Adams v. Clark
Filing
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FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS to Dismiss the Petition 1 for Failure to State a Cognizable Claim, Dismiss Petitioner's Motion for an Extension of Time as Moot 16 , Decline to Issue a Certificate Appealabiity, and Direct the Clerk to Close the Case, signed by Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto on 5/9/11. Referred to Judge O'Neill. Objections Deadline: Thirty (30) Days. (Gonzalez, R)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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PHILLIP ADAMS,
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Petitioner,
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v.
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KEN CLARK,
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Respondent.
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1:10-cv—01820-LJO-SKO-HC
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
DISMISS THE PETITION FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM
(DOC. 1), DISMISS PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME
AS MOOT (DOC. 16), DECLINE TO
ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY, AND DIRECT THE
CLERK TO CLOSE THE CASE
OBJECTIONS DEADLINE:
THIRTY (30) DAYS
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Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a
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petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to
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28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 and 304.
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the Court is the petition, which was filed in this Court on
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September 20, 2010.
Pending before
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I.
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Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United
Consideration of Dismissal of the Petition
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States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make
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a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.
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The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly
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appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
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petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....”
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Habeas Rule 4; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.
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1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.
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1990).
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grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts
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supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested.
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Notice pleading is not sufficient; rather, the petition must
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state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional
Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all
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error.
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O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v.
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Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977)).
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that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to
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summary dismissal.
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Cir. 1990).
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Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption;
Allegations in a petition
Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th
Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas
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corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to
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the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the
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petition has been filed.
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8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43
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(9th Cir. 2001).
Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule
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In the present case, on December 17, 2010, the Court’s
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initial screening of the petition resulted in the issuance of an
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order to Petitioner to show cause why the petition should not be
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dismissed for failure to exhaust state court remedies.
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Petitioner sought extensions of time within which to respond.1
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court decided
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Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. –, 131 S.Ct. 859, 861-62 (2011).
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Because Swarthout appears to govern the instant case, the Court
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proceeds to consider whether the petition states a cognizable
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claim for relief.
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II.
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Petitioner alleges that he was an inmate of the California
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Background
Substance Abuse Treatment Facility at Corcoran, California
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(CSATF), who is serving a sentence of fifteen (15) years to life
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imposed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court pursuant to
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Petitioner’s 1980 conviction of second degree murder.
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Petitioner challenges the decision of California’s Board of
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Parole Hearings (BPH) finding Petitioner unsuitable for parole
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made after a hearing held on May 27, 2009; Petitioner also argues
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that the state court decisions upholding the governor’s parole
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determination were objectively unreasonable.
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(Pet. 1.)
(Pet. 5-6, 10, 2.)
It appears from Petitioner’s allegations and the partial
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transcript of the parole hearing submitted by Petitioner in
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support of the petition that he attended the parole hearing
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before the Board on May 27, 2009, and had an opportunity to
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address the board concerning parole suitability factors such as
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his disciplinary history and his work as a caregiver.
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12-18.)
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BPH’s denial of parole, which was based on the board’s conclusion
(Pet. 10,
Petitioner was given a statement of reasons for the
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In view of the recommendation in this order that the petition be
dismissed, it will be recommended that the Court dismiss as moot Petitioner’s
pending motion for an extension of time to respond to the order to show cause
regarding exhaustion.
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that Petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger or
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threat to public safety if released from prison.
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18.)
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disciplinary history, which reflected a long-term, major problem
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with anger.
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(Pet. 12, 12-
The reasons included Petitioner’s violent criminal and
(Pet. 12-18.)
Petitioner asks this Court to review whether there was some
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evidence to support the conclusion that Petitioner was unsuitable
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for parole because he posed a current threat of danger to the
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public if released.
(Pet. 5-6.)
Petitioner argues that his
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right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment was
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violated because the evidence of Petitioner’s past disciplinary
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problems was stale and insufficient to support the finding of
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current danger, the board failed to articulate a rational nexus
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between his history and current dangerousness, and the board
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failed to conduct an individualized assessment of each of the
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statutory factors of parole suitability as required by California
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statutes and case law.
(Pet. 5-6.)
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III.
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Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the
Failure to Allege a Claim Cognizable on Habeas Corpus
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effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
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Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding.
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v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008
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(1997); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999).
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A district court may entertain a petition for a writ of
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habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
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a state court only on the ground that the custody is in violation
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of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28
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U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
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Lindh
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375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. –, -, 131 S.Ct. 13,
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16 (2010) (per curiam).
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The Supreme Court has characterized as reasonable the
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decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that
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California law creates a liberty interest in parole protected by
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the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, which in turn
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requires fair procedures with respect to the liberty interest.
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Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. –, 131 S.Ct. 859, 861-62 (2011).
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However, the procedures required for a parole determination
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are the minimal requirements set forth in Greenholtz v. Inmates
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of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979).2
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Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 862.
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rejected inmates’ claims that they were denied a liberty interest
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because there was an absence of “some evidence” to support the
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decision to deny parole.
