Stewart v. Cate et al
Filing
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ORDER DISMISSING Complaint, Without Leave to Amend, for Failure to State a Cognizable Claim, signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 1/24/14. CASE CLOSED. (Gonzalez, R)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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WILLIE STEWART,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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MATTHEW CATE, et al.,
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Defendants.
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Case No.: 1:11-cv-02020-SAB (PC)
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT,
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND,
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE
CLAIM
Plaintiff Willie Stewart is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action
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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of
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the United States Magistrate Judge on January 24, 2012. Local Rule 302.
Plaintiff initiated the instant action on December 7, 2011. On August 23, 2013, the Court
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screened and dismissed the original complaint with leave to amend for failure to state a cognizable
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claim. On September 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint.
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I.
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SCREENING REQUIREMENT
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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
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“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks
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monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
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entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but
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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally
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participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County,
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Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings
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liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now
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higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive
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screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow
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the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal,
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556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer
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possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely
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consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556
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U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
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II.
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COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS
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When Plaintiff was released from the hospital in September 2010, he informed Defendants
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Cate, Yates, and Igbinosa of his medical condition and pleaded to be transferred to a different facility.
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None of the Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff contends that Defendants only
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responded to his inmate grievance by stating, an “inmate patient who do[es] not meet any of these
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criteria or have already contracted Valley Fever do not medically qualify for a transfer.” Plaintiff
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contends he met the criteria, yet he was not authorized for a transfer.
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Former Warden Yates exposed Plaintiff to unnecessary and excessive risk to Valley Fever by
approving his job assignment as a yard crew worker. In 2006, Yates was notified by staff that over
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500 cases of Valley Fever were at Pleasant Valley State Prison (PVSP). Yates failed to protect
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Plaintiff from the increased infection regarding the construction at Coalinga State Prison located
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directly next to PVSP. Yates failed to implement environment controls recommended by the
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California Department of Health Services. Yates approved of construction on prison grounds which
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exposed Plaintiff to large dust clouds as he worked in the yard. Masks were not proved at any time.
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Plaintiff contends Yates authorized inmates to dig and maintain a softball field without wetting the
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dirt, which caused Plaintiff to involuntarily inhale excessive dust.
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Chief Medical Officer Igbinosa was informed by the medical director of the deadly disease.
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All of the Defendants visited the yards and knew of the inmates activities, but no action was ever
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taken to assist Plaintiff. Igbinosa knowingly refused to transfer Plaintiff from the prison, despite
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notification by way of inmate appeal. Plaintiff contends Igbinosa was indifferent to his pain and
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suffering and lack of nutrition and medication. Due to a lockdown, no daily showers were allowed
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without a medical chrono. When Plaintiff requested a dust mask, it was refused pursuant to Igbinosa’s
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policy that only allowed inmates with a serious medical condition, such as HIV, to possess a mask.
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On November 11, 2010, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. J.Ortiz-Singh and informed he had
relapsed with Valley Fever.
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III.
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DISCUSSION
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A.
Eighth Amendment Medical Deliberate Indifference Claim
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Plaintiff raises claims under Section 1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
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against cruel and unusual punishments. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
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Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.”
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Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim does not rise to the level of an
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Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal
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civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate indifference
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in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296
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F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). In order to find a prison official liable under the
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Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement within a prison, the official must
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know “that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard[] that risk by failing to take
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reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
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To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate must
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show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could
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result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and (2) a
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deliberately indifferent response by defendant. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).
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The deliberate indifference standard is met by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a
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prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Id.
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The failure to respond to a prisoner’s complaints of pain can be sufficient to support an Eighth
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Amendment claim. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 990 (9th Cir. 2012); Clement v. Gomez, 298
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F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). However, deliberate indifference must be shown and it is a high legal
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standard. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060 (quotation marks omitted). “Under this standard, the prison
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official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
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risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting
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Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then
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the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting
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Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of factual support for his claim that Defendants Cate,
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Yates, or Igbinosa acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs. Plaintiff’s complaint
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alleges that he contracted Valley Fever, a serious disease. However, Plaintiff nonetheless fails to
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allege any facts showing the he requested and was denied medical attention from Defendants. The
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mere allegation that Defendant Igbinosa was indifferent to his pain and serious and lack of nutrition
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and medication based on the daily of daily showers without a medical chrono due to a lockdown, is
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wholly insufficient to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Nor has Plaintiff alleged any facts
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to demonstrate that any of the named Defendants were subjectively aware of a serious risk to
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Plaintiff’s health. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a
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claim against Defendants for deliberate indifference, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
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B.
Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claim
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The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners
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not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of confinement.”
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Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). “[W]hile conditions of confinement may
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be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they ‘must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction
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of pain.’” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981)). “What is
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necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause depends
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upon the claim at issue. . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992). “[E]xtreme
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deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.”
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Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine
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discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only
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those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to
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form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
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Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison
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officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
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serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The deliberate indifference
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standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in
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objective terms, “sufficiently serious. . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970
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(1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991)). Second, the prison
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official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. . . .” Farmer, 511
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U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying
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humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and
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disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. Prison officials
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may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting
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evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at 844-45. Mere negligence on
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the part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct
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must have been wanton. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128.
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Here, Plaintiff’s complaint lacks specific allegations supporting his claim that Defendants
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Cate, Yates and Igbinosa knowingly disregarded the alleged risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health or safety.
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. General allegations about the dangerous conditions at
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PVSP and the failure to protect Plaintiff from those conditions, or risks, are not sufficient to support an
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Eighth Amendment claim. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official is not sufficient to
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establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835;
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Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128.
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C.
Dismissal Without Leave to Amend
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Generally, leave to amend a dismissed complaint should be granted if it appears at all possible
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that the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th
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Cir. 2000). However, leave to amend may be denied when a plaintiff was previously notified of the
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deficiencies in his claims but did not cure them. See Chodos v. West Publishing Co., 292 F.3d 992,
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1003 (9th Cir. 2002).
Here, Plaintiff was previously informed of the deficiencies in his claims and his First Amended
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Complaint failed to cure them.
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Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint without leave to amend.
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IV.
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CONCLUSION AND ORDER
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For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails
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to state any cognizable claims. Moreover, the Court finds that leave to amend should be denied
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because Plaintiff’s claims cannot be cured by granting further leave to amend.
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Accordingly,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
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failure to state a cognizable claim;
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The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment; and
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3.
This dismissal is subject to the Athree-strikes@ provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. '
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED, without leave to amend, for
1915(g). Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2011).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
January 24, 2014
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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