Mattox v. Castrol, et al.

Filing 17

ORDER to SHOW CAUSE re Continuing This Action signed by Chief Judge Ralph R. Beistline on 4/15/2013. Plaintiff's Show Cause Response due by 5/17/2013. (Jessen, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JOHN DEAN MATTOX,
Case No. 1:10-cv-01641-RRB
Plaintiff,
vs.
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
SGT. CASTROL, et al.,
Defendants.

Plaintiff

John

Dean

Mattox,

a

California

State

prisoner

appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various officials and employees of the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”).
Mattox’s claims arose from an incident that occurred during his
incarceration

at

the

North

Kern

State

Prison

(“NKSP”)

and

a

deliberate indifference claim against dental/medical personnel
following his transfer to Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”).1

1

Mattox has named eleven individuals in addition to Sgt.
Castrol: CCII Martinez; Lt. Marquez; Dr. Alexander, D.D.S.; Capt.
Steadman; Lt. Marquez; Sgt. M.T. Ervan; CCI Harris; Dr, Hermon
D.D.S.; Dr. Alexander, D.D.S.; Dr. F. Igbinoza, M.D.; Paco Mendoza;
as well as twelve, or more, John and Jane Does alleged to be
responsible dental/medical personnel at either NKSP or PVSP.
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I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENTS
This

Court

is

required

to

screen

complaints

brought

by

prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer
or employee of a governmental entity.2 This Court must dismiss a
complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that
are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”3
In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court
looks

to

the

pleading

standard

under

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”4 “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces
does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands
more

than

accusation.”5

an

unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates

the familiar standard applied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), including the rule that complaints filed by pro se
prisoners are to be liberally construed, affording the prisoner the
2

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

3

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

5

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)).
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benefit of any doubt, and dismissal should be granted only where it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can plead no facts in
support of his claim that would entitle him or her to relief.6
Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant
personally participated in the deprivation of his rights.7 This
requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to
state a plausible claim for relief.8 “[A] complaint [that] pleads
facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability
. . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility
of entitlement to relief.’”9

Further, although a court must accept

as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court
need

not

accept

“Threadbare

a

recitals

plaintiff’s
of

the

legal

elements

conclusions
of

a

cause

true.10

as
of

action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”11

6

Wilhelm v. Rotham, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).

7

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002); see
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–95 (1978)
(rejecting the concept of respondeat superior in the context of
§ 1983, instead requiring individual liability for the violation).
8

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–69; see Moss v. U.S. Secret
Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting and applying
Iqbal and Twombly).
9

Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

10

Id.

11

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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II.

ALLEGATIONS
Mattox alleges four counts. Count I – a violation of his

First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights arising out
of an alleged illegal confiscation of his property, including legal
materials germane to a then pending federal action; Count II – a
violation of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments alleging
a deliberate indifference to Mattox’s safety by moving him to
another facility where he was brutally attacked; Count III – a
violation of his First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights in that after being assaulted Mattox was initially treated
in an outside hospital for serious facial injuries, upon his return
he was placed in administrative segregation and denied further
necessary medical treatment; and Count IV – a continuous course of
harassment, retaliation, and deliberate indifference treatment by
a correctional officer.
III. PRIOR PROCEEDING
On August 8, 2008, prior to filing this action, Mattox filed
a nearly identical action: Mattox v. Martinez, et al., 1:08-cv01265-FRZ (“Mattox I”).12 In his Amended Complaint in Mattox I,
Mattox alleged five counts against various defendants, including

12

case.

This Court takes judicial notice of the files in that
Fed. R. Evid. 201.

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the defendants named in this case. A review of that Amended
Complaint reveals that Counts I, II, III, and V therein are
essentially

duplicated

by

Counts

I,

II,

III,

and

IV

of

the

Complaint in this action. As result of screening in Mattox I,
except for his Count IV, all of Mattox’s claims were dismissed
without

prejudice

for

failing

to

state

a

cause

of

action.13

Thereafter, the defendant was granted summary judgment on the
remaining Count in Mattox I.14 Mattox has appealed from that action,
and his appeal is still pending before the Ninth Circuit.15
IV.

