Warkentin v. Countrywide Home Loans, et al.
Filing
6
FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS recommending that the Complaint (Doc. 5 ) be DISMISSED With Prejudice for Lack of Federal Jurisdiction, signed by Magistrate Judge Sandra M. Snyder on 11/30/2011. Referred to Judge O'Neill. Objections to F&R due within thirty (30) days. (Jessen, A)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
DOYLE WARKENTIN,
CASE NO. 1:11-cv-01752-LJO-SMS
10
Plaintiff,
11
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK
OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
v.
12
13
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS; RECON
TRUST COMPANY, N.A.; GOLDMAN
SACHS & COMPANY
14
Defendants.
15
(Doc. 5)
/
16
Plaintiff Doyle Warkentin, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed an
17
amended complaint against Defendants alleging improprieties in the servicing and foreclosure of
18
his property in Merced County, California. This matter has been referred to a magistrate judge
19
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and 72-304. Because Plaintiff seeks to
20
litigate matter inextricably entwined with prior state proceedings, the undersigned recommends
21
that this case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
22
I.
Procedural and Factual Background
23
Plaintiff owns real property commonly identified as 7023 Tokay Circle, Winton,
24
California, which he financed using mortgage financing from an unidentified lender. At some
25
point before May 1, 2005, the original lender advised Plaintiff that the loan was to be
26
“transferred,” probably to Countrywide Home Loans, on or about May 1, 2005. Accordingly, on
27
or about April 29, 2005, Plaintiff contacted Countrywide to determine the status of tax and
28
1
1
insurance reserves held but not yet paid by the original lender. Countrywide’s representative
2
advised Plaintiff that, because it did not have the note, deed of trust, or contract, it could not
3
answer Plaintiff’s questions. When Plaintiff expressed concern that he might make his mortgage
4
payment to the wrong party, causing it to be late, the representative told Plaintiff that
5
Countrywide would generate a loan number to be used when Plaintiff paid them. The
6
representative reassured Plaintiff that “nothing could wrong for the first sixty days while they
7
located the necessary paperwork.”
8
Countrywide generated a welcome letter dated May 4, 2005. Thereafter, according to
9
Plaintiff, although a Countrywide representative contacted him almost every day, both at work
10
and at home, Countrywide was unable to provide proof that they possessed the documents
11
needed to support their collection of Plaintiff’s mortgage payments. The representatives
12
repeatedly told Plaintiff that no default could occur within the first sixty days following the
13
loan’s transfer.
14
15
The complaint does not allege that Plaintiff made his mortgage payments to anyone once
he was advised that the loan had been transferred.
16
On or about June 14, 2005, Countrywide sent Plaintiff a “Notice of Default and
17
Acceleration of Payment.” Plaintiff replied in writing, disputing Countrywide’s right to collect
18
and requesting verification to which he believed he was entitled under the Fair Debt Collection
19
Practices Act (“FDCPA”). On or about August 1, 2005, Countrywide acknowledged Plaintiff’s
20
request, indicating that it would resolve the disputed issues within 20 days. It never responded
21
further. At some point thereafter, Countrywide offered Plaintiff an opportunity to sign a new
22
note, which he apparently declined.
23
On August 5, 2005, Recon Trust, allegedly a subsidiary of Countrywide, notified Plaintiff
24
by certified mail of his default and their election to sell the property. Plaintiff retained an
25
attorney, who withdrew “after failing in his first attempt.” Plaintiff then filed the first amended
26
complaint and obtained other financing to halt the pending foreclosure sale. He retained a
27
second attorney, who withdrew after filing three more amended complaints. Thereafter, Plaintiff
28
has proceeded pro se.
2
1
Plaintiff appealed and prevailed in the California Appellate Division, thereafter filing a
2
fourth amended complaint.1 Following a defense motion, Plaintiff filed a fifth amended
3
complaint.
4
Thereafter, Merced County Superior Court Judge Brian McCabe sanctioned Plaintiff for
5
failure to fully comply with the Court’s order and directed Plaintiff to again amend his complaint.
6
Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff again failed to comply with the Court’s order, resulting in the Court’s
7
striking all claims except one alleging a Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”)
8
violation. McCabe also ordered Plaintiff to respond to requested discovery and be deposed.
9
When the defendants notified Plaintiff of his deposition, Plaintiff believed the notice was
10
improper and agreed to attend “with only a 48 hour proper notice or alternatively the questions
11
they intended to ask.” In response to the defendants’ motions, McCabe ordered monetary
12
sanctions and dismissed the case.
13
Plaintiff appealed the order to the Appellate Division, which affirmed. The State
14
Supreme Court denied review. Plaintiff then unsuccessfully attempted to file a new action,
15
seeking remittitur of the monetary sanctions for his discovery violation(s).
16
On October 21, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court. Following screening, the
17
Magistrate Judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend within
18
thirty days. Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on November 7, 2011, claiming (1) violations
19
of RESPA and FDCPA; (2) infliction of emotional distress; and (3) failure to properly respond to
20
Plaintiff’s qualified written request of June 14, 2005.
21
II.
22
Abstention and Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This complaint candidly alleges Plaintiff’s prior attempts to litigate the same claims in
23
California state court. Although the complaint is less than completely clear, the Merced County
24
Superior Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for several reasons, finally dismissing the only
25
remaining claim for discovery violations. Plaintiff unsuccessfully pursued his claims to the
26
California Supreme Court. Having failed to obtain the relief he sought, Plaintiff attempted to
27
1
28
Since Plaintiff alleges that five complaints had already been filed, the Court is uncertain whether Plaintiff
has misnumbered the amended complaints or whether the complaint’s allegations are otherwise inaccurate.
3
1
further litigate the case in state court. Having been rebuffed, he now turns to the federal district
2
court to address the same claims pursued in state court. The district court lacks subject matter
3
jurisdiction.
4
Appellate jurisdiction of state court judgments rests in the United States Supreme Court,
5
not in the federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. A federal district court lacks subject matter
6
jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a state court judgment (the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine). District
7
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
8
263 U.S. 413 (1923). See also Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
9
denied, 540 U.S. 1213 (2004). A federal complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
10
jurisdiction if the claims raised in the complaint are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
11
decisions so that adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the
12
district court to interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules. Bianchi, 334 F.3d at
13
898. Put another way, a claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if the
14
federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it
15
or if the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court’s decision
16
or void its ruling. Fontana Empire Center, LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir.
17
2002). The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine applies to federal “cases brought by state-court losers
18
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
19
district court proceedings and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
20
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
21
Plaintiff’s complaint seeks to relitigate matters that he has already litigated in state court.
22
This Court lacks jurisdiction to conduct such a review. His complaint must be dismissed.
23
VII.
24
Conclusion and Order
Because Plaintiff’s complaint seeks to relitigate matters already litigated in state court.
25
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must abstain from considering Plaintiff’s claims.
26
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
27
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the Honorable Lawrence J.
28
O’Neill, the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28
4
1
U.S.C § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and
2
Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the Court. Any such document
3
should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.”
4
Plaintiff is advised that, by failing to file objections within the specified time, he may waive the
5
right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
6
7
IT IS SO ORDERED.
8
Dated:
icido3
November 30, 2011
/s/ Sandra M. Snyder
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?