Hall et al v. Mims et al

Filing 175

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (Docs. 113 and 170). Referred to Judge O'Neill; within 14 days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written objections wi th the Court. The parties are advised that if they do not object these Recommendations, each counsel shall file of a statement of non-opposition, as this will shorten the objection period and facilitate the adjudication of this motion by the District Judge. signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 10/7/2015. (Herman, H)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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QUENTIN HALL, SHAWN GONZALES,
ROBERT MERRYMAN, DAWN SINGH, and
BRIAN MURPHY, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

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v.

No. 1:11-cv-02047-LJO-BAM
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENT

(Docs. 113 and 170)

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COUNTY OF FRESNO,
Defendant.

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Plaintiffs Quentin Hall, Shawn Gonzales, Robert Merryman, Dawn Singh, and Brian

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Murphy, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated seek final approval of a class

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settlement reached with Defendant, the County of Fresno. (Doc. 170). In addition, Plaintiffs seek

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an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. (Doc. 113). The Court heard oral argument on September

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28, 2015.

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Plaintiffs. Counsel Michael Woods appeared in person for the Defendant. Having carefully

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considered the parties’ submissions, oral argument, and the entire record in this case, the Court

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recommends Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval and Attorneys’ Fees be GRANTED. (Docs.

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113, 170).

(Doc. 174).

Counsel Donald Specter and Kelly Knapp appeared in person for

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BACKGROUND

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On December 13, 2011, Plaintiffs, individually and acting for the interests of the general

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population of the Fresno County Jail, initiated this action. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs are prisoners who

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are or have been incarcerated in the Fresno County Jail. The class consists of all prisoners who

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are now, or will in the future be, incarcerated in the Fresno County Jail (“Jail”). Defendant is the
County of Fresno, which is responsible for the operation of the Jail.
The operative complaint in this action is the First Amended Complaint filed on January
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(Doc. 8).

The Complaint alleged that the conditions in the Jail violated the

constitutional and statutory rights of all prisoners who were or will be housed in the Jail.
Specifically, the Complaint alleged that the Jail does not provide prisoners with access to
adequate medical, mental health and dental care in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments; prisoners are not reasonably protected from injury and violence from other
prisoners in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and that prisoners are not
provided with reasonable accommodations for their disabilities in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Compl. ¶ 23.
On June 1, 2012, Defendant filed its answer to the amended complaint denying the
material allegations and asserting affirmative defenses. The parties thereafter began class
certification discovery. The parties subsequently agreed to suspend discovery for the purpose of
settlement negotiations. On February 21, 2013, the parties agreed to a process whereby experts
agreeable to both parties would inspect the Jail and issue reports and recommendations. Pursuant
to that agreement, experts inspected the jail and provided the parties with their reports and
recommendations. Based on those recommendations, the parties engaged in extensive settlement
negotiations. In multiple status conferences, this Court provided guidance in the parties’
settlement negotiations on no less than fifteen occasions. (Docs. 65, 69, 71, 73, 76, 79, 82, 86,
89, 92, 96, 100, 103, 106, 109, 111)
In May 2015, the parties executed the proposed Consent Decree and the parties filed a
joint motion seeking preliminary approval of the Consent Decree, which the Court granted on
July 21, 2015. (Docs. 112, 129, 132). The parties now seek final approval of their class action
settlement.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Ninth Circuit has declared that a strong judicial policy favors settlement of class
actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). The role of the

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district court in evaluating the fairness of the settlement is not to assess the individual
components, but to assess the settlement as a whole. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 81819 (9th Cir. 2012) reh’g denied 709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013).

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Review of the proposed settlement of the parties proceeds in two phases. True v.
American Honda Motor Co., 749 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2010). At the preliminary
approval stage, the court determines whether the proposed agreement is within the range of
possible approval and whether or not notice should be sent to class members. Id. at 1063. “If the
proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations,
has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class
representatives or segments of the class, and falls within the range of possible approval, then the
court should direct that the notice be given to the class members of a formal fairness hearing.” In
re Tableware Antitrust Litigation, 484 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting Manual
for Complex Litigation, Second § 30.44 (1985)). At the final approval stage, the court takes a
closer look at the settlement, taking into consideration objections and other further developments
in order to make the final fairness determination. True, 749 F.Supp.2d at 1063.

