Coleman v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation et al

Filing 12

ORDER DISMISSING CASE Against All Defendants Without Leave to Amend and Directing Clerk of the Court to Enter Judgement of Dismissal, With Prejudice, Which States that the Dismissal Counts as a "Strike" Under 42 U.S.C. 1915(g); ORDER REVOKING In Forma Pauperis Status for Appeal Purposes, signed by Chief Judge Ralph R. Beistline on 11/12/2014. CASE CLOSED. (Jessen, A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ROBERT COLEMAN,
Case No. 1:11-cv-01587-RRB
Plaintiff,
vs.
DISMISSAL ORDER
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS and
REHABILITATION, et al.,
Defendants.

Robert Coleman, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this
civil rights action under the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983), the American with Disabilities
Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794)
against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and three of
its officials.1 Coleman’s Complaint arises out of his incarceration in the Special Housing Unit
(“SHU”) at California State Prison–Corcoran (“COR”). Coleman is currently incarcerated at
the California State Prison–Sacramento (“CSP-Sac”).

1

In addition to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Coleman
names as defendants: Susan L. Hubbard (Director of CDCR); Scott Kernan (Chief Deputy
Secretary of Adult Operations, CDCR); and Robin Dezembr (Director, Division of Correctional
Health Care Services).
DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 1

I.

GRAVAMEN OF COMPLAINT
Coleman has been clinically diagnosed with a mental disorder: “Exhibitionism.” In his

Complaint Coleman alleges that by confining him in administrative segregation (“ad-seg”) in
a SHU Defendants have: (1) denied him equal protection; (2) been deliberately indifferent to
his medical needs; (3) violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; and (4) violated Title II of the
ADA.
Coleman’s Complaint appears to challenge the CDCR housing policy initiated by
Defendants Scott Kernan and Robin Dezembr placed into effect on August 31, 2007. As
pertinent to the complaint that policy provides:
AMENDED HOUSING POLICY FOR ADULT MALE INMATES REFERRED
FOR TREATMENT OF EXHIBITIONISM
This supersedes the memorandum issued July 2, 2007, that announced the
housing policy for adult male inmates diagnosed with exhibitionism.
Pursuant to a Coleman court order issued March 9, 2007, the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) is required to implement
a specialized group Exhibitionism Treatment Program for inmates in the Mental
Health Services Delivery System (MHSDS) who have been identified as
requiring treatment for exhibitionism. The Coleman order required that group
treatment be provided in at least three institutions by July 1, 2007. A mental
heath interdisciplinary team (IDTT) will provide a form 128:MH8 Chrono, Mental
Health IDTT Housing/Program Recommendation (sample attached),
documenting that the inmate meets clinical criteria requiring treatment of
exhibitionism. A CDCR Form 128-C, Medical, Psych, Dental Chrono may be
used temporarily while institutions are in the process of implementing form 128MH8. Treatment is required when an inmate has had at least one episode of
indecent exposure in the last six months (at the time of the IDTT), and is either
diagnosed with Exhibitionism, or meets the following alternate criteria.
Alternate criteria: The Exhibitionism diagnosis requires that the patient
experiences "fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving the exposure of
one's genitals to an unsuspecting stranger." An inmate who meets all criteria
for the diagnosis of Exhibitionism, except that the victim was not an
"unsuspecting stranger" but was a staff member or inmate who did not consent
DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 2

to or encourage the behavior, must be referred for treatment of exhibitionism.
A diagnosis of Exhibitionism is not required for inmates who meet the alternate
criteria.
Inmate-patients meeting the clinical criteria shall be transferred to one of the
three locations, based on the following custody criteria.
Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP)-Psychiatric Services Unit (PSU)
California State Prison, Sacramento (SAC) - PSU
•
Inmates currently serving Security Housing Unit (SHU) terms and who
are at the Enhanced Outpatient Program (EOP) level of care.
•
Inmates on Administrative Segregation Unit (ASU) status with pending
SHU terms at their current location and who are at the EOP level of
care.
California State Prison, Corcoran (COR) SHU
•
Inmates currently serving SHU terms and who are at the Correctional
Clinical Case Management System(CCCMS) level of care.
•
Inmates on ASU status pending SHU terms at their current location and
who are at the CCCMS level of care.
Inmates that are eligible for COR SHU who are susceptible to developing
Coccidiomycosis (Valley Fever) organism will-go-to SAC PSU.
* * * *
HOUSING POLICY
Once clinically diagnosed with Exhibitionism or determined to meet the alternate
criteria, the case will be reviewed by an Institutional Classification Committee
and Interdisciplinary Treatment Team (ICC/IDTT). The ICC/IOTT will evaluate
the inmate's case factors to determine whether he can safely program in a
group therapy setting in one of the three programs listed above. In addition to
the required documentation outlined in the California Code of Regulations, Title
15, Section 3375, "Classification Process", the CDCR Form 128-G,
Classification Chrono, shall document the following:
•
The date of placement and initial reason for placement in segregated
housing.
•
Whether a Rules Violation Report (RVR) was issued and, if so, its
disposition. Identify the outcome if adjudicated. Note whether the case
was referred to the District Attorney (DA) and, if so, the status of the
referral.
•
Any subsequent RVRs the inmate has received and their status
(adjudicated, pending DA referral, etc).
•
Whether the inmate has a pending RVR and, if so, annotate that the
sending institution will retain responsibility for the adjudication of all
pending RVRs.
DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 3