DISCUSSION
The present posture of this case and Mattox I requires this

Court to determine whether this case is duplicative of Mattox I
and, therefore, should be dismissed. “Plaintiffs generally have ‘no
right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject
matter at the same time in the same court against the same
defendant.’”16 In such case, “[a]fter weighing the equities of the

13

Mattox I, Docket 21. It is those dismissed claims that
Mattox now attempts to resurrect in this action.
14

Mattox I at Dockets 57, 58.

15

Mattox v. Chrones, No. 11-17788. This Court also takes
judicial notice of the files in that case. Fed. R. Evid. 201. The
Docket indicates that briefing has been completed in that case, and
it awaits submission.
16

Adams v. California Dept. of Health Svcs., 487 F.3d 684,
688 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70

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case, the district court may exercise its discretion to dismiss a
duplicative

later-filed

action,

to

stay

the

action

pending

resolution of the previously filed action, to enjoin the parties
from proceeding with it, or to consolidate both actions.”17
To determine whether a suit is duplicative, we
borrow from the test for claim preclusion.
As the
Supreme Court stated in The Haytian Republic, “the true
test of the sufficiency of a plea of ‘other suit pending’
in another forum [i]s the legal efficacy of the first
suit, when finally disposed of, as ‘the thing adjudged,’
regarding the matters at issue in the second suit.” 154
U.S. 118, 124, 14 S. Ct. 992, 38 L. Ed. 930 (1894); see
also Hartsel Springs Ranch, 296 F.3d at 987 n. 1 (“[I]n
the claim-splitting context, the appropriate inquiry is
whether, assuming that the first suit were already final,
the second suit could be precluded pursuant to claim
preclusion.”); Curtis, 226 F.3d at 139–40 (“[T]he normal
claim preclusion analysis applies and the court must
assess whether the second suit raises issues that should
have been brought in the first.”); Davis v. Sun Oil Co.,
148 F.3d 606, 613 (6th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (referring
to the doctrine against claim-splitting as “the ‘other
action pending’ facet of the res judicata doctrine”).
Thus, in assessing whether the second action is
duplicative of the first, we examine whether the causes
of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or
privies to the action, are the same. See The Haytian
Republic, 154 U.S. at 124, 14 S. Ct. 992 (“There must be
the same parties, or, at least, such as represent the
same interests; there must be the same rights asserted
and the same relief prayed for; the relief must be
founded upon the same facts, and the . . . essential
basis, of the relief sought must be the same.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Curtis, 226 F.3d at 140

(7th Cir. 1977) (en banc)).
17

Id. (citations omitted).

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(holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing “Curtis II claims arising out of
the same events as those alleged in Curtis I,” which
claims “would have been heard if plaintiffs had timely
raised them”); Serlin, 3 F.3d at 223 (“[A] suit is
duplicative if the claims, parties, and available relief
do not significantly differ between the two actions.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).18
The Ninth Circuit then laid down the following “same causes of
action” test:
We examine first whether the causes of action in
Adams's two suits are identical. To ascertain whether
successive causes of action are the same, we use the
transaction test, developed in the context of claim
preclusion. “Whether two events are part of the same
transaction or series depends on whether they are related
to the same set of facts and whether they could
conveniently be tried together.” Western Sys., Inc. v.
Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir.1992) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982)). In
applying the transaction test, we examine four criteria:
(1) whether rights or interests established in the
prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by
prosecution of the second action; (2) whether
substantially the same evidence is presented in the
two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve
infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the
two suits arise out of the same transactional
nucleus of facts.
Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199,
1201–02 (9th Cir.1982). “The last of these criteria is
the most important.” Id. at 1202.19
Counts I, II, III, and V in Mattox I allege the same operative
facts as do Counts I through IV of the complaint in this action.

18

Id. at 688–89.

19

Id. at 689.

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That is, the claims raised by Mattox in both lawsuits arise out of
the same actions, involve the same parties, and infringe upon the
same right.

To the extent that Mattox has pleaded additional facts

in this action, it does not appear that Mattox could not have
sought

leave

to

include

those

additional

facts

in

Mattox

I.

Furthermore, it appears that the last act occurred more than three
years before this action was initiated and its likely barred by the
otherwise applicable limitations period.
V.

CONCLUSION/ORDER
Because it appears that there is no reason that Mattox could

not bring the claims raised in this action in Mattox I, this action
is duplicative of Mattox I.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff shows good cause for
continuing this action, on or before May 17, 2013, or the Court
will dismiss it as duplicative, without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th day of April, 2013.
S/RALPH R. BEISTLINE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
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