Moreno et al v. Castlerock Farming and Transport, Inc. et al

Filing 29

ORDER GRANTING 8 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for Stay signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 3/29/2013. Plaintiffs are directed to file a status update every six (6) months. CASE STAYED. (Jessen, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MARIO G. MORENO, ESTHER L.
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LOPEZ, FRANCISCO OROZCO,
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ABRAHAM ORTIZ, JAVIER GARCIA, )
FLORENCIA GUTIERREZ, and ISRAEL )
LOPEZ, on behalf of themselves and all )
others similarly situated,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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CASTLEROCK FARMING AND
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TRANSPORT, INC., J.L. PADILLA &
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SONS LABOR SERVICE, INC., MELBA )
NUNEZ CONTRACTING (form
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unknown), and Does 1 to 20, inclusive,
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Defendants.
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____________________________________ )

CIV-F-12-0556 AWI JLT
ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR
STAY

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I. History

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This case arises out of a complex procedural history and is completely intertwined with a

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related case, Soto v. Castlerock, Civ. Case No. 09-0701. Both cases (“Soto” and “Moreno”) are

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being heard before the undersigned and Magistrate Judge Thurston. In Soto, the only remaining

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named plaintiff, Silvestre Soto, seeks to represent a class of farmworkers who have worked for

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Defendant Castlerock Farming and Transport, Inc. (“Castlerock”) in the past. Silvestre Soto

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alleges that Castlerock failed to abide by a number of California regulations concerning

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uncompensated “off the clock” work, forced purchasing of tools, meal and rest periods, time-

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keeping documentation, and wage statements.
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Silvestre Soto worked for Castlerock through a farm labor contractor (“FLC”) called

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Golden Grain Farm Labor. Castlerock asserts that Silvestre Soto can only represent a class

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consisting of Golden Grain Farm Labor workers employed at Castlerock facilities. Silvestre Soto

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asserts that he can represent all workers who have been employed at Castlerock facilities. This

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issue and others have been the subject of various pre-class certification discovery disputes. No

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class certification motion has yet been made. In order to avoid this issue, Silvestre Soto made a

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motion to amend the complaint, seeking to add Javier Garcia as a named plaintiff. Soto, Doc. 54.

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Javier Garcia worked directly for Castlerock and through two FLCs, Golden Grain Farm Labor

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and J.L. Padilla & Sons Labor Service. Judge Thurston denied the motion to amend, finding

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prejudice. Soto, Doc. 71. Silvestre Soto did not seek reconsideration of that denial.
Subsequent to that ruling, the present case was filed. Among the named plaintiffs in

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Moreno (“Moreno Plaintiffs”) is Javier Garcia. The attorneys representing the Moreno Plaintiffs

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are different than the attorneys representing Silvestre Soto. However, the legal causes of action

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in Moreno are almost identical to those of Soto and the substantive factual claims are the same.

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The named defendants are Castlerock and two FLCs, J.L. Padilla & Sons Labor Service and

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Melba Nunez Contracting. Castlerock has made a motion to have Moreno dismissed, or in the

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alternative stayed for being duplicative of Soto. Doc. 9. The Moreno Plaintiffs oppose the

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motion, proposing instead to consolidate Moreno and Soto. Doc. 10.

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II. Legal Standards
“District courts retain broad discretion to control their dockets and in the exercise of that

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power they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate, default or dismissal....After

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weighing the equities of the case, the district court may exercise its discretion to dismiss a

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duplicative later-filed action, to stay that action pending resolution of the previously filed action,

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to enjoin the parties from proceeding with it, or to consolidate both actions.” Adams v. Cal.

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Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007), citations omitted. This discretionary

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rule also applies to class actions. See Plack v. Cypress Semiconductor, 864 F. Supp. 957, 959

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(N.D. Cal. 1994) (“The filing of a successive, identical class action qualifies as abusive
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regardless of whether class certification was granted or denied in an earlier case; both scenarios

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entail unnecessary duplication. A class action identical in scope to an earlier certified class action

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is unnecessary because the class members’ claims are already being litigated in the earlier

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action”); Tara M. v. City of Philadelphia, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12184, *6-8 (E.D. Pa. 1998)

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(earlier filed class action was certified and both class actions shared a named plaintiff; the later

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filed suit was dismissed); James v. AT&T Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 410, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)

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(second class action suit almost identical to first class action suit with addition of new defendant

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is dismissed as duplicative); cf. Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1024-25 (9th Cir.

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2011) ( “The district court dismissed the case [Johnson] at the pleading stage on the basis that it

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was simply duplicative of Mancini and suffered from the same defects. In that the district court

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erred....Johnson was significantly different from Mancini, and the district court erred in

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determining that it was not. Thus, we must reverse the dismissal of the complaint based on the

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determination that it was duplicative”).

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III. Discussion

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“[I]n assessing whether the second action is duplicative of the first, we examine whether

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the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same.”

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Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 2007). The Moreno Plaintiffs

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“dispute that the Moreno action is identical to the Soto action” but concede “the factual

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allegations regarding Defendants’ wrongdoing is substantially similar in both actions.” Moreno,

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Doc. 10, Plaintiffs’ Opposition, 3:8 and 9:21-23. The key question is whether they cover the

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same potential class. When analyzing duplicative suits, “In a class action, the classes, and not

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the class representatives, are compared.” Weinstein v. Metlife, Inc., 2006 WL 3201045, *4 (N.D.

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Cal. 2006), citations omitted. Whether Moreno is duplicative depends upon how the class is

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defined in Soto.

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In Soto, Castlerock argues Silvestre Soto “claim[s] to represent a wage-and-hour class of

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not just the persons on the plaintiff’s crew, and not just persons employed by the same FLC, but

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instead a class of (i) all of Castlerock’s direct employees since 2001 and (ii) all employees of any
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other FLC who performed work at a Castlerock ranch or facility since 2001. Plaintiffs’ counsel

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thus seek to certify a radically overbroad class.” Soto, Doc. 40, 2:5-9. In the discovery disputes,

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Castlerock argues Silvestre Soto is “not entitled to discovery concerning anyone other than

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Golden Grain employees because they could not be proper class representatives of other

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workers.” Soto, Doc. 