•

Whether the inmate is currently serving a SHU term and, if so, whether
it is determinate or indeterminate, and the Minimum Eligible Release
Date (MERD), if applicable.
•
If the inmate is pending a SHU term. document the projected MERD
date.
•
Review of potential enemy concerns.
•
Any security concerns the committee may have as a result of the
inmate's case factors.
•
If suitable for placement, indicate the specific exhibitionism treatment
program the inmate is being recommended for transfer.
•
If not suitable for placement, provide specific reasons why the inmate is
not eligible.
Inmates with pending RVRs and/or court proceedings may be transferred to the
program. After the inmate is transferred, the sending institution will retain
responsibility for the adjudication ·of all pending RVRs and be responsible for
transporting the inmate to and from all necessary court proceedings. The
sending institution will be responsible for notifying the receiving institution when
the inmate must be transported for court proceedings.
Inmates whose SHU terms are within 90 days of expiring and who have no
subsequent disciplinary related issues pending will not be transferred to the
treatment program. Inmates whose SHU terms will not expire within 90 days or
have additional SHU terms pending are eligible for transfer.
Inmates that are in ASU with pending or projected SHU terms of greater than
90 days are eligible for transfer. Inmates with projected MERDs of less than 90
days will not be transferred to the program.
Therefore, any inmate with a SHU or projected SHU term of less than 90 days
is not eligible for placement in the Exhibitionism Treatment Program.
Inmates previously housed on Sensitive Needs Yards (SNY) who are currently
placed in ASU or are serving SHU terms will be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis by the current institution's ICC/IDTT for placement consideration to
determine whether the individual can safely participate in a group treatment
program in close proximity to non-SNY inmates. This information will be
documented on the CDCR 128-G. If determined appropriate for placement in
an Exhibitionism Treatment Program, the receiving institution will conduct an
ICC/IDTT to determine how best to provide for the inmate's safety while housed
in the treatment program, and document such provisions on the CDCR 128-G.
Inmates scheduled for transfer to the Exhibitionism Treatment Program at one
of the participating institutions will not supersede the established mental health
priority transfer agreement as it relates to PSU and SHU beds. The CSR will
fax a copy of the endorsement chrono to the DCHCS, Health Placement Unit,
at [phone], for tracking purposes.
DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 4

The Exhibitionism Treatment Program is voluntary; however, pursuant to the
court order, inmates meeting the criteria for inclusion will be transferred to one
of the three institutions providing this group treatment. If a qualifying inmate
refuses to enter the program; he shall be put up for transfer to one of the
participating institutions. Once at the institution, mental health staff will
intervene to encourage the inmate to participate. The inmate will remain at the
institution until he either: (1) voluntarily enters the Exhibitionism Treatment
Program; (2) has not committed a qualifying offense for a six-month period; or
(3) his SHU term has been completed.2
In 2008 Coleman challenged his SHU confinement in an administrative proceeding
within the California prison system, which denied him relief.3
Second Level Decision (June 3, 2008)
APPEAL DECISION: DENIED
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:
It is the appellant's position that he be transferred to Atascadero State Hospital,
Patton State Hospital, or a Psychiatric Services Unit (PSU). He also has
several custody complaints.
ACTION REQUESTED:
The appellant states on appeal that he has been "denied adequate mental
health treatment" and he requests housing in a PSU. He also states that his
"mental illness suffers dearly by AdSeg placement that contributes to certain
disorders and behavior".
APPEAL RESPONSE:
The appellant was interviewed at the First Level of Review by W. Von Kliest,
Ph.D., his clinical case manager. She states that he is participating fully in the
Correctional Clinical Case Management System (CCCMS) program and his

2

Docket 1, pp. 34–38.

