Johnson v. Sandoval et al

Filing 27

ORDER DENYING 25 Motion for Reconsideration and ORDERED that Proposed First Amended Complaint 26 is STRICKEN, signed by Chief Judge Ralph R. Beistline on 1/22/14. (Martin-Gill, S)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DONTAY JOHNSON,
Case No. 1:12-cv-00018-RRB
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER REGARDING
MOTION AT DOCKET 25

C. LOPEZ, et al.,
Defendants.

I.

BACKGROUND/PENDING MOTION
Dontay Davion Johnson, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis,

filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After screening, this Court ordered service
of the Complaint on C. Lopez and dismissed the Complaint as to the other defendants.1
Lopez has answered the Complaint.2 At Docket 25 Johnson has moved for reconsideration
of the Court’s Screening Order and to allow him to file an amended complaint that Johnson
contends properly alleges claims against the dismissed Defendants, C. Sandoval, J. Lomeli,
and M. King. At Docket 26 Johnson lodged his proposed First Amended Complaint.
As relevant to the pending motion, Johnson contends that in conducting a strip
search Defendant C. Lopez digitally invaded Johnson’s anus causing him severe pain.

1

Docket 14.

2

Docket 16.

ORDER [Re: Motion at Docket 25]
Johnson v. Lopez, 1:12-cv-00018-RRB – 1

Johnson further alleges that Lopez used unnecessarily excessive force in conducting the
search. Johnson contends that in conducting the physically invasive search Lopez violated
Johnson’s rights under the Fourth (unreasonable search) and Eighth (intentional infliction
of pain) Amendments, as well as the common law tort of assault and battery.
With respect to Defendant King, Johnson alleges that, although he witnessed the
alleged acts of Defendant Lopez, Johnson does not allege that Defendant King participated
in the alleged assault, only that King failed to intervene.
Johnson does not even allege that Defendants C. Sandoval and J. Lomelli,
supervisors of Defendants Lopez and King, were present at the time of the alleged assault,
let alone that they either participated in it or failed to prevent it. Johnson alleges that
through their actions or inactions, Sandoval and Lomelli somehow compromised an internal
investigation into Johnson’s allegations of sexual assault against Lopez and, although they
promised he would see a doctor, they failed to follow through, thereby evidencing deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs.
II.

SCREENING REQUIREMENTS
This Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.3 This Court
must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

3

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

ORDER [Re: Motion at Docket 25]
Johnson v. Lopez, 1:12-cv-00018-RRB – 2

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that
“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”4
In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court looks to the pleading
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”5 “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”6 Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard
applied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), including the rule that complaints filed
by pro se prisoners are to be liberally construed, affording the prisoner the benefit of any
doubt, and dismissal should be granted only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can plead no facts in support of his claim that would entitle him or her to relief.7
This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief.8 “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

4

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); see Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1126 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
5

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

6

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)).
7

Wilhelm v. Rotham, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).

8

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–69; see Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962,
969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting and applying Iqbal and Twombly).
ORDER [Re: Motion at Docket 25]
Johnson v. Lopez, 1:12-cv-00018-RRB – 3

entitlement to relief.’”9 Further, although a court must accept as true all factual allegations
contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true.10
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”11
III.

DISCUSSION
With respect to Defendant King, other than to add his conclusion that King somehow

had a duty to intervene, Johnson adds nothing to the allegations against King alleged in
Johnson’s original complaint. The additional allegation, which is merely conclusory in
nature, adds nothing of substance to Johnson’s original complaint and still falls far short of
stating a cause of action against King.
To the extent that Johnson continues to allege that Defendants Sandoval and Lomeli
somehow failed to properly supervise Lopez, Johnson must demonstrate that each
defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his or her rights.12 Johnson’s
allegations still fail to satisfy this test.

9

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

10

Id.

11

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

12

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1069
(9th Cir. 2012); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002); see Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–95 (1978) (rejecting the concept of respondeat superior
in the context of § 1983, instead requiring individual liability for the violation); Taylor v. List,
880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Liability under [§] 1983 arises only upon a showing
of personal participation by the defendant. A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional
violations of . . . subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or
knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” (Citations omitted)).
ORDER [Re: Motion at Docket 25]
Johnson v. Lopez, 1:12-cv-00018-RRB – 4

To the extent Johnson contends that, in somehow preventing him from receiving
medical treatment, Sandoval and Lomeli were guilty of deliberate indifference, Johnson’s
Amended Complaint also fails. Johnson must show that Defendants exhibited “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.”13 Such a showing is necessary to demonstrate the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”14 In this
case, Johnson’s own allegations undermine his deliberate indifference claim against
Sandoval and Lomelli. First, Johnson alleges that prior to the time Sandoval and Lomelli
became involved, Johnson was seen, but not examined, by an RN. Second, Johnson
alleges that the same night he submitted a sick call slip to the building nurse requesting to
see a doctor. As a result Johnson was examined by Sexual Assault Response Team nurse
two days later. At most, Johnson alleges a delay in obtaining medical treatment. Where the
claim is based upon delay in providing treatment, a prisoner has no claim for deliberate
medical indifference unless the delay was harmful.15 Johnson has failed to allege that he
suffered any harm from the delay.
IV.

CONCLUSION and ORDER
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is insufficient to state a cause of action as against

Defendants C. Sandoval, J. Lomeli, and M. King. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for

13

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).

14

Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
15

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other
grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
ORDER [Re: Motion at Docket 25]
Johnson v. Lopez, 1:12-cv-00018-RRB – 5

Reconsideration in Screening Order of 1983 Complaint/Leave to Amend at Docket 25 is
DENIED and the proposed First Amended Complaint at Docket 26 is STRICKEN.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of January, 2014.
S/ RALPH R. BEISTLINE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ORDER [Re: Motion at Docket 25]
Johnson v. Lopez, 1:12-cv-00018-RRB – 6