Hughes v. Bruner

Filing 13

ORDER DISMISSING 1 Complaint, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, for Failure to State a Claim; ORDER DIRECTING Clerk's Office to Provide Plaintiff with a Blank Complaint Form; Thirty Day Deadline signed by Magistrate Judge Gerald B. Cohn on 4/21/2011. First Amended Complaint due by 5/26/2011. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint Form)(Sant Agata, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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BERNARD C. HUGHES,

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Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. 1:11-cv-00110-AWI -GBC (PC)
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM

v.
ROBERT BRUNER,

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(Doc. 1)
Defendant.

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ORDER DIRECTING CLERK’S OFFICE TO
PROVIDE PLAINTIFF WITH A BLANK
COMPLAINT FORM

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(Doc. 1)

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THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

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Screening Order
I.

Screening Requirement
Plaintiff Bernard Hughes, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 21, 2011.

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

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“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall
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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

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claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

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is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). “[P]laintiffs [now] face a higher

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burden of pleadings facts . . ,” Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), and while a

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plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,”

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Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and

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citation omitted).

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To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth factual allegations sufficient to state

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a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962,

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969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility

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standard. Id.

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II.

Plaintiff’s Claim

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Plaintiff brings this civil suit against Sergeant Robert Bruner, an employee at the Mariposa

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County Detention Facility and Lieutenant Susan Brent (“Defendants”). (Doc. 1, Complaint at p. 2).

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On December 28, 2009, Defendant Bruner and Plaintiff had an argument. (Doc. 1, Comp. at 4).

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Presumably as a result of the argument, Defendant Bruner submitted a false report stating that

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Plaintiff threatened Defendant Bruner at the Mariposa County Adult Detention Facility. (Doc. 1,

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Comp. at 4). Plaintiff went through the disciplinary process and was found guilty based upon the

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report and statement of Defendant Bruner. (Doc. 1, Comp. at 4). As a result of a guilty finding from

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the disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff was placed in disciplinary isolation as punishment. (Doc. 1, Comp.

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at 4).

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Plaintiff then filed a “Citizen’s Complaint” to redress Defendant Bruner’s falsification of the

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report and upon investigation, a sherif deputy found that Defendant Bruner had made false

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allegations. (Doc. Comp. at 4-5). According to his complaint, Plaintiff suffered multiple days of
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disciplinary isolation, loss of visits and loss of phone calls because the investigation were results

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given too late and not in time to prevent implementation of punishment as a result of the prior

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disciplinary decision. (Doc. 1, Comp. at 5).

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A. Linkage Requirement

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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

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Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .
. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

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actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell

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v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

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Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,

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within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

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affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

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deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In

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order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with

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some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff’s federal rights.

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Plaintiff lists Lieutenant Susan Brent as a Defendant in the complaint, but fails to mention

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her or her alleged unconstitutional conduct anywhere else in his complaint. If Plaintiff intends to

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pursue claims against Lieutenant Susan Brent, he must clarify how Lieutenant Susan Brent

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personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federally protected

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rights. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930,

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934 (9th Cir. 2002).

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B. Due Process

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A prisoner does not have a “constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or

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wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”

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Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F. 2d 450, 452 (8th Cir.1989). Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment provides

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that a prisoner “has a right not to be deprived of a protected liberty interest without due process of
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law.” Id. As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the disciplinary hearing,

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allegations of a fabricated charge fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Sprouse, 870 F. 2d at 452;

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Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir.1986); Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140-41

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(7th Cir.1984). Moreover, the fact that a prisoner may have been innocent of the charges does not

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raise a due process issue. The Constitution demands due process, not error-free decision-making.

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See Ricker v. Leapley, 25 F.3d 1406, 1410 (8th Cir. 1994).

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An inmate in California is entitled to due process before discipline is imposed that results in

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an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See Sandin

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v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 1) a written statement at least twenty-four hours before the

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disciplinary hearing that includes the charges, a description of the evidence against the prisoner, and

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an explanation for the disciplinary action taken; 2) an opportunity to present documentary evidence

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and call witnesses, unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional security; and 3) legal

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assistance where the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

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U.S. 539, 563-70 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Superintendent v. Hill 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Neal v.

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Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1997); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1419-20 (9th Cir.

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1994); McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir. 1986). The findings of the prison

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disciplinary decision-maker must be supported by some evidence in the record, Superintendent v.

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Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), and there must be some indicia of reliability of the information that

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forms the basis for prison disciplinary actions, Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1987).

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To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim against Defendant Bruner based merely upon

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allegations that Defendant Bruner submitted a false report, Plaintiff's claim is insufficient to state

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a due process violation. However, if Plaintiff believes that he was not afforded sufficient due

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process as articulated above, Plaintiff may amend his complaint.

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III.

Conclusion and Order

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Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim for relief under section 1983. The Court will

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grant Plaintiff one opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-

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49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims
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in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each

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named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights,

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Iqbal at 1948-49; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must

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be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

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(citations omitted).

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Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,

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114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must

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be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220.

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Therefore, “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an

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amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand,

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644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1.

The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form;

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2.

Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

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be granted;

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3.

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Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an
amended complaint; and

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4.

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If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this
action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:
0jh02o

April 21, 2011
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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