3

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b) (“Unless otherwise stated in these regulations,
all appeals are subject to a third level of review, as described in section 3084.7, before
administrative remedies are deemed exhausted. All lower level reviews are subject to
modification at the third level of review.”). Section 3084.7 provides for three levels of review,
the third level conducted by the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, or by a designated representative. Following this procedure exhausts a
prisoner’s administrative remedies with respect to the issues raised therein.
DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 5

mental health level of care is appropriate. This reviewer finds that appellant has
been seen weekly by his case manager, most recently May 27, 2008. In
addition, the appellant was seen and evaluated by a psychiatrist on May 6,
2008, for a 14 day follow-up. These clinicians found the appellant to be stable
and placed at the appropriate level of care. The appellant received adequate
mental health treatment within the guidelines of the CDCR.
The Appellant has been provided with a thorough response. Therefore, based
on the above, his appeal is being DENIED at the Second Level of Review.
His custody complaints can be addressed in a separate 602.4
Director’s Level Appeal Decision (Dated October 6, 2008)
I.
APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT: It is appellant’s position that the Corcoran
State Prison (COR) mental health staff have denied him the right to receive
adequate medical health care.
The appellant requests that he be transferred to Atascadero or Patton Hospital
and moved to a Psychiatric Segregation Unit.
II.
SECOND LEVEL’S DECISION: [Omitted]
III.
DIRECTOR’S LEVEL DECISION:
A.
FINDINGS: Documentation and arguments presented are
persuasive that the appellant has failed to support his appeal issue with
sufficient evidence or facts to warrant modification of the SLR. It is not
appropriate for the appellant to self diagnose his own mental health
problems and then expect the mental health staff to implement
appellant’s recommendation for a course of medical treatment. The
appellant’s case factors have been evaluated by mental health staff who
have determined that he has been appropriately placed in the Mental
Health Services Delivery System at the CCCMS level of care. There is
no indication that any evidence has been found to justify placing the
appellant in an alternate level of care.
The appellant filed the appeal as an American with Disabilities Act issue.
Following careful examination, there is no evidence to support that the
issue and its resolution fall within the Armstrong Remedial Plan or
California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section (CCR) 3085. As such
it has been processed in accordance with CCR 3084 et sequitur. The
appellant added new issues and requests to his appeal. The additional
requested action is not addressed herein as it is not appropriate to
expand the appeal beyond the initial problem and the initially requested

4

Docket 1, p. 30.

DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 6

action (CDC Form 602, Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form, Sections A and
B).
B.
BASIS FOR THE DECISION:
CCR 3001, 3264, 3350, 3360, 3379.
C.
ORDER: No changes or modifications are required by the
institution.5
The record submitted by Coleman also indicates that the following year Coleman was
convicted in a disciplinary proceeding of indecent exposure and was sentenced to a 9-month
term in the SHU commencing on September 26, 2009. Based upon Coleman’s continued
misconduct, by action dated January 26, 2010, his SHU term was made indeterminate On
May 20, 2010, the Inmate Classification Committee (“ICC”), noting a pending Rule Violation
Report (“RVR”) dated May 13, 2010, found it appropriate to continue Coleman’s placement
in the SHU for an indefinite period. The Committee Action Summary also included the
following:
CLINICIAN REVIEW: S is a participant in the MHSDS at the CCCMS level of
care per CDCR 128C dated 5/13/10. Based on interview with S and review of
the C-File with WS Nickel, CCI: S does have a history of suicidal ideation. S
is not currently prescribed pyschotropic medication. S’s Activities of Daily Living
(ADL) are adequate. S’s interactions with staff appear to be appropriate. S
placement in alternative levels of care in the Mental Health Services Delivery
System was considered and not recommended. Present and assigned as staff
assistant is CCI P. Johnson.6

5

Docket 1, p. 20.

6

Docket 1, p. 42.

DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 7

II.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT
This Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.7 This Court must
dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that
“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”8
In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court looks to the pleading
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”9
“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but
it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”10
Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), including the rule that complaints filed by pro se prisoners
are to be liberally construed, affording the prisoner the benefit of any doubt, and dismissal

7

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

8

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1126 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
9

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

10

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)).
DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 8

should be granted only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can plead no facts in
support of his claim that would entitle him or her to relief.11
This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim
for relief.12 “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s
liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”13
Further, although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint,
a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true.14 “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”15
III.

