Singleton, Sr. v. Biter, et al.

Filing 28

ORDER DENYING Defendants' 22 Motion for Reconsideration signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 11/19/2013. (Sant Agata, S)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

LARRY SINGLETON, SR.,

12

Plaintiff,
v.

13
14

M.D. BITER, et al.,

15

Defendants.

16
17
18

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: 1:12cv00043 AWI DLB (PC)
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(Document 22)

Plaintiff Larry Singleton, Sr. (“Plaintiff”) is a California state prisoner. He is proceeding pro
se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

19

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

20

Plaintiff filed this action on January 9, 2012. On February 12, 2013, the Court ordered that the

21

action proceed on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants M. D. Biter and Sherri

22

Lopez.

23

Defendants filed their answer on August 23, 2013.

24

On August 28, 2013, the Court issued a Discovery and Scheduling Order. Part I of the Order

25
26

requires the parties to provide initial disclosures, including names of witnesses and production of
documents.

27
28
1

1
2
3

On September 11, 2013, Defendants filed a Request for Reconsideration of Part I of the
Discovery and Scheduling Order. Plaintiff filed an opposition on September 20, 2013. Defendants
did not file reply and the matter is deemed submitted pursuant to Local Rule 230(l).

4
5

LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants move for reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 303(c), which permits District

6

Judge review of a Magistrate Judge’s order. Local Rule 303(a) incorporates the “clearly erroneous” or

7

“contrary to law” standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). Thus, the District Judge

8

must “modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R.

9

Civ. P. 72(a).

10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17

DISCUSSION
Defendants correctly argue that Part I of the Discovery and Scheduling Order requires the
parties to engage in disclosures similar to those required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)(1). Defendants are also correct in that Plaintiff is a pro se prisoner, and that such actions are
generally exempt from initial disclosure requirements.
Defendants are incorrect, however, insofar as they argue that the Discovery and Scheduling
Order is an improper “standing order” meant to modify the initial disclosure requirements. As the
Court has previously explained in many other prisoner actions where the Discovery and Scheduling

18

Order has been issued, the order is a case-specific order that issued in this action “[t]o expedite the fair

19

disposition of this action and to discourage wasteful pretrial activities.” Therefore, the order is proper

20

since “even in a case excluded . . ., the court can order exchange of similar information in managing

21

the action under rule 16.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) Advisory Committee Note of 2000. The fact that a

22
23
24
25
26
27

similar order has issued in other prisoner cases does not transform the order into a formal, or informal,
standing order.
The Court notes that the discovery order at issue, which has been used and upheld in other
actions in this Court, was implemented in light of the numerous discovery issues that were arising with
increasing frequency in other pro se prisoner actions. Defendants’ discovery practices were bordering
on unnecessarily obstructive, and these tactics caused numerous discovery disputes that required

28
2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

extensive Court resources to resolve. The intent of the order, as explained above, is to discourage
similar wasteful activities. The Court also notes that in other prisoner actions where the Discovery
Order has been upheld, the parties have filed their notice of initial disclosures without incident.
Defendants further believe that such requirements are an undue burden on the State in prisoner
cases. However, again, the intent behind the order is to streamline the discovery process and
ultimately reduce the overall burden on the State, the Court and the parties. Similarly, although
Defendants suggest that the order deprives counsel of the exercise of professional judgment in
determining how much time and effort to devote to investigation, the order requires no more than
would be required under Rule 26(a), or in the ordinary course of investigating a complaint. The

10

purpose of initial disclosures under FRCP 26(a) is “to accelerate the exchange of basic information . . .

11

and to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such information.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)

12
13
14

Advisory Committee Note of 1993 (emphasis added). Orders such as this fall well within the vested
control of a trial court to control its docket and to ensure efficient use of limited judicial resources.
Defendants also attempt to raise an issue based on the Discovery and Scheduling Order’s

15

failure to limit the disclosures to “discoverable information.” While the order may not specifically

16

state that disclosures are limited to “discoverable information,” the context of the order, as well as

17

common sense, dictate that only discoverable information need be exchanged. Indeed, the order limits

18

Defendants’ disclosures to information regarding individuals “likely to have information about

19

Defendant(s)’ claims or defenses, or who will be used to support Defendant(s)’ version of the events

20

described in the complaint.” August 28, 2013, Order 2.

21
22
23
24

Finally, insofar as Defendants object to the requirement that Defendants produce materials in
the possession, custody or control of Defendants and CDCR, their objection fails. Defendants
specifically object to the definition used in Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL 309945 (E. D. Cal. 2007),
cited in the order, and contend that they do not control CDCR or its documents. Mot. 9. This

25

standard, however, requires no more than production of information for which Defendants have “the

26

legal right to obtain” on demand. If a document does not fall within the definition of Allen, it need not

27

be produced. Certainly, Defendants will not have “possession, custody or control” of all of CDCR’s

28
3

1
2
3
4
5

documents. The order does not require Defendants to produce documents that they cannot otherwise
obtain in the course of their employment.
The above arguments are not persuasive and do not establish that the Discovery and
Scheduling Order, in general, is contrary to law or clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

6
7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

8

Dated: November 19, 2013

9

SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4