Mitchell v. Gipson et al

Filing 25

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS Recommending that Defendants' 17 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim be Denied signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck on 10/8/2013. Referred to Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill. Objections to F&R due by 11/12/2013. (Sant Agata, S)

1
2
3
4
5
6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

8
9
10
11

HENRY M. HAYES,

12
13
14

Plaintiff,
vs.
BOLEN, et al.,

15

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1:12cv00469 LJO DLB PC
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS
(Document 17)

16
17
18
19
20

Plaintiff Henry M. Hayes (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 12, 2012. On February 27, 2013, the Court
issued a screening order finding a cognizable First Amendment claim against Defendants Seifert
and Bolen. The Court ordered Plaintiff to either file an amended complaint or notify the Court of

21

his willingness to proceed on the cognizable claim. On March 29, 2013, Plaintiff notified the
22
23
24
25
26
27

Court that he wished to proceed on the First Amendment claim against Defendants Seifert and
Bolen. Accordingly, on April 3, 2013, the Court dismissed the remaining claims and
Defendants.
On May 24, 2013, Defendants Seifert and Bolen filed this Motion to Dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed his opposition on June 10, 2013, and

28
1

1
2
3

Defendants filed their reply on June 24, 2013. The motion is deemed submitted pursuant to
Local Rule 230(l).
I.

4

LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

5

accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
6
7
8
9

678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct.
1955 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted); Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42
(9th Cir. 2011); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court must

10

accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

11

the non-moving party. Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010);

12

Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007); Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465

13

F.3d 992, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2006); Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir.

14

2000). Further, although the pleading standard is now higher, the Ninth Circuit has continued to

15

emphasize that prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their

16
17
18

pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman,
680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. May 25, 2012); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.
2012); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

II.

ALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
As noted above, the Court has already screened this action and found a cognizable claim

against Defendants Bolen and Seifert. Accordingly, as all other claims and Defendants have
been dismissed, the Court will summarize only the relevant allegations.
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at California State Prison, Lancaster. The events
occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at California State Prison, Corcoran.
Plaintiff alleges that on August 23, 2011, Defendant Bolen sent him a Notification of
Disapproval, informing him that an incoming package was seized pursuant to California Code of

28
2

1

Regulations Title 15, section 3134(a)(11) because it exceeded 16 ounces. Plaintiff contends that

2

Defendant Seifert gave the authority to disallow the package. Plaintiff’s package was a total of

3

36 ounces.

4
5

Plaintiff proceeded through the inmate appeal process, contending that section
3134(a)(11) “has no relation to a restriction on the weight of an incoming mail/package item.”

6
7
8
9

Compl. 3. Plaintiff argued that subdivision (11) is “restrictive only to a mail/package that has
more than Forty postage stamps, or a Photo album enclosed within it.” Compl. 3. Plaintiff
believed that the mailroom was reading the regulation too broadly, contending that it “gives

10

direction for how many stamps are needed to satisfy an outgoing first-class letter sent out by an

11

inmate….The items for enclosure can weight [sic] more than 16 ounces.” Compl. 3.

12

Alternatively, Plaintiff argued that pursuant to section 3136, disapproval of inmate mail is based

13

only on criteria established in section 3006 (Contraband) and section 3135 (Disturbing or

14

Offensive Correspondence).

15
16
17
18

During his appeal, Plaintiff also argued that the prohibition of incoming general mail
based on a weight limit is unlawful censorship. Plaintiff’s appeal was denied at all levels. At the
Third Level of Review, the Appeals Examiner explained that Plaintiff was unacquainted with
institutional security needs, and his claim that there were no potential risks/complications with

19
20
21
22

inmates receiving unrestricted weight in mail was misguided.
III.

DISCUSSION
The Court screened this complaint in a reasoned decision dated February 27, 2013. In

23

bringing this motion, Defendants wholly fail to acknowledge the Court’s prior finding, a finding

24

that was premised upon the same legal standards as this 12(b)(6) motion. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A;

25

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).

26
27
28
3

1
2
3
4

A screening order may not ignored or disregarded. Ingle v. Circuit City, 408 F.3d
592, 594 (9th Cir. 2005). To the contrary, the existence of a screening order which utilized the
same legal standard upon which a subsequent motion to dismiss relies necessarily implicates the
law of the case doctrine. As a result, the moving party is expected to articulate the grounds for

5

the 12(b)(6) motion in light of a screening order finding the complaint stated a claim. Ingle, 408
6
7
8
9

F.3d at 594; Thomas v. Hickman, 2008 WL 2233566, *2-3 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
In this regard, this Court recently explained:

20

If the defendants in a case which has been screened believe there is a
good faith basis for revisiting a prior determination made in a screening order,
they must identify the basis for their motion, be it error, an intervening change
in the law, or some other recognized exception to the law of the case doctrine.
Ingle, 408 F.3d at 594 (“A district court abuses its discretion in applying the law
of the case doctrine only if (1) the first decision was clearly erroneous; (2) an
intervening change in the law occurred; (3) the evidence on remand was substantially
different; (4) other changed circumstances exist; or (5) a manifest injustice would
otherwise result.”). The duty of good faith and candor requires as much, and
frivolous motions which serve only to unnecessarily multiply the proceedings may
subject the moving parties to sanctions. Pacific Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air
Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). Parties are not entitled to a
gratuitous second bite at the apple at the expense of judicial resources and in
disregard of court orders. Ingle, 408 F.3d at 594 (The law of the case “doctrine has
developed to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided
during the course of a single continuing lawsuit.”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); Thomas, 2008 WL 2233566, at *3 (for important policy reasons,
the law of the case doctrine disallows parties from a second bite at the apple).

21

Chavez v. Yates, No. 1:09-cv-01080-AWI-SKO (PC) (E.D.Cal. Oct. 3, 2013) (ECF No. 41).

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

22
23
24

Here, rather than move forward with this action based upon the Court’s findings in the
screening order, Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint based on their reading of

25

Section 3134(a)(11). Specifically, Defendants call Plaintiff’s interpretation of the regulation

26

“absurd” and set forth their logic for finding section 3134(a)(11) applicable to incoming

27

packages. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim because CDCR’s

28
4

1
2

interpretation of the regulation was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent, and/or because prison
officials may regulate mail based on weight.

3
4

At this stage of the proceeding, Defendants’ arguments are not persuasive and do not
merit departure from the Court’s findings in the February 27, 2013, screening order. While

5

examining the text of the regulation does not necessarily turn this into a motion for summary
6
7
8
9

judgment, it goes far beyond the threshold requirement for a pro se litigant. “[A] pleading
challenge following a Section 1915A screening of a prisoner complaint rarely will be successful,
especially in light of the requirement that pro se complaints be liberally construed.” Treglia v.

10

Kernan, 2013 WL 4427253, * 2 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

11

Cir.2010) (even after Supreme Court cases heightened the standards for pleading, the court’s

12

obligation remains, where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the

13

pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt) (citations omitted).

14
15
16
17
18

The Court also rejects Defendants’ arguments related to qualified immunity. Again, at
this early stage of litigation, the Court cannot undertake a proper analysis of qualified immunity
given the limited set of factual allegations before it.
IV.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the above, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to

19
20
21
22

Dismiss for failure to state a claim, filed on May 24, 2013, be DENIED.
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District
Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

23

thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may

24

file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to

25

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” A party may file a reply to the objections

26

within fourteen (14) days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

27
28
5

1
2

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order.
Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

3
4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

5

Dated:
6

/s/ Dennis L. Beck

October 8, 2013

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
D C_Si gnat ue EN :
EA
r- D

7

3b142a
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6