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In Swarthout, the Court
The Court stated:
There is no right under the Federal Constitution
to be conditionally released before the expiration of
a valid sentence, and the States are under no duty
to offer parole to their prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
When, however, a State creates a liberty interest,
the Due Process Clause requires fair procedures for its
vindication–and federal courts will review the
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In Greenholtz, the Court held that a formal hearing is not required
with respect to a decision concerning granting or denying discretionary
parole; it is sufficient to permit the inmate to have an opportunity to be
heard and to be given a statement of reasons for the decision made. Id. at
16. The decision maker is not required to state the evidence relied upon in
coming to the decision. Id. at 15-16. The Court reasoned that because there
is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be released
conditionally before expiration of a valid sentence, the liberty interest in
discretionary parole is only conditional and thus differs from the liberty
interest of a parolee. Id. at 9. Further, the discretionary decision to
release one on parole does not involve restrospective factual determinations,
as in disciplinary proceedings in prison; instead, it is generally more
discretionary and predictive, and thus procedures designed to elicit specific
facts are unnecessary. Id. at 13. In Greenholtz, the Court held that due
process was satisfied where the inmate received a statement of reasons for the
decision and had an effective opportunity to insure that the records being
considered were his records, and to present any special considerations
demonstrating why he was an appropriate candidate for parole. Id. at 15.
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application of those constitutionally required procedures.
In the context of parole, we have held that the procedures
required are minimal. In Greenholtz, we found
that a prisoner subject to a parole statute similar
to California’s received adequate process when he
was allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided
a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.
(Citation omitted.)
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Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. 859, 862.
The Court concluded that the
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petitioners had received the process that was due as follows:
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They were allowed to speak at their parole hearings
and to contest the evidence against them, were afforded
access to their records in advance, and were notified
as to the reasons why parole was denied....
That should have been the beginning and the end of
the federal habeas courts’ inquiry into whether
[the petitioners] received due process.
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Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 862.
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noted that California’s “some evidence” rule is not a substantive
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federal requirement, and correct application of California’s
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“some evidence” standard is not required by the federal Due
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Process Clause.
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The Court in Swarthout expressly
Id. at 862-63.
Here, Petitioner asks this Court to engage in the very type
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of analysis foreclosed by Swarthout.
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facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error or
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that otherwise would entitle Petitioner to habeas relief because
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California’s “some evidence” requirement is not a substantive
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federal requirement.
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support the denial of parole is not within the scope of this
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Court’s habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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Petitioner does not state
Review of the record for “some evidence” to
Petitioner’s claim that he did not receive a sufficiently
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individualized consideration of the factors appropriate under
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California law is likewise not cognizable.
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process to which Petitioner is entitled does not include any
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The minimal due
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particular degree of individualized consideration.
Petitioner cites state law concerning the process of
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granting parole and parole suitability.
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Petitioner’s claim or claims rest on state law, they are not
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cognizable on federal habeas corpus.
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not available to retry a state issue that does not rise to the
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level of a federal constitutional violation.
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562 U.S. — , 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502
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U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991).
To the extent that
Federal habeas relief is
Wilson v. Corcoran,
Alleged errors in the application of
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state law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.
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Schiavo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002).
Souch v.
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A petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without
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leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief
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can be pleaded were such leave granted.
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F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).
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Jarvis v. Nelson, 440
Here, the allegations in the petition and the supporting
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documentation reveal that Petitioner attended the parole
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suitability hearing, made statements to the BPH, and received a
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statement of reasons for the decisions of the BPH.
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Petitioner’s own allegations establish that he had an opportunity
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to be heard and received a statement of reasons for the decisions
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in question.
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It therefore does not appear that Petitioner could state a
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tenable due process claim.
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Thus,
Petitioner thus received all process that was due.
Accordingly, it will be recommended that the petition be
dismissed without leave to amend.
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IV.
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Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of
Certificate of Appealability
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appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals
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from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the
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detention complained of arises out of process issued by a state
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court.
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U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
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only if the applicant makes a substantial showing of the denial
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of a constitutional right.
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petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether
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the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
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that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement
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to proceed further.
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(quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).
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certificate should issue if the Petitioner shows that jurists of
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reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a
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valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
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jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district
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court was correct in any procedural ruling.
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529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000).
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28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
A certificate of appealability may issue
§ 2253(c)(2).
Under this standard, a
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336
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Slack v. McDaniel,
In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of
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the claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their
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merits, and determines whether the resolution was debatable among
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jurists of reason or wrong.
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applicant to show more than an absence of frivolity or the
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existence of mere good faith; however, it is not necessary for an
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applicant to show that the appeal will succeed.
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Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338.
Id.
It is necessary for an
Miller-El v.
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A district court must issue or deny a certificate of
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appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the
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applicant.
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could
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debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a
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different manner.
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of the denial of a constitutional right.
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recommended that the Court decline to issue a certificate of
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appealability.
Petitioner has not made a substantial showing
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V.
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Accordingly, it will be
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
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1)
Recommendation
The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED
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without leave to amend because Petitioner has failed to state a
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claim cognizable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254; and
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2)
Petitioner’s motion for an extension of time within
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which to respond to the order to show cause regarding exhaustion
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be DISMISSED as moot; and
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3)
The Court DECLINE to issue a certificate of
appealability; and
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The Clerk be DIRECTED to close the action because
dismissal would terminate the proceeding in its entirety.
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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the
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United States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant
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to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of
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the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,
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Eastern District of California.
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being served with a copy, any party may file written objections
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with the Court and serve a copy on all parties.
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should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings
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and Recommendations.”
Within thirty (30) days after
Such a document
Replies to the objections shall be served
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and filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if
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served by mail) after service of the objections.
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then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
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636 (b)(1)(C).
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objections within the specified time may waive the right to
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appeal the District Court’s order.
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1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
The Court will
The parties are advised that failure to file
Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
ie14hj
May 9, 2011
/s/ Sheila K. Oberto
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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