Archer et al v. City of Taft, Ca. Inc. et al

Filing 143

ORDER DENYING 134 Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on 2/18/2016. (Jessen, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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DARRELL ARCHER, AND KEITHA
DARQUEA,

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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION.

Plaintiffs,

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Case No. 1:12-CV-00261-LJO-JLT

v.
JILL GIPSON; JOSEPH BURKE; AND,
J.E. BURKE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

(Doc. 134)

Defendants.

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Before the Court in the above-styled and numbered cause of action is Plaintiffs Darrell

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Archer and Keitha Darquea’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed January 25, 2016. (Doc. 134). The

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matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See E.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 230(g). Having

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considered the record and relevant law, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ motion.

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BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Darrell Archer and Keitha Darquea (together, “Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se,

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initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants on February 23,

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2012. (Doc. 1). Subsequent to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, this Court dismissed certain claims

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and multiple defendants. (Doc. 12). Defendant moved for summary judgment and of the three

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remaining causes of action, this Court granted the motion as to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action under

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§ 1983 related to Defendant Gipson’s warrantless yet reasonable search at the subject property, but

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in all other ways denied the motion as to the second and third causes of action. (Doc. 81).

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A jury trial was held in this case from August 4-6, 2015. The jury found in favor of Plaintiffs

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on their claims that Defendant Jill Gipson (“Gipson”) and J.E. Burke Construction, Inc. (together,

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“Defendants”) violated their Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully seizing their personal property

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without a warrant, and that these Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their due process rights by failing

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to provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard prior to seizing their personal property.

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The jury awarded compensatory damages to Plaintiffs of $937.36 “plus interest due as of

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[August 6, 2015]” against Defendant Gipson and $1.00 against Joseph Burke and/or J.E. Burke

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Construction, Inc. (Doc. 121). The jury also found that Defendant Gipson and J.E. Burke

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Construction, Inc.’s conduct was malicious, oppressive, or in reckless disregard of the Plaintiffs’

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constitutional rights. See id. In a bifurcated damages phase, the jury awarded punitive damages of

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$800.00 against Defendant Gipson and $200.00 against J.E. Burke Construction, Inc. (Doc. 122).

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The Court entered final judgment on August 10, 2015 (Doc. 125).

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After prevailing at trial, Plaintiffs filed motions for attorneys’ fees (Docs. 127 & 128). The

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Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motions. See Doc. 133. Plaintiffs now ask the

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Court to reconsider its partial denial of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.
LEGAL STANDARD

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A motion to alter or amend a judgment may be made pursuant to Rule 59(e). A district court

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should not grant a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) “absent highly unusual circumstances

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… .” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations and quotations

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omitted). “There are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: 1) the motion is

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necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; 2) the moving

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party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; 3) the motion is necessary to

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prevent manifest injustice; or 4) there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Turner v.

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Burlington N. Santa Fe R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and

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quotations omitted).
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No such highly unusual circumstances exist here. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ motion rehashes the

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same arguments previously before the Court. Plaintiffs’ argument is that they are entitled to

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attorneys’ fees for counsel’s time billed before he was counsel of record, counsel’s block-billed time,

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and that they are due these fees without any reduction. The Court previously rejected Plaintiffs’

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arguments. In their motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs do not show clear errors of law or fact.

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Plaintiffs fail to offer any newly discovered evidence. There is no evidence that there has been any

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change in controlling law.

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In sum, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Court committed “clear error” or that “the
initial decision was manifestly unjust.” Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir.

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2013) (quoting Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.

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1993)). A Rule 59(e) motion is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of

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finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014)

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(quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). Accordingly, the

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Court declines to reconsider its partial denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER

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For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration (Doc. 134) is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill

February 18, 2016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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