Le v. Chokatos et al

Filing 11

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS Recommending Dismissal of Certain Claims and Defendants; Objections, if any, Due within Fourteen Days signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck on 11/5/2012. Referred to Judge Anthony W. Ishii. Objections to F&R due by 11/26/2012. (Sant Agata, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LOC PHAT LE,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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JOHN CHOKATOS, et al.,

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Defendants.

Case No. 1:12-cv-00460-AWI-DLB PC
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF
CERTAIN CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS
ECF No. 1
OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN
FOURTEEN DAYS

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I.

Background
Plaintiff Loc Phat Le (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner in the custody of the California Department of

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Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in

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this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On March 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed his complaint.

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ECF No. 1. On October 19, 2012, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and found that it stated a

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cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Chokatos, but failed to state any other

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claims against any other Defendants. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff was provided the opportunity to either

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file an amended complaint or notify the Court that he wished to proceed only on the cognizable

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claims. On November 1, 2012, Plaintiff notified the Court that he did not wish to amend and would

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proceed against Defendant Chokatos. ECF No. 10. The Court issues the following Findings and

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Recommendation.

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The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

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Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

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“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

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“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

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claim upon which relief may be granted.” Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

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is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

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U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). While factual

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allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

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II.

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Summary of Complaint
Plaintiff was incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”) in Coalinga, California,

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where the events alleged in this action occurred. Plaintiff names as Defendants medical doctor John

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Chokatos, chief executive officer of healthcare services Anthony S. Lonigro, warden R. H.

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Brazelton, and secretary of CDCR Matthew Cate.

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Plaintiff alleges the following. On May 30, 2011, Plaintiff collapsed in his unit cell. Compl.

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¶ 9. Plaintiff had excruciating pain in his legs and ankles, swollen ankles, calves, and knees,

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dizziness, and fever. Compl. ¶ 9. A fellow prisoner, Le Kim, aided Plaintiff to his feet and

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practically carried him to the C-Facility medical center. Compl. ¶ 9. Because Plaintiff’s English

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was sub-standard, Kim served as an interpreter. Compl. ¶ 9.

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the description of Plaintiff’s symptoms and accused Plaintiff feigning them. Compl. ¶ 9. Defendant

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Chokatos told Kim to get out. Compl. ¶ 9.

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Defendant Chokatos heard Plaintiff’s

During the medical exam, Defendant Chokatos tapped the back of Plaintiff’s knees and

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ankles with a rubber mallet. Compl. ¶ 9. Defendant Chokatos then told Plaintiff that he could go.

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Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff made several attempts to tell Defendant Chokatos of the excruciating pain and

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what his specific symptoms were, but was ignored and dismissed from the medical center. Compl. ¶

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9. Plaintiff persisted, and Defendant Chokatos motioned a correctional officer over and order
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Plaintiff to get up. Compl. ¶ 9. Fearing for his safety, Plaintiff left the clinic. Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff

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contends that Defendant Chokatos has a pattern and practice of minimizing healthcare that is to be

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administered. Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff was later diagnosed with cancer.

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Plaintiff contends a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the

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Fourteenth Amendment, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and § 504 of the

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Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff requests as relief compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory

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relief, and costs of suit.

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III.

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Analysis
A.

Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff names Defendants Lonigro, Brazelton, and Cate, but fails to allege any facts which

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indicate that these Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights. See Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743

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(9th Cir. 1978) (“A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

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meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or

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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

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complaint is made.”).

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To the extent that Plaintiff alleges liability against Defendants solely based on their

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supervisory roles, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. The term “supervisory liability,” loosely and

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commonly used by both courts and litigants alike, is a misnomer. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

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“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates

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under a theory of respondeat superior.” Id. at 676. Rather, each government official, regardless of

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his or her title, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id. at 677. When the named defendant

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holds a supervisory position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional

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violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

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Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). To state a claim for relief under § 1983 for

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supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally

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participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights or knew of the violations and failed to

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act to prevent them. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Allegations that Defendants

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Lonigro, Brazelton, and Cate are responsible because of their supervisory role amounts at most to
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liability under a respondeat superior theory, which fails to state a claim.

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B.

Eighth Amendment

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The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. “The Constitution does not

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mandate comfortable prisons.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation and citation

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omitted). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an Eighth

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Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized

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measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate indifference in

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doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296

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F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). The deliberate indifference standard involves an

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objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms,

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“sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298

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(1991)). Second, the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate

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health or safety . . . .” Id. at 837.

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“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Under this

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standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be

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drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’”

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Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the

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risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the

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risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Chokatos. Plaintiff satisfies

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the first prong by alleging sufficient facts which indicate that he faced an excessive risk of serious

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harm to his health. Plaintiff satisfies the second prong by alleging sufficient facts which indicate

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that Defendant Chokatos acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Defendant

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Chokatos was notified that Plaintiff was suffering excruciating pain, dizziness, a fever, and swollen

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ankles, calves, and legs. Defendant Chokatos, however, failed to provide treatment.

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C.

Equal Protection

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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “commands that no State shall

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‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a
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direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne

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Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of

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the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants

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acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a

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protected class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). If Plaintiff’s

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membership is not in a protected class, then “[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be

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valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a

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legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.

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Plaintiff fails to allege facts which indicate that he was discriminated against because of his
disability. Plaintiff thus fails to state an Equal Protection claim.

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D.

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In order to state a claim under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must

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allege that: (1) she is an individual with a disability under the Act; (2) she is “otherwise qualified” to

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participate in or receive the benefit of the entity's services, programs, or activities, i.e., she meets the

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essential eligibility requirements of the entity, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) she

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was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the entity's services, programs, or

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activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity solely by reason of her

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disability; and (4) the entity is a public entity (for the ADA claim) or receives federal financial

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assistance (for the Rehabilitation Act claim). Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045

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(9th Cir.1999).

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ADA and Rehabilitation Act

Plaintiff alleges no facts which indicate that Plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis

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of a disability. To the extent that Plaintiff complains of the medical treatment that he received,

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Plaintiff does not state an ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim. Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609

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F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not

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inadequate treatment for disability.”); Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1216 n.27 (9th

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Cir. 2008) (finding there is no significant difference between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA).

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IV.

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Conclusion and Recommendation
Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against Defendant Chokatos for deliberate indifference to a
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serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff does not state any other claims

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against any other Defendants. Plaintiff was provided the opportunity to file an amended complaint

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to cure the deficiencies identified. Plaintiff notified the Court that he is willing to proceed only on

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the cognizable claim against Defendant Chokatos.

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Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

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1.

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serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment;

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This action proceeds against Defendant Chokatos for deliberate indifference to a

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All other claims be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted; and

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Defendants Lonigro, Brazelton, and Cate be dismissed from this action.

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

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assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) days

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after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections

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with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

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Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

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waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir.

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1991).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

/s/ Dennis

November 5, 2012

L. Beck

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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DEAC_Signature-END:

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