Piazza v. Brackett et al

Filing 9

SCREENING ORDER re 1 Complaint signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 1/9/2012. (Lundstrom, T)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL J. PIAZZA,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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D. R. BRACKETT, DEREK PERRY,
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Defendants.
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_____________________________________ )

1:11-cv-01536-AWI-BAM
SCREENING ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT
(Doc. 1)

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I.

Introduction

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Plaintiff Michael J. Piazza (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
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pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action against
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defendants D. R. Brackett, a California Highway Patrol Officer (hereinafter referred to as
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“Brackett”), and Derek Perry, a detective with the Ceres Police Department (hereinafter referred
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to as “Perry”) (Perry and Brackett are collectively referred to as the “Defendants”) on September
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8, 2011. (Doc. 1.)
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/././
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/././
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II.

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Screening Requirement
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

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legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

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that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

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§§ 1915A(b)(1)-(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the complaint fails to

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state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint

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can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief . . ..” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

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required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing

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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). Plaintiff

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must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its

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face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court must accept as true the factual

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and nonconclusory allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex

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Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

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favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all

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doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

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III.

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Plaintiff’s claims
Plaintiff alleges that on August 25, 2008, Defendants used excessive force and “inflicted

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cruel and unusual punishment” in affecting Plaintiff’s arrest at 1215 Glenn Avenue, Modesto,

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CA 95351. (Pl.’s Compl., 5, Doc. 1.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants, prior to affecting Plaintiff’s

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arrest on August 25, 2008, towed a 1988 Ford Bronco from the Glenn avenue residence and

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placed a GPS tracking device on Plaintiff’s “1988 Chevy Pick-up,” also located at the Glenn

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Avenue residence. Id. at 5-6.

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Around 11:30 a.m. that same day, Plaintiff returned to the Glenn Avenue address to make

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some repairs on the 1988 Chevy Pick-Up. At that time, Plaintiff noticed the GPS device under

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his vehicle. Plaintiff alleges when he found the GPS device, Defendants surrounded Plaintiff at

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gunpoint and began to beat him while handcuffed. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants

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committed the following acts against Plaintiff: Defendants tasered Plaintiff several times while

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Plaintiff was handcuffed; Defendants stepped on Plaintiff’s face, causing a loss of Plaintiff’s

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teeth and impaired hearing; and Defendants also employed other means of excessive force

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resulting in physical injury to Plaintiff. Id.

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IV.

Analysis

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The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides as follows:

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Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. . . shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.

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In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a person

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was acting under color of state law at the time the act complained of was committed; and (2) that

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person’s conduct deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the

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Constitution or laws of the United States. Paratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). To

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warrant relief under the Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must allege and show that defendant’s acts or

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omissions caused the deprivation of his constitutionally protected rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844

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F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1993). Thus, the statute requires that there be an actual causal connection

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or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by

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plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423

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U.S. 362 (1976).

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Construing the facts alleged as true, and in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,

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Defendants conduct was an unlawful and excessive use of force, violating Plaintiff’s rights under

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the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the complaint states a cognizable claim for relief under section

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1983 against Defendants Perry and Brackett. See Bernat v. California City Police Dept., 2011

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WL 1103130, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar.22, 2011) (Wanger, J.) (“it has long been settled that

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gratuitous use of force against a compliant, nonthreatening suspect violates the Fourth

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Amendment.”)

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V.

Conclusion

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For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants

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Perry and Brackett under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may proceed as those claims are sufficiently pled for

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purposes of pro se screening.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:
10c20k

January 9, 2012

/s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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