DISCUSSION
Reduced to its essence Coleman’s complaint is that, because he has been diagnosed

with a mental disorder that contributed to the behavior for which he was subjected to
disciplinary action, his ad-seg placement in a SHU violates his rights. Coleman does not
otherwise contest the adjudication that he violated prison regulations, only that he may not be
placed in ad-seg in a SHU. Instead, Coleman appears to contend that he must be allowed to
participate in mental health care at one of the other two institutions designated for treatment

11

Wilhelm v. Rotham, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).

12

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–69; see Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969
(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting and applying Iqbal and Twombly).
13

Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

14

Id.

15

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 9

for “exhibitionism”: Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) or California State Prison, Sacramento
(“CSP-Sac”).
A.

Denial of Equal Protection
Although somewhat difficult to follow, the gist of Coleman’s equal protection argument

appears to be that inmates diagnosed with “exhibitionism” who have been convicted of rules
violations are being discriminated against because they are being treated differently than other
inmates suffering from the same disorder who have not been so convicted. More specifically,
it appears that Coleman contends that, unlike other Enhanced Outpatient Program (“EOP”)
inmates who are excluded from placement in the SHU, he is being denied the same medical
treatment that he would receive if placed in one of CDCR’s Psychiatric Services Units.
In order to invoke the protection of the Equal Protection Clause Coleman must first
establish that he is a member of a protected class.16 Initially, the Court notes that sex
offenders do not constitute a suspect class.17 But more importantly, Coleman’s factual
allegations are incorrect. Contrary to Coleman’s allegations, those diagnosed with
“exhibitionism” are not necessarily compelled to receive treatment only in the SHU, nor are

16

See Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (“To state a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to
discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
17

See Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1277–79 (9th Cir. 2004); see also
United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. LeMay,
260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).
DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 10

they prohibited from receiving treatment at either of the two other designated prisons: PBSP
or CSP-Sac. Only those who, like Coleman, have been convicted of a rules violation are
housed in the SHU at COR. Simply put, there is no authority for the proposition that prisoners
convicted of violations of prison violations must be treated the same under the Equal
Protection Clause as otherwise similarly situated prisoners who have not been convicted of
a rules violation. Consequently, Coleman’s equal protection argument fails.
B.

Deliberate Indifference
The Supreme Court, holding that the infliction of unnecessary suffering on prisoners

violated the Eighth Amendment, stated:
[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison
doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally
interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced,
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of
action under § 1983.18
The Constitution “does not necessitate comfortable prisons,”19 nor is the Eighth
Amendment a mandate for “broad prison reform” or excessive federal judicial involvement.20

18

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–105 (1976) (footnotes, internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
19

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 349 (1981))
20

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982) (abrogated on other grounds
by Sandlin v. O’Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 11

However, the Eighth Amendment does not permit inhumane conditions, and prison conditions
are subject to scrutiny under its provisions.21
The United States Supreme Court has outlined a two-part test to determine if prison
officials have violated a prisoner’s rights under the Eighth Amendment:
[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements
are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious[;]
a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities . . . . The second requirement follows from
the principle that only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates
the Eighth Amendment. To violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
a prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.22
With regard to the first requirement, “[t]he circumstances, nature, and duration of a
deprivation of [shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety] must be
considered.”23 “The more basic the need, the shorter the time it can be withheld.”24
Deprivation of basic necessities for even brief periods can constitute a violation whereas more
moderate deprivations must be more lengthy or ongoing.25

21

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.

22

Farmer 511 U.S. at 834 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299–300 (1991) (discussing subjective requirement); Johnson v.
Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing two-part test); Osolinski v. Kane, 92
F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076–77 (9th Cir.
1995) (same); Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (same).
23

Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731.

24

Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1259.

25

Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731–32.

DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 12

As to the second requirement, the relevant state of mind is “one of ‘deliberate
indifference’ to inmate health or safety.”26 To show deliberate indifference, the inmate must
prove that “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”27 “Thus, Farmer
[ ] requires an inmate to show that the official knew of the risk and that the official inferred that
substantial harm might result from the risk.”28 The “prison official need not have acted
‘believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted . . .
despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.’”14 The question of the official’s
knowledge is a question of fact.15
Liberty interests affected by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint that
“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.”16 Confinement in a SHU ordinarily does not rise to this level.17

26

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

27

Id. at 837; see Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir.
(discussing objective and subjective elements of deliberate indifference claim).
28

Wallis, 70 F.3d at 1077.

14

Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842) (omission in original).

15

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 826.

16

2004)

Id. at 484.