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DISCUSSION
A.

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Terms of Settlement
The parties agreed to a Consent Decree granting injunctive and declaratory relief to the

Class without providing for a monetary award to the Class. Declaration of Kelly Knapp
(“Remedial Plan”), Attach. 1, (Doc. 170-1). Under the terms of the Consent Decree, the parties
have agreed to a detailed Remedial Plan that Defendant will be responsible for implementing
subject to monitoring by Plaintiffs’ counsel. The Remedial Plan provisions cover the substantive
areas in dispute: health care, personal safety, and disability discrimination.1 Id. Plaintiffs’ counsel

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Specifically, the Remedial Plan requires Defendant to ensure that: (1) prisoners with chronic illnesses
continue to receive necessary medications, (2) pregnant inmates receive timely and appropriate prenatal care,
postpartum care, counseling, and specialized obstetrical services when indicated, (3) there are sufficient numbers of
dental staff to provide timely access to adequate dental care, (4) mental health clinical decisions, diagnoses, and
treatment plans shall only be made by licensed mental health clinicians, (5) continuity of mental health care will be
provided from admission to transfer or discharge from the facility, (6) psychiatric medications, including but not
limited to antipsychotic medications, shall be prescribed to prisoners with mental illness in accord with nationally
accepted professional standards for the treatment of serious mental illness, (7) mental health clinicians shall complete
a comprehensive suicide risk assessment form for all prisoners who display signs of suicide risk to determine if the
inmate presents a low, moderate, or high risk of suicide, (8) for prisoners with serious mental illness who are housed

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will be responsible for monitoring compliance with the Consent Decree and the Remedial Plan.
Plaintiffs’ counsel will be able to inspect the Jail twice per year and the subject matter experts
will prepare a report during the first year of monitoring and upon request after the first year.

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Under the Consent Decree, Class counsel will receive $900,000.00 for merits fees and for
costs incurred during litigation. The agreement also specifies that Defendant will pay $40,000.00
per year for monitoring fees and expenses. Declaration of Donald Specter (“Consent Decree”),
Doc. 112-1, Ex. 1 ¶ 21. In the event of a dispute, the parties have agreed on an informal dispute
resolution process, and the Court will retain jurisdiction to entertain motions to enforce
compliance if the dispute resolution process fails.
B.

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The Court finds that the notice to the settlement class, as described in the July 1, 2015
order preliminarily approving the class settlement, provided the best practicable notice to the
class members and satisfied the procedures of Due Process. The Class Notice described the key
terms in the Consent Decree and the proposed agreement regarding attorneys’ fees, and advised
class members the Court will consider submitted written comments when deciding whether to
approve the settlement. Declaration of Donald Specter (“Specter Decl.”), Doc. 112-170-1, Ex. 2.

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Notice to Class Members

Defendant posted the Notice in English and Spanish in all housing units in such a manner
as to make the notice visible to all prisoners. The Notice was also hand delivered to each prisoner
in restricted housing and housing units on lockdown. Defendant also provided a copy of the
Court’s Order granting preliminary approval of the class settlement, the full Consent Decree, the
Remedial Plan, and Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees to all prisoners who completed an inmate
request form requesting these documents. Declaration of Tom Gattie (“Gattie Decl.”), Doc. 152.
The Court finds that the procedures employed were adequate to satisfy Due Process.
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in unit 2D, correctional and mental health staff will ensure those inmates are offered to be taken out of their cells for
recreation a minimum of 7 hours per week and mental health treatment will be offered 3 times per week, (9)
prisoners with disabilities will be housed in the most integrated and appropriate housing possible, based on their
disabilities, and (10) a staffing plan will be designed to reduce prisoner-on-prisoner violence in the Jail, which
includes the hiring of 127 new correctional officers. (Doc. 170 at 5-6).

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C.

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Based on the showing made by the parties in support of the Motion for Preliminary
Approval and the Motion for Final Approval and as discussed more fully in the Preliminary
Approval Order, the Court finds the parties have met their burden as to the prerequisites for class
certification set forth in Rule 23(a) and (b)(2).

