Naylor v. Allenby et al

Filing 6

ORDER DIRECTING Plaintiff to File an Amended Complaint or Notify the Court of his Desire to Proceed only on his Cognizable Claims; Plaintiff's Response Due within Thirty (30) Days signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 11/27/2013. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint Form)(Sant Agata, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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TROY MITCHELL NAYLOR,

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Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. 1:11-cv-01649-MJS
ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE
AN AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY
THE COURT OF HIS DESIRE TO
PROCEED ONLY ON HIS COGNIZABLE
CLAIMS

v.
CLIFF ALLENDBY, et al.,

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Defendants.

(ECF NO. 1)

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PLAINTIFF‟S RESPONSE DUE WITHIN
THIRTY (30) DAYS

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SCREENING ORDER
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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Plaintiff Troy Mitchell Naylor, a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma

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pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on September 29,

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2011. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No.

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4.)

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II.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must conduct an initial review of the

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Complaint for sufficiency to state a claim. The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion

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thereof if it determines that the action has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or

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malicious,” “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

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1915(e)(2)(B). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have

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been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . .

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the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

28 U.S.C. §

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Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the „deprivation of any rights,

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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws‟ of the United States.”

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Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass‟n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

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Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for

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vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

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(1989).

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III.

SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

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The Complaint identifies the following individuals as Defendants: (1) Cliff

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Allendby, Acting Executive Director, Department of Mental Health; (2) Pam Ahlin,

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Executive Director, Coalinga State Hospital (CSH); (3) Ron Harmon, Chief of Hospital

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Police; and (4) Jerry Duvall, Sergeant, Hospital Police.

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Plaintiff alleges the following:

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On July 6, 2009, hospital police searched Plaintiff‟s room and confiscated all of

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Plaintiff‟s electronic devices based on another detainee‟s assertion that Plaintiff

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possessed illegal material on his computer.

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challenging the search. Defendants were served with Plaintiff‟s suit on September 13,

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2011. Three days after service, Defendant Duvall and other officers retaliated against

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Plaintiff by conducting another search. Plaintiff‟s computer and other electronics were

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seized and still have not been returned. The Complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff‟s

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Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and

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Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection.
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Plaintiff filed suit in superior court

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IV.

ANALYSIS

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A.

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To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

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elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

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violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the

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color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda

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Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

Section 1983

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

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the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

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are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.

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1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

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Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim that is

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plausible on its face.‟” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility

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that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as

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true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 1949-50.

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B.

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Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally

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participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th

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Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a

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plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572

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F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting

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this plausibility standard. Id.

Linkage Requirement

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The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

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actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the

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plaintiff.

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Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a

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theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948. Since a government official
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See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability in § 1983 actions, Plaintiff must

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plead sufficient facts showing that the official has violated the Constitution through his

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own individual actions. Id. at 1948. In other words, to state a claim for relief under §

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1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission

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that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights.

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Defendant Duvall is the only individual identified by name in Plaintiff‟s factual

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summary. The Complaint fails to establish a connection between any of the remaining

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Defendants and the alleged violation of Plaintiff‟s rights.

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Plaintiff does allege that Defendants Allenby, Ahlin, and Harmon were supervisors

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responsible for operations at CSH, but he offers nothing to suggest they were actually

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involved in the matter at issue. The mere fact one or more of them may have supervised

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the individuals responsible for a violation is not enough. Defendants may only be held

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liable in a supervisory capacity if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew

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of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

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(9th Cir. 1989).

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The Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. To state a claim under §

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1983, Plaintiff must “set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant's” deprivation

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of protected rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). That is to

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say, Plaintiff must explain in his own words exactly how each Defendant contributed to

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the violation of his rights. Plaintiff must provide specific examples of misconduct and

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avoid overly broad or vague allegations. If Plaintiff cannot describe how a Defendant

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violated his rights, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff‟s claims against that Defendant with

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prejudice.

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C.

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The Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches and

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seizures extends to those persons under civil confinement. Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d

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978, 993 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, 129 S.Ct. 2431 (2009).

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reasonableness of a particular search or seizure is determined by reference to the
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Fourth Amendment

The

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detention context. Id. “Whether a search is reasonable is determined by assessing, on

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the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the

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other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental

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interests.” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (internal quotation marks

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omitted). Civil detainees have “a diminished expectation of privacy after commitment to

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a custodial facility.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979). Legitimate concerns

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justifying searches and seizures are “the safety and security of guards and others in the

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facility, order within the facility and the efficiency of the facility's operations.” Hydrick,

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500 F.3d at 993 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “a search or seizure that is

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arbitrary, retaliatory, or clearly exceeds the legitimate purpose of detention” violates the

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Fourth Amendment. Id.

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Plaintiff complains that the Defendants are responsible for two unreasonable

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searches in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The first search, on July 6, 2009,

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was conducted by unspecified members of the hospital police in response to a report

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that Plaintiff possessed contraband. Such allegations fail to state a claim. Plaintiff does

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not specify which, if any, of the Defendants are responsible for the search or why the

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search was unreasonable. To state a claim Plaintiff must link a named Defendant to the

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alleged violation, Jones, 297 F.3d at 934, and must explain why pursuing reported

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contraband was unreasonable under the circumstances and in light of the fact that safety

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and security are legitimate institutional concerns, Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 993.

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The second search, on September 16, 2011, was allegedly conducted three days

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after the Defendants were served with a lawsuit filed by Plaintiff.

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participated in this search and, according to Plaintiff, identified no basis for his suspicion

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that Plaintiff possessed contraband. Plaintiff‟s allegations, taken as true at this stage of

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the proceedings, are sufficient to state a Fourth Amendment claim. Id.

