Irvin v. Yates, et al.

Filing 51

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS Regarding Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint 50 , signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 07/09/14. Referred to Judge Ishii. Thirty-Day Objection Deadline. (Gonzalez, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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KAJAUNA KENYATTA IRVIN,

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Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES A YATES, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:10-cv-01940-AWI-SAB (PC)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH AMENDED
COMPLAINT
[ECF No. 50]

Plaintiff Kajauna Kenyatta Irvin is appearing pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42

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U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). The case

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was removed from state court on October 14, 2010.

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Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint filed March 27, 2014.

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I.

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks

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monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally

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participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County,

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Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings

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liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now

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higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive

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screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow

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the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal,

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556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer

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possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely

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consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556

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U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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II.

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COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

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Plaintiff raises several claims regarding his right to exercise his religion while he was housed

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at Pleasant Valley State Prison (PVSP). Plaintiff is a sincere believer in the religion of Islam and

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actively participates in all religious activities prescribed by Islamic law.

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Islam is based on five pillars: (1) to testify that there is no diet worthy of worship but Allah (G-

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d) and that Muhammed is the Messenger of Allah; (b) to perform the five daily prayers at dawn, noon,

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afternoon, sunset and night; (c) to give of one’s weather in charity; (d) to fast each day from dawn to

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sunset in the holy month of Ramadan; and (e) to perform Hajj (pilgrimage) to the holy city of Mecca

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at least once in one’s lifetime, if financially and physically able to do so.

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In Islam, Muslims adhere to two sources of Islamic law: (1) the Holy Qur’an—which Muslims
believe to be Allah’s words revealed to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), and (b) the Sunnah (i.e.,
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actions, commands, examples and sayings) of Prophet Muhammad, to which Muslims are commanded

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in Qur’an, to follow his commands and abstain from what he forbids.

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Plaintiff and the majority of PVSP’s Facility A inmate Muslim population adhere to the Sunni

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interpretation of Islamic law, meaning that they follow a strict and, when appropriate, literal

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interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah.

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Under Islamic law, Muslims are commanded to perform certain religious rites and rituals as a

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condition or aspect of one’s Faith, such as: (1) to attend the weekly congregational Jum’ah, which

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replaces the noon prayer on Fridays; (2) to study and learn the religion of Islam; (3) to purify one’s

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body, clothing and places of worship prior to prayers; (4) to fast on holy month of Ramadan; (5) to

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observe the two major holidays in the Islamic lunar year, which if missed, cannot be made up later

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dates: Id-ul-Fitr (Festival of Breaking the Fast) and Id-ul-Adha (Festival of the Sacrifice), The Id-ul-

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Fitr commemorates the end of the Ramadam fast, and Id-ul-Adha commemorates the end of the Hajj

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season. The Id commences with a congregational prayer, followed by a sermon. Afterwards, Muslims

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enjoy a feast (of Islamic halal foods) and fellowship; (6) it is an Islamic tradition for Muslims to use

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scented oils before prayers, and at every gathering (esp., Jumu’ah and Ids); (7) it is also an Islamic

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tradition for Muslims to wear head coverings (i.e., Muslim men wear a turban (kifayyah) or prayer cap

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(kufi), and other distinct Muslim identifying artifacts; and (8) to consume only halal (Islamically

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permissible) foods and drinks.

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Islam is not an earth-based religion, meaning that Muslims are not outdoor, nature

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worshippers. The Prophet Muhammad emphasized indoor worship by constructing a masjid/mosque,

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and ordered Muslims to do the same. Additionally, he forbade Muslims from worshipping in areas of

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filth and where there is frequent movement.

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Plaintiff was housed at PVSP from January 25, 2006, to January 13, 2011. At the time of his
arrival, PVSP had in its employment a full-time Muslim Chaplain named Michael A. Salaam.
In September of 2006, Chaplain Salaam had Plaintiff assigned as the inmate Muslim Clerk.

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While employed at PVSP, Chaplain Salaam ensured that Plaintiff and other Muslim inmates received

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weekly chapel access for Ta’leem and Jumu’ah prayer services, as well as approved requests to

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purchase and receive religious artifacts, which he ensured were issued in a reasonably timely fashion;
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obtained religious significant foods from outside Islamic business for the annual Ramadan and two Id

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banquets; obtained donations for PVSP’s Islamic program; and managed a PVSP trust account with

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funds allotted by CDCR’s religious budget for the benefit of Plaintiff and other Muslim inmates.
While Chaplain Salaam worked at PVSP, Plaintiff and other Muslim inmates had minimal

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problems receiving adequate religious accommodations. Indeed, on several occasions Chaplain

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Salaam had obtained permission from custody supervisory staff to allow Plaintiff and other Facility A

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Muslim inmates to gather in the chapel for religious services, under custody supervision, during his

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absences from PVSP.
During Chaplain Salaam’s tenure, Plaintiff and other Muslim inmates were allowed to receive

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chapel access for Ta’leem and Jumu’ah services during program modifications, pursuant to PVSP

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policy.

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On November 12, 2008, Chaplain Salaam submitted PVSP officials written notification of his

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last day at PVSP on December 5, 2008, to begin working at Avenal State Prison (ASP) on December

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8, 2008.
Prior to Chaplain Salaam’s job transfer, he obtained written approval from then Facility A

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supervisory staff on November 14, 2008, to allow Plaintiff and other Muslim inmates to gather in the

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chapel, under custody staff supervision, on Thursdays for Ta’leem and Fridays for Jumu’ah during the

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interim of PVSP hiring a replacement Muslim Chaplain.
Soon after Chaplain Salaam’s departure, Plaintiff and other Facility A Muslim inmates began

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experiencing problems from PVSP staff regarding chapel access for scheduled religious services,

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issues concerning staff refusal to sign and promptly return religious service approval lists, and

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religious special purchase package forms, staff refusal to retrieve and promptly deliver religious

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special purchase pack forms within a reasonably timely fashion, and staff hindrance on religious

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accommodations for Ramada and two Ids.