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Specifically, the Class includes an estimated 2,700 inmates at the Jail, and is therefore so
numerous that joinder is impracticable. (Doc. 129 at 4). As to commonality, the Class presents
common questions of law and fact arising out of Defendant’s system-wide practices that present a
risk of harm and discriminatory treatment to all prisoners in the Fresno jails. The typicality
requirement is fulfilled because Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same policies and procedures
similarly impacting all class members. The adequacy requirement is met because Plaintiffs will
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class, and the Prison Law Office is
experienced class counsel knowledgeable in the applicable areas of the law.

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Class Certification

As to the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2), the widespread injunctive relief sought is
appropriate for the Class as a whole, because all Class Members face the same policies and
practices that risk harm and discriminatory treatment to the class. (Doc. 129 at 4).
D.

Settlement Approval Factors Support the Consent Decree
In determining whether or not the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, courts

balance several factors, including: (1) the strength of plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status
throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed,
and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a
governmental participant; (8) and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.
Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating a proposed settlement, “[i]t is the settlement taken as a whole, rather than the
individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness.” Hanlon v. Chrysler
Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court “does not have the ability to delete,
modify, or substitute certain provisions,” and “[t]he settlement must stand or fall in its entirety.”

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Id. The question is not whether the settlement “could be prettier, smarter, or snazzier,” but solely
“whether it is fair, adequate, and free from collusion.” Id. at 1027.

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Here, the Consent Decree provides substantial equitable relief to class members. As
discussed in the order granting preliminary approval, the Consent Decree was the product of an
arm’s-length negotiation by Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Doc. 132 at 2). Additionally, the Court found
that the Consent Decree was the result of “serious, informed, and noncollusive negotiations
between experienced and knowledgeable counsel who have actively prosecuted and defended this
litigation.” Id. Thus, the Consent Decree is entitled to a presumption of fairness. See e.g., Harris
v. Vector Marketing Corp., 2011 WL 1627973, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Defendant has agreed to
settlement terms that directly address the class claims in this case, including the delivery of
constitutionally adequate healthcare, reasonable accommodations for prisoners with disabilities,
and a significant increase in the number of correctional officers to help reduce violence between
inmates. Remedial Plan at 18, (Doc. 112-1). The settlement was reached, with extensive Court
oversight, after two years of negotiations between the parties, who were zealously represented by
their experienced counsel throughout this litigation. Specter Decl. at ¶¶ 2-3. The settlement was
also reached after joint experts found systemic deficiencies in Defendant’s policies and practices
including understaffing the Jail with correctional officers and healthcare providers, prescribing
nonstandard medications to prisoners with mental illness, and housing prisoners with disabilities
in inaccessible dorms and cells. (Doc. 124).

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Given the relief achieved and the risks and costs involved in further litigation, the
negotiated settlement represents a fundamentally “fair, reasonable, and adequate” resolution of
the disputed issues. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(e)(2). Further, considering there was arm’s-length
bargaining; extensive investigation and discovery by experienced counsel; and a small percentage
of objectors, the Court concludes the settlement was presumptively fair, adequate and reasonable,
and should be granted final approval. Harris, 2011 WL 1627973, at *8.
E.

Class Members’ Reaction to the Proposed Settlement
Prior to the hearing on final approval, the Court received written objections to the

settlement from twenty-nine objectors. The objections fall into two categories: (1) ten objectors

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commented on the substance of the Consent Decree and/or Remedial Plan;2 and (2) the remaining
nineteen class members voiced individual problems with the current Jail health care system;
described prisoner-on-prisoner violence, or detailed otherwise unrelated issues such as individual
access to the law library or their criminal case, but did not provide substantive comments on the
terms of the Consent Decree or Remedial Plan.3 Finding that the evidence presented supports
approval of the settlement, the Court now considers whether the objections otherwise require
disapproval of the class settlement.4

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1.

Objections on the Scope of the Consent Decree and Remedial Plan

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Seven class members objected that the settlement terms do not go far enough to address
the deficiencies identified by the parties’ experts. (Docs. 133, 139, 142, 146, 156, 163, and 164).

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However, as the Ninth Circuit has observed, this alone is not a basis for rejecting a settlement:
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Of course it is possible, as many of the objectors’ affidavits imply, that the
settlement could have been better. But this possibility does not mean the settlement
presented was not fair, reasonable, or adequate. Settlement is the offspring of
compromise; the question we address is not whether the final product could be
prettier, smarter, or snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate, and free from
collusion.

