Harrington v. Bautista et al

Filing 90

ORDER DENYING Plaintiff's 89 Motion for Reconsideration of Recusal of Assigned Magistrate Judge signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on 1/27/2016. (Sant Agata, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GARRICK HARRINGTON,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
J. BAUTISTA, et al.,

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Defendants.

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF‟S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RECUSAL OF
ASSIGNED MAGISTRATE JUDGE
[ECF No. 89]

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On January 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court‟s January 13,

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Case No.: 1:10-cv-01802-LJO-SAB (PC)

Plaintiff Garrick Harrington is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action

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2016, order, denying his request for recusal of the assigned magistrate judge.
Reconsideration motions are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Rodgers v. Watt,

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711 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983); Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir.

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1987). A party seeking reconsideration must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to

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induce the court to reverse a prior decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield,

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634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff‟d in part and rev‟d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514

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(9th Cir. 1987).

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This Court reviews a motion to reconsider a Magistrate Judge‟s ruling under the “clearly

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erroneous or contrary to law” standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 72(a). As such, the court may only set aside those portions of a Magistrate Judge‟s order

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that are either clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also Grimes v. City and

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County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir.1991) (discovery sanctions are non-dispositive

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pretrial matters that are reviewed for clear error under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)).

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A magistrate judge‟s factual findings are “clearly erroneous” when the district court is left with

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the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Security Farms v. International

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Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 1997); Green v. Baca, 219 F.R.D. 485, 489 (C.D. Cal.

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2003). The “„clearly erroneous‟ standard is significantly deferential.” Concrete Pipe and Products of

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California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 623

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(1993).

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The “contrary to law” standard allows independent, plenary review of purely legal

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determinations by the magistrate judge. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3rd

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Cir.1992); Green, 219 F.R.D. at 489; see also Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir.

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2002). “An order is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or

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rules of procedure.” Knutson v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 254 F.R.D. 553, 556 (D. Minn.

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2008); Rathgaber v. Town of Oyster Bay, 492 F.Supp.2d 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Surles v. Air

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France, 210 F.Supp.2d 501, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F.Supp. 202, 205

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(N.D. Cal. 1983).

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Plaintiff‟s motion for reconsideration must be denied. Title 28 U.S.C. § 455 requires recusal if

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the judge‟s alleged bias or prejudice “stems from an extrajudicial source and not from conduct or

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rulings made during the course of the proceedings. Toth v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 862 F.2d 1381,

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1388 (9th Cir. 1988). “A judge‟s previous adverse ruling alone is not sufficient bias.” Mayes v.

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Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984). As stated in the Court‟s January 13, 2016, order,

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Plaintiff‟s reason for recusal is based on his disagreement with rulings made during the course of these

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proceedings, and not from any extrajudicial source, and Plaintiff‟s request for recusal is denied. (ECF

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No. 88, Order at 3.) In addition, as addressed in Court‟s January 13, 2016, order, Plaintiff continues to
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repeat the same allegations relating to his medical condition and limited access to resources as the

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basis to further extend the time to file an opposition. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate with sufficient

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factual detail extraordinary circumstances, given the prior grant of four extensions of time, that

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prevent him from complying with the court‟s previous deadlines. (Id. at 2.) Furthermore, Plaintiff has

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had over four months to file an opposition to the pending motions for summary judgment, and the

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Magistrate Judge noted that the failure to file a timely opposition will result in the matter being

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submitted without Plaintiff‟s input. (Id. at 3.) Instead of focusing his attention on filing an

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opposition, Plaintiff has filed the instant motion for reconsideration, and for the reasons stated herein

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the motion must be denied. As stated in the Court‟s January 13, 2016, order Defendants‟ pending

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motions for summary judgment would be deemed submitted as of January 27, 2016 (fourteen days

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from the date of service of the January 13, 2016, order). Plaintiff is granted until February 8, 2016, to

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file an opposition to the pending motions for summary judgment. No further motions will be

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entertained and the motions for summary judgment will be deemed submitted for review after this

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date.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff‟s motion for reconsideration and recusal of the assigned

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magistrate judge is DENIED, and Plaintiff‟s opposition to the pending motions for summary judgment

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is due on or before February 8, 2016, after which time the motions will be deemed submitted for

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review.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

/s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill

January 27, 2016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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