Defendant Duvall

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D.

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Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner‟s First Amendment rights to speech or

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to petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658
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First Amendment

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F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135

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(9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995); and Short v.

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Sanzberro, 2009 WL 5110676, *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009) (“Civil detainees are

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protected from retaliation by the First Amendment.”). “Within the prison context, a viable

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claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a

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state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner‟s

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protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate‟s exercise of his First

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Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

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correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord

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Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva, 658 at 1104; Brodheim

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v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

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The Complaint alleges that Defendant Duvall led a search of Plaintiff‟s room and

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arbitrarily seized personal property because Plaintiff had served the Defendant with a

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lawsuit three days earlier. Plaintiff has satisfied the third element of his retaliation claim;

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prisoners have a protected right to access the courts. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567. Plaintiff

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has also satisfied the first, second, and fourth elements of his claim.

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confiscating and withholding property qualifies as an adverse action. Id. at 568. A

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plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence to establish the motive or intent of the

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defendant. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that a prisoner

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established a triable issue of fact regarding prison officials‟ retaliatory motives by raising

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issues of suspect timing, evidence, and statements); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265,

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267-68 (9th Cir. 1997); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808 (“timing can properly be considered as

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circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent”). In this case Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

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Duvall acted three days after being served.

Arbitrarily

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The fifth prong requires a prisoner to allege that “the prison authorities‟ retaliatory

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action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution or was not tailored

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narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

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1985). This is not a high burden to reach. See id. (prisoner‟s allegations that search
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was arbitrary and capricious sufficient to satisfy this inquiry). The Complaint alleges that

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Defendant Duvall had no reasonable basis to justify the search. Thus, the Court finds

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that Plaintiff has satisfied the fifth and final element of his retaliation claim against

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Defendant Duvall.

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E.

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Fourteenth Amendment
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Procedural Due Process

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The Due Process Clause protects prisoners and, by extension, civil detainees1,

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from being deprived of property without due process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

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539, 556 (1974), and both groups have a protected interest in their personal property,

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Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). However, while an authorized,

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intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process Clause, see

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Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n. 13 (1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush

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Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435–36 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985),

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neither negligent nor unauthorized intentional deprivations of property by a governmental

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employee “constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process

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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss

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is available,” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.

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Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his property without due process twice,

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once on July 6, 2009 and again on September 16, 2011. The first search appears to

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have been an authorized and intentional deprivation that may be actionable under the

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Due Process Clause.

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established state procedures, regulations, or statutes.

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1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Knudson v. City of Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149

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(9th Cir. 1987). The Complaint alleges that unspecified members of the hospital police

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searched Plaintiff‟s room in response to a report of contraband. The search appears to

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have been conducted according to hospital procedure.

An authorized deprivation is one carried out pursuant to
Piatt v. McDougall, 773 F.2d

However, as discussed in

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“[T]he rights afforded prisoners set a floor for those that must be afforded [civil detainees] . . . . Hydrick
v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 993 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, 129 S.Ct. 2431 (2009).

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section IV. C., above, Plaintiff does not specify which, if any, of the Defendants are

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responsible for the July 6, 2009 search and therefore fails to state a claim.

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Plaintiff alleges that the second search was retaliatory in violation of his First

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Amendment rights and was not motivated by institutional security.

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adequate post-deprivation remedy under California law and therefore, he may not

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pursue a due process claim arising out of the unlawful confiscation of his personal

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property on September 16, 2011. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir.

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1994) (citing Cal. Gov‟t Code §§810-895).

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2.

Plaintiff has an

Equal Protection

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Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants‟ conduct violated his rights to equal

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protection. The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated

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be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439

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(1985); Hartmann v. California Dep‟t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir.

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2013); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. Schriro, 514

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F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal protection claim may be established by showing

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that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff based on his membership in

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a protected class, Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1030; Comm.

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Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 702-03 (9th Cir.

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2009); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. City of Los

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Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly situated individuals were

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intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state

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purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 601-02 (2008);

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Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v.

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Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526

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F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).

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Plaintiff asserts that his right to equal protection was violated but fails to

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specifically address the claim in his summary of facts. The Complaint does not allege

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Plaintiff was a member of a protected class or that other detainees were treated
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differently. Since the basis for Plaintiff‟s claim is not apparent, the Court will grant leave

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to amend. Should Plaintiff choose to amend, he must allege facts clearly demonstrating

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a violation of his right to equal protection.

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V.

CONCLUSION

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The Complaint states claims against Defendant Duvall for the violation of

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Plaintiff‟s First and Fourth Amendment rights, but does not state a claim against any of

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the remaining Defendants. The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an

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amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Noll v.

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Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987).

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However, Plaintiff is advised that he does not have to file an amended complaint if

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he is agreeable to proceeding only on the claims the Court found, above, to be

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cognizable. If he wishes to so proceed, Plaintiff shall notify the Court in writing. The

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Court will then dismiss his other claims and provide Plaintiff with a summons and USM-

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285 form for completion and return. Upon receipt of the forms, the Court will direct the

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United States Marshal to initiate service of process on Defendant Duvall.

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If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P.

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8(a), but must state what each named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of

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Plaintiff‟s constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78.

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accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief

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above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Further,

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Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his

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amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot”

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complaints).

Although

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Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth v.

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Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

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(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or

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superceded pleading.” Local Rule 220.

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
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The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

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2.

Within thirty (30) days, Plaintiff must either:

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a.

Court in this order, OR

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File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the

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Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and is willing to proceed only on his cognizable claim; and
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If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for

failure to obey a court order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

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November 27, 2013

/s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DEAC_Signature-END:

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Michael J. Seng

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