array of surgically implanted electrodes
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which enables “the administering of this wireless, enforced therapy, without

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detection.” (Id.) This energy torments and tortures the individual the disc,

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due to the pain and suffering from this “remotely administered

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lobotomy...and shock therapy.” (Id. at 7.)

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7.

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The individual with the disc is also inflicted with physical pain and suffering
“in a program of aversive of operant conditioning.” (Id.)

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Plaintiff also has been harassed through the use of sound, which he hears

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through cochlear implants and impedes his ability to concentrate or

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complete a thought. (Compl. at 7-8.)

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When the individual complains about the sound, it appears to be an auditory

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hallucination, which then results in the individual being classified as

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“clinically depressed” or “delusional.” (Id. at 8.)

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10.

A cochlear implant can stimulate the auditory nerves to create the

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perception of sound in the brain, and the use of this device from a remote

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position can result in the simulation of a mental illness. (Id.)

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Plaintiff is charged with the obligation of setting forth “sufficient factual matter,

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accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949

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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable

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basis in either law or fact. Plaintiff has failed to meet this pleading requirement. Plaintiff’s

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claims as asserted lack an arguable basis in fact. They should be dismissed without leave

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to amend on the grounds they are legally frivolous. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.

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IV.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

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The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may

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be granted. Although the Court is typically required to allow a plaintiff the opportunity to

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amend her pleading to address the deficiencies noted by the Court during screening, the

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Court finds that amendment would be futile in this case. For the reasons stated above, the

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Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as

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true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting
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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed,

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with prejudice, for failure to state a claim under section 1983 and that Plaintiff not be given

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leave to amend.

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These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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Within thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any

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party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a

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document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and

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Recommendations." Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within ten days

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after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

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the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Y1

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st, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:
ci4d6

October 30, 2011

Michael J. Seng

/s/
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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