17

See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (disciplinary confinement does “not present the type
of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest”);
(continued...)
DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 13

Coleman argues that as a result of his confinement in the SHU he suffered immense
mental anguish that resulted suicidal attempts for which he was admitted several times to the
COR mental health crisis unit. To evidence that allegation, Coleman attached a CDCR 7230
MH Interdisciplinary Progress Notes dated October 29, 2009, showing that he had been
admitted to MHCB on October 23, 2009, and was discharged and physically left the MHCB
facility on October 29, 2009.18 Nothing in that one-page document, which does nothing more
than show he was treated in the MHCB facility, provides any evidentiary support for the
allegation that his confinement in the SHU contributed to his treatment in the MHCB.
Coleman also refers to the ICC Committee Action Summary dated May 20, 2010, that noted
in the Clinician Review that Coleman had a history of suicidal ideation, but was not then
currently prescribed pyschotropic medication.19
The deficiency in Coleman’s contention is that his deliberate indifference claim is
based solely upon his own “diagnosis” that his incarceration in the SHU caused him to suffer

17

(...continued)
see also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A]dministrative segregation
falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence.”); Anderson v.
County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995) (“no liberty interest in remaining in the
general population” of prison).
18

Docket 1, p. 40.

19

Docket 1, p. 42.

DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 14

severe mental anguish. This is simply insufficient as a matter of law to establish deliberate
indifference.20
C.

Rehabilitation Act
“[T]o state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege (1) he is an

individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to receive the benefit; (3) he was denied
the benefits of the program solely by reason of his disability; and (4) the program receives
federal financial assistance.”21
While Coleman has adequately pleaded the first, second, and fourth elements of a
Rehabilitation Act claim, he has not pleaded, nor does it appear he can truthfully plead, the
third element. That is, he has not and cannot plausibly plead that he was denied the benefit
of a treatment program solely by reason of his “exhibitionism.” At most, Coleman has pleaded
that he is entitled to participate in the treatment program in a different confinement status in
a different prison, i.e., as part of the general population at PBSP or CSP-Sac. According to
his treating clinician, Coleman received adequate and appropriate medical care for his medical
condition. As noted above, the fact Coleman disagrees is insufficient to negate this
determination.

20

See Franklin v. State of Oregon, State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.
1981) (noting that a disagreement between a prisoner and a medical professional over the
most appropriate course of treatment cannot give rise to a viable claim of deliberate
indifference).
21

O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007)
(internal quoration marks and citation omitted).
DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 15

E.

Americans with Disabilities Act
In order to state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) he ‘is an individual with a disability;’ (2) he ‘is otherwise qualified to
participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity's services,
programs, or activities;’ (3) he ‘was either excluded from participation in
or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or
activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity;’
and (4) ‘such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by
reason of [his] disability.’22
Coleman’s allegations satisfy the first two elements of an ADA claim, and perhaps, at

least colorably, the third. Coleman’s ADA claim clearly fails to satisfy the fourth element.
Coleman was not excluded from or denied the benefits or discriminated against by reason of
his disability. Coleman’s confinement in administrative segregation in the SHU was on
account of his failure to conform his conduct to legitimate prison regulations. While the record
reflects that Coleman’s conduct was at least in part attributable to his disability, the current
state of the law does not preclude prison officials from placing him in administrative
segregation for disciplinary reasons where, as here, the prisoner continues to receive
appropriate medical treatment.
IV.

CONCLUSION/ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that, as a matter of law, confinement

in administrative segregation in a Special Housing Unit of a person suffering from
“exhibitionism” does not rise to a constitutional violation cognizable under the Civil Rights Act
(42 U.S.C. § 1983). Nor does it violate either the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794) or the

22

O’Guinn, 502 F.3d at 1060 (citations omitted).

DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 16

Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.). Accordingly, the Complaint
herein is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety as against all Defendants, without leave to amend.
This Court, having fully considered the matter finds that reasonable jurists could not
disagree with this Court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude
the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Therefore,
any appeal would be frivolous or taken in bad faith.23 Accordingly, Coleman's in forma
pauperis status is hereby REVOKED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment of dismissal, with prejudice, which
states that the dismissal counts as a “strike” under 42 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of November, 2014.
S/ RALPH R. BEISTLINE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

23

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); see Hooker v. American Airlines, 302 F.3d 1091, 1092
(9th Cir. 2002) (revocation of in forma pauperis status is appropriate if the appeal is frivolous).
DISMISSAL ORDER
Coleman v. CDCR, 1:11-cv-01587-RRB – 17