LeCompte v. Dhah et al

Filing 29

ORDER Denying Defendants' Motion For Reconsideration (Document 27 ), signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on 2/25/2014. (Fahrney, E)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

TIMOTHY LECOMPTE,

12
13
14

15

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
DHAH, et al.,
Defendants.

16

Case No.: 1:11cv02105 LJO DLB (PC)
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(Document 27)

17
18

Plaintiff Timothy LeCompte (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner in the custody of the California

19

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this civil

20

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

21
22

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action on December 21, 2011. On February 1, 2013, the Court ordered that

23

the action proceed on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Dhah, Moon, Wang,

24

Macias and Zamora.

25

Defendants Moon, Macias, Wang and Zamora filed their answer on December 9, 2013.

26
27
28
1

1
2
3

On December 10, 2013, the Court issued a Discovery and Scheduling Order.1 Part I of the
Order requires the parties to provide initial disclosures, including names of witnesses and production
of documents.

4
5
6

On January 24, 2014, Defendants Moon, Macias, Wang and Zamora filed a Request for
Reconsideration of Part I of the Discovery and Scheduling Order. Plaintiff did not file an opposition.
The matter is deemed submitted pursuant to Local Rule 230(l).

7

LEGAL STANDARD

8

Defendants move for reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 303(c), which permits District

9

Judge review of a Magistrate Judge’s order. Local Rule 303(a) incorporates the “clearly erroneous” or

10

“contrary to law” standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). Thus, the District Judge

11

must “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R.

12

Civ. P. 72(a).

13

DISCUSSION

14

15
16
17

Defendants correctly argue that Part I of the Discovery and Scheduling Order requires the
parties to engage in disclosures similar to those required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(1). Defendants are also correct in that Plaintiff is a pro se prisoner, and that such actions are
generally exempt from initial disclosure requirements.

18
19
20

Defendants are incorrect, however, insofar as they argue that the Discovery and Scheduling
Order is an improper “standing order” meant to modify the initial disclosure requirements. As the
Court has previously explained in numerous prisoner actions where the Discovery and Scheduling

21

Order has been issued, the order is a case-specific order that issued in this action “[t]o expedite the fair

22

disposition of this action and to discourage wasteful pretrial activities.” Therefore, the order is proper

23

since “even in a case excluded . . ., the court can order exchange of similar information in managing

24

the action under rule 16.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) Advisory Committee Note of 2000. The fact that a

25

similar order has issued in other prisoner cases does not transform the order into a formal, or informal,

26
27
28

1

Defendant Dhah filed an answer on February 3, 2014, after the Court’s issuance of the Discovery and Scheduling Order.
Given the pendency of this motion, the Court has not yet made the Discovery and Scheduling Order applicable to
Defendant Dhah.

2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17

standing order. Indeed, if there is an instance where initial disclosures are not warranted, the Court
will not issue an order requiring their exchange.
The Court notes that the discovery order at issue, which has been used and upheld in other
actions in this Court, was implemented in light of the numerous discovery issues that were arising with
increasing frequency in other pro se prisoner actions. Defendants’ discovery practices were bordering
on unnecessarily obstructive, and these tactics caused numerous discovery disputes that required
extensive Court resources to resolve. The intent of the order, as explained above, is to discourage
similar wasteful activities.
Defendants further believe that such requirements are an undue burden on the State in prisoner
cases. However, again, the intent behind the order is to streamline the discovery process and
ultimately reduce the overall burden on the State, the Court and the parties. In fact, since the
requirement to exchange initial disclosures has been in place, there has been a significant decrease in
discovery disputes in actions where the ordered has issued. This decrease has benefited both the
parties and the Court.
Similarly, although Defendants suggest that the order deprives counsel of the exercise of
professional judgment in determining how much time and effort to devote to investigation, the order
requires no more than would be required under Rule 26(a), or in the ordinary course of investigating a

18

complaint. The purpose of initial disclosures under FRCP 26(a) is “to accelerate the exchange of basic

19

information . . . and to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such information.” Fed. R.

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Civ. P. 26(a)(1) Advisory Committee Note of 1993 (emphasis added). Orders such as this fall well
within the vested control of a trial court to control its docket and to ensure efficient use of limited
judicial resources.
Defendants’ generic burden argument is also undermined by the fact that in almost all cases
where this order has been upheld, Defendants have, within a reasonable amount of time, filed a notice
with the Court that they have provided their initial disclosures. Moreover, given that the amount of
discovery is not as broad as Defendants argue, it is likely that Defendants already have a majority of
documents in their possession based on their initial review of the action.

28
3

1

Defendants also attempt to raise an issue based on the Discovery and Scheduling Order’s

2

failure to limit the disclosures to “discoverable information.” While the order may not specifically

3

state that disclosures are limited to “discoverable information,” the context of the order, as well as

4

common sense, dictate that only discoverable information need be exchanged. Indeed, the order limits

5

Defendants’ disclosures to information regarding individuals “likely to have information about

6

Defendant(s)’ claims or defenses, or who will be used to support Defendant(s)’ version of the events

7

described in the complaint.” December 10, 2013, Order at 2.

8
9
10
11
12

Finally, insofar as Defendants object to the requirement that Defendants produce materials in
the possession, custody or control of Defendants and CDCR, their objection fails. Defendants
specifically object to the definition used in Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL 309945 (E. D. Cal. 2007),
cited in the order, and contend that they are medical and appeal staff who do not control CDCR or its
documents. Mot. 9. This standard, however, requires no more than production of information for

13

which Defendants have “the legal right to obtain” on demand. If a document does not fall within the

14

definition of Allen, it need not be produced. Certainly, Defendants will not have “possession, custody

15

or control” of all of CDCR’s documents. The order does not require Defendants to produce

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

documents that they cannot otherwise obtain in the course of their employment.
The above arguments are not persuasive and do not establish that the Discovery and
Scheduling Order, in general, is contrary to law or clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill

February 25, 2014

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

23
24
25
26
27
28
4