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III.

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DISCUSSION

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A.

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The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, made

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applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, “forbids all laws ‘prohibiting the free

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exercise’ of religion.” McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 620 (1978). The Free Exercise Clause

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protects a person’s right to hold a particular belief and the right to engage in conduct motivated by that

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belief. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) “[T]he ‘exercise of religion’ often involves not

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only belief and profession [of belief] but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts….” Id.

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Free Exercise of Religion

“The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not terminate at the prison door.”

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McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342

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(1987) and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)). Moreover, the right to free exercise of

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religious faith is “necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to

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achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.” McElyea, 822 F.2d at 197 (citing

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O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348). Action by prison officials which impacts the inmate’s right to free exercise

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of religion “is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Id. (quoting O’Lone,

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482 U.S. at 348, in turn quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).

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1.

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Plaintiff contends that he was denied chapel access for Ta’leem, Jumu’ah, Ramadan, and Id-ul-

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Denial of Chapel Access

Adha banquests.

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Based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint, he states a cognizable claim

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for denial of chapel access from November 2008 to 2011, against Defendants McGee, Allen, Bennett,

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Huckabay, Myers, McBride, Laniz, Cate, Yates, Trimble, Fisher, Brazelton, Nash, Shimmin, Davis,

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Walker, and Does 1-25.

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2.

Denial of Religious Dietary Foods

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Plaintiff contends that on June 8, 2009, Defendants Myers, Nash, Shimmin, and Farkas

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determined that Plaintiff and other Muslim inmates would no longer be provided with edible dates for

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the three major annual Islamic events. After this time, Plaintiff was not provided with appropriate

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food to meet his religious practices

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Based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint, Plaintiff states a cognizable

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claim against Defendants Myers, Nash, Shimmin, Farkas, McGee, Allen, Walker, Davis, Brazelton,

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Trimble, Yates, Fisher, Guthery, McBride, and Laniz.

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3.

Denial of Religious Artifacts/Packages

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Plaintiff contends that after Chaplain Salaam’s departure, he was denied ordering and/or

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receiving religious packages, including Islamic artifacts such as prayer rugs, kufi caps, dhiker bead,

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and prayer oils. Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against Defendants

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McGee, Myers, Nash, Trimble, Brazelton, Yates, Cate, and Does 1 through 25.

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4.

Failure to Hire Muslim Chaplain

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Plaintiff contends that from December 8, 2008 to 2012, PVSP’s Muslim Chaplain position

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remained vacant despite the prison having received a hiring exception and numerous letters of interest

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from Muslim clergy. However, PVSP hired and approved chaplains and volunteers of other faith

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groups during this period. Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against

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Defendants Trimble, Brazelton, Fisher, Nash, Shimmin, Myers, and Yates.

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B.

RLUIPA

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To state a claim for violation of RLUIPA, Plaintiff must allege facts plausibly showing that the

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challenged policy and the practices it engenders impose a substantial burden on the exercise of his

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religious beliefs; Plaintiff bears the initial burden of persuasion on this issue. Hartmann v. California

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Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).

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Under RLUIPA, the government may not impose a substantial burden on a person’s exercise of

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religion unless it: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least

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restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. The

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Ninth Circuit has found that a substantial burden on religious exercise “must impose a significantly

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great restriction or onus upon such exercise. San Jose Christian Coll. V. City of Morgan Hill, 360

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F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004).

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As stated above in section A, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the denial of chapel access,

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religious dietary food, and religious artifacts/packages are sufficient to state a cognizable claim under

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the RLUIPA against Defendants McGee, Allen, Bennett, Huckabay, Myers, McBride, Laniz, Cate,

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Yates, Trimble, Fisher, Brazelton, Nash, Shimmin, Davis, Walker, Farkas, Guthery, and Does 1-25.

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C.

Equal Protection

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The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike.

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City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985); Hartmann

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v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705

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F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). To state a

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claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him based on his

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membership in a protected class. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1030; Serrano v.

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Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir.

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2001).
Plaintiff contends that the “Defendants” have refused to grant chapel access to Plaintiff and

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other Muslim inmates with chaplain supervision. Yet, Buddhist and Judeo-Christian groups who had

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chaplains and/or religious volunteers were granted access to the chapel. Plaintiff further contends that

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McGee specifically refused to assist groups other than Protestants and canceled Muslim services in

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order to conduct Protestant services.

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Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable equal protection claim against

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Defendant McGee only. Although Plaintiff alleges that Muslim inmates were denied chapel access

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and other religious services, Plaintiff specifically acknowledges that the denial was a result of the lack

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of chapel services to be supervised by a Muslim chaplain. Plaintiff fails to allege facts to demonstrate

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that any defendant other than McGee intentionally discriminated against him in favor of another

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religion. Accordingly, Plaintiff states an equal protection claim against Defendant McGee only.

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Because Plaintiff has previously been provided with the applicable legal standard and failed to cure

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the deficiency, further leave to amend is not warranted. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th

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Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

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IV.

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RECOMMENDATION

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Based on the foregoing,

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

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This action proceed on Plaintiff’s First Amendment, RLUIPA, and equal protection
claims against the defendants set forth above;

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2.

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All other claims and defendants be DISMISSED, with prejudice, for failure to state a
cognizable claim; and

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3.

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The matter be referred back to the Magistrate Judge for initiation of service of process.

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days

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after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections

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with the Court. The document should be captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s Findings and

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Recommendations.@ Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

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waive the right to appeal the District Court=s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

July 9, 2014
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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