Adams v. Clark

Filing 13

ORDER to petitioner to SHOW CAUSE in thirty days why the petition should not be dismissed for petitioner's failure to exhaust state court remedies, signed by Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto on 12/16/2010. Show Cause Response due by 1/20/2011.(Marrujo, C)

(HC) Adams v. Clark

Doc. 13

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 PHILLIP ADAMS, 11 Petitioner, 12 13 14 15 16 17 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a 18 petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 19 The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 20 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 and 303. 21 the Court is the petition, which was filed in this Court on 22 September 20, 2010. 23 parole authorities in September 2009 finding Petitioner 24 unsuitable for parole. 25 I. 26 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United 27 States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make 28 1
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

v. KEN CLARK, Respondent.

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1:10-cv--01820-LJO-SKO-HC ORDER TO PETITIONER TO SHOW CAUSE IN THIRTY (30) DAYS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES (Doc. 1)

Pending before

The petition challenges a decision made by

(Pet. 17-18.)

Screening the Petition

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a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court...." Habeas Rule 4; O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all

grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. Notice pleading is not sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption;

O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n. 7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition

that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to summary dismissal. Cir. 1990). Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th

8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2001). II. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and 2

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gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1988). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court

was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United

States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971), we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged 3

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violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2001), stating: Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law. See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982)), or the underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d at 865. ... In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as

24 amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 25 2001). 26 Where none of a petitioner's claims has been presented to 27 the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine, 28 4

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the Court must dismiss the petition.

Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed

petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

In the present petition, Petitioner raises three claims concerning denial of his Fourteenth Amendment rights: 1) the Board's denial of parole for three old disciplinary infractions was arbitrary and not supported by some evidence of unreasonable danger to the public; 2) the Board failed to articulate a rational nexus between the facts and Petitioner's current dangerousness; and 3) the Board failed to conduct an individualized assessment of each statutory factor. (Pet. 5-6.)

Petitioner describes exhaustion of various issues before the state trial and intermediate appellate courts. However, in

responding to the query concerning what grounds had been raised before the California Supreme Court, Petitioner stated: WILL I SPEND THE REST OF MY (sic) IN PRISON FOR THE 3 CDC 115'S OR ANY OTHER MATTERS THEY WISH TO BRING UP ME (sic) TO KEEP ME IN PRISON. (Pet. 2-3.) Petitioner provides orders from the California

Supreme Court in case number S184063, but he does not specifically describe the proceedings in the Supreme Court in which he exhausted his claims. Therefore, upon review of the

instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, it appears that Petitioner has not presented his numerous claims to the California Supreme Court. If Petitioner has not presented all of

his claims to the California Supreme Court, the Court cannot 5

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proceed to the merits of those claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). It is possible, however, that Petitioner has presented his claims to the California Supreme Court but has simply neglected to inform this Court. Thus, Petitioner must inform the Court which specific claims have been presented to the California Supreme Court, and if possible, provide the Court with a copy of the petition filed in the California Supreme Court, along with a copy of any ruling made by the California Supreme Court. Without knowing what

claims have been presented to the California Supreme Court, the Court is unable to proceed to the merits of the petition. III. Order to Show Cause Accordingly, Petitioner is ORDERED to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for Petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies. Petitioner is ORDERED to inform the

Court what claims have been presented to the California Supreme Court within thirty (30) days of the date of service of this order. Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order will result in dismissal of the petition pursuant to Local Rule 110.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: ie14hj December 16, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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