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Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027.

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Some of these objections include: (1) access to CPAP machines; (2) adequacy of medical

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diets; (3) temperature controls; (4) removing triple bunks; (5) training and discipline for officers

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who engage in misconduct against prisoners with mental health challenges or disabilities; (6)

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closing the antiquated south annex; (7) applying the remedial plan to Unit 4f of the Main Jail; (8)

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timeline of hiring an additional 127 correctional officers; and (9) the need for sanctions if

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Defendant fails to comply/implement the Remedial Plan.

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(Docs. 133, 139, 142, 146, 154, 156, 162, 163, 164).
(Docs. 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 155, 157, 159, 160,
161, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 173).
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In cases of this type, it is not unusual to have a large number of objections, nor is it unusual for a court to
approve a settlement over such objections. See, e.g., Reed v. General Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1983)
(approving settlement over objections of more than 40% of class members and 23 out of 27 named plaintiffs); Austin
v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 876 F. Supp. 1437, 1472 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (approving settlement related to prison conditions
over objections of 457 class members); Hawker v. Consovoy, 198 F.R.D. 619, 628 (D.N.J. 2001) (approving prison
conditions settlement over objections from 250 class members); Pack v. Beyer, No. 91-3709, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19542, 1995 WL 775360, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 1995) (approving prison conditions settlement over objection from
41% the class).

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These objections are either implicitly addressed by the Remedial Plan (example: cpap
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machine/temp controls/diets) or counsel has amended the Remedial Plan to address the objection.
The other objections can be addressed through the ongoing monitoring of the Remedial Plan once
the Remedial Plan is implemented.

Considering these objections, the Court finds that the

settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and specifically directed at resolving the problems raised
by these and other inmates. The Consent Decree and Remedial Plan will provide Plaintiffs with
improved health treatment to which they are entitled.
2.

Objections to Specific Remedial Plan Provisions

Inmates Daniel Trebas and Dustin Callison objected to three specific provisions of the
Remedial Plan, but did not present evidence that the class action settlement is unfair, inadequate,

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or unreasonable. Areas addressed include: (1) electronic health records; (2) assistive devices; and

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(3) autopsies. (Docs. 146, 154).

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For example, Dustin Callison specifically objected to language in the Remedial Plan that

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stated “autopsies shall be performed for all deaths, except for those caused by suicide or

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homicide.”

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Remedial Plan was revised to specify that autopsies will be performed for “all deaths where the

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cause of death cannot be conclusively determined.” Remedial Plan ¶ 10.

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need for assistive devices and the creation of electronic health records can and will be addressed

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through monitoring after the settlement is approved. These objections do not weigh against

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approving the proposed Consent Decree

(Doc. 154 at 3).

This objection resulted in a revision to the Remedial Plan. The

Objections as to the

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3.

Objections Regarding the Applicable Constitutional Standard

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Inmate Mike Starrett filed an objection based on his belief that the Eighth Amendment’s

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prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, as it relates to medical care, should not be applied

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to pretrial detainees. (Doc. 162). While Mr. Starrett is correct in part, the class action complaint

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was written broadly to include both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims to include both

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sentenced prisoners and pretrial detainees. In an effort to provide relief to all inmates, the

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Remedial Plan incorporates remedial measures regardless of an inmate’s status as a pretrial

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detainee or convicted prisoner. For this reason, the Court does not find that this objection weighs

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against approval of the settlement.
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Inmates Daniel Trebas and Dustin Callison filed objections attempting to opt-out of the
settlement class because they are pursuing individual actions that will be filed at a later date.
Jared Ward also complains that the settlement does not provide money damages to the class.
(Doc. 139).

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Objections Regarding Money Damages and Opting Out of Class

These objections do not negate the fairness of the settlement as there is no need for
inmates to opt-out of the class because they are not barred from seeking individual damage

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claims. Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he general rule is that a class

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action suit seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief does not bar subsequent individual

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damage claims by class members, even if based on the same events”). Moreover, the Consent

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Decree requires systemic changes to the Jail’s policies, procedures, and operations, and thus, by

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its very nature, necessarily impacts all people incarcerated in the Jail. Further, objections to the

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lack of money damages are meritless because this is a class action certified pursuant to Rule

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23(b)(2) that seeks only injunctive relief. Therefore, the absence of an award of money damages

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is neither unfair nor unreasonable.

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5.

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Of the twenty-nine total objectors, nineteen individuals submitted comments that the

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Court will liberally construe as objections. Those class members are: Jimmy Buford (Doc. 134);

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Matthew Messick (Doc. 135); Juan Alvardo (Doc. 136); Ronnie Azevedo (Docs. 138, 150);

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Robert L. Morris (Doc. 140); Elaine Villareal (Docs. 141, 147, 151, 169); David Edwards Estrada

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(Docs. 143, 165); Rory D. Jordan (Doc. 144); Georgina McGee (Doc. 145); Kelly Lynn

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McKinney (Docs. 148, 151); Nyree Dawn Bernard (Doc. 149); Dennis Reynolds (Doc. 153),

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Asatour Nagapetin (Doc. 157); Jezrell Crawford (Docs. 159, 161, 168, 173); Calvin Simpson

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(Doc. 160); Martin Ganoa (Doc. 167); Gary Thompson (Doc. 163); and Gregory Ell Sheehee

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(Doc. 172). 5 Although some of the objections are difficult to understand, the Court thoroughly

Additional Objections

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The name of one objector is illegible and is therefore not included in this list. (Doc. 137).

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reviewed each objection.6

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Specifically, the bulk of these objections are more accurately deemed as criticism of the
current medical care system in place at the Jail. The following are examples of objections from
inmates that do not relate to the fairness and adequacy of the Consent Decree itself: (1) inmate
Matthew Messick claims that the hygiene standards at the Jail are inadequate and he requests
additional recreational activities and more time in the yard (Doc. 135); (2) inmates Elaine
Villareal, Kelly McKinney, and Georgina McKee complain of the presence of black mold in and
around the Jail (Docs. 145, 148, 169); and (3) multiple inmates complain about delayed response
times for medical grievance forms (Docs. 135, 138, 140, 143, 144, 145, 155, 157, 165, 168, 169,
172).

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After having carefully reviewed the objections, the Court characterizes them, in their
totality, as complaining about the current conditions at the Jail rather than any disagreement with
the terms of the Consent Decree and Remedial Plan.

fundamental misunderstanding of the underlying purpose of the class action, a lack of knowledge
of the ramifications if the settlement is not approved, and unrealistic or overly optimistic
expectations. The Consent Decree and Remedial Plan require systemic changes in the Jail’s
policies, procedures, and operations and thus, upon implementation, should address the individual
concerns raised by objectors. Regardless, when implemented, these types of concerns would fall
within the scope of the ongoing monitoring activity contemplated by the Consent Decree.
Accordingly, these objections fail to convince the Court that the Consent Decree is unfair or
unreasonable.
F.

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Many objections are the result of a

Attorneys’ Fees
The Consent Decree also provides that Defendant agrees to pay Plaintiffs’ class counsel,

the Prison Law Office, $900,000.00 in attorney’s fees and expenses and $40,000.00 per year for

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Certain objections are wholly unrelated to the Consent Decree and address issues which are either frivolous
or nonsensical. (Docs. 149, 159, 161, 168). For example, Inmate Nyree Brown details a list of complaints about the
Fresno high-speed rail system, Barack Obama’s presidency, and she argues that she is “the only person who aint gay
in America.” (Doc. 149 at 17). Inmate Jezrell Crawford details plans to sell children’s programs such as the “Bubble
Guppies” to Valley PBS kids. (Doc. 159). The Court does not regard such comments as proper objections to the
Consent Decree, and, consequently, will not address them.

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monitoring fees and expenses as part of the settlement. (Doc. 113). Plaintiffs’ Counsel represents
that this amount–which reimburses Plaintiffs’ counsel for some but not all of their actual hours
spent and $50,000 in out-of-pocket expenses—is fair and reasonable in light of the extraordinary
results obtained through this litigation and protracted and complex settlement negotiations.
Where a class action settlement results in injunctive relief, the court must ensure that the
amount of the requested attorneys’ fees does not result in “‘less injunctive relief for the class than
could otherwise have been obtained.’” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935,
947 (9th Cir. 2011). In a Section 1983 action, like this one, the Court may determine that a
prevailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d 1029; 42 U.S.C. § 1988. A
reasonable fee is generally calculated by application of the lodestar method, which requires
multiplying the hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. See City of Riverside v.
Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 568 (1986) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
Counsel calculated their attorneys’ fees using the lodestar method; that is, Plaintiffs’
counsel kept contemporaneous time records that detailed all work completed, and calculated the
requested award by multiplying the number of hours actually worked by a reasonable hourly rate.
Specter Decl., ¶ 8. In setting a reasonable hourly rate, Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed to limit their rate
to $211.50 based on the limits set out in the PLRA for payment of court-appointed counsel.
Vllebb v. Ada Cnty. 285 F.3d 829, 839 (9th Cir. 2002). Attorneys’ fees were then calculated by
applying an hourly rate of $211.50 per hour to a number of hours far below the number of actual
hours worked. Specter Decl. ¶ 8. While the rate of $211.50 is slightly higher than fees allowable
under the PLRA, the Court finds that the rate requested by the attorneys here is lower than the
overall market rate for attorneys of similar abilities and experience in this District. See Sanchez v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102771 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2015) (reviewing billing rates
for the Fresno Division and concluding that a rate $350 per hour rate was reasonable in a class
action).
The Court also notes that this rate is particularly reasonable in light of the extensive
litigation involved in this case. A year after Plaintiffs initiated this action; the Court provided
guidance over settlement negotiations in fifteen or more status conferences. Accordingly, the

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Court has firsthand knowledge that in order to further settlement efforts, counsel conducted
complex discovery, interviewed and corresponded with hundreds of prisoners, reviewed and
analyzed thousands of pages of healthcare records, inspected jail facilities, worked with neutral
experts, and met and conferred with opposing counsel and the County to participate in
negotiations. Thus, after a careful review of the record, and in considering the Court’s extensive
involvement, the Court concludes that the proportion between the fee award, the hours worked,
and the benefit obtained for the class is per se reasonable in this nearly four year old case.
Moreover, with the exception of one class member believing the fee amount is not enough
(Doc. 139), there have been no objections to the $900,000.00 attorneys’ fee amount.
Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 23(h) be GRANTED. (Doc. 113).

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
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Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of the Consent Decree be GRANTED;

2.

The terms of the proposed Consent Decree be found to be fair, adequate and

reasonable and comply with Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
3.

Plaintiffs’ request for certification of the Settlement Class be GRANTED and the

class defined as all prisoners who are now, or will in the future be, confined in the Fresno County
Jail be certified for settlement purposes;
4.

For purposes of the settlement, the above-defined settlement class be found to

meet all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2).
5.

The notice that has been provided to the settlement class members, as well as the

means by which it was provided constitutes the best notice practicable under the circumstances
and is in full compliance with the United States Constitution and the requirements of Due Process
and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, that such notice fully and accurately
informed settlement class members of all material elements of the lawsuit and proposed class
action settlement, and each member’s right and opportunity to object to the proposed class action
settlement;

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6.

Reasonable attorney fees and expenses in the amount of $900,000.00 and

$40,000.00 per year for compliance monitoring be awarded to Class Counsel the Prison Law
Office;
7.

That the Court enter the proposed Consent Decree (Doc. 112-1) as follows:

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The Court recognizes that the Plaintiffs allege various violations of Federal law
and the Defendant County of Fresno denies those allegations. Having reviewed the
reports of the joint experts, the Court hereby finds that the remedy set forth herein
is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of
Federal constitutional and statutory rights of the Plaintiffs’ class, and is the least
intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of federal rights. Therefore, and
good cause appearing, the Court approves the Consent Decree, and orders the
parties to comply with all its terms, and orders Defendant to implement the
Remedial Plan pursuant to the schedule set forth therein.
8.

This action be dismissed with prejudice in accordance with the terms of the

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agreement; however, the Court shall retain continuing jurisdiction to interpret, implement and
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enforce the settlement, and all orders and judgment entered in connection therewith.
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These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the
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Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within
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14 days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written
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objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate
Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.”

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive
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the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991);

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Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 834 (9th Cir. 2014).
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The parties are advised that if they do not object these Recommendations, each
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counsel shall file of a statement of non-opposition, as this will shorten the objection period
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and facilitate the adjudication of this motion by the District Judge.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:
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/s/ Barbara

October 7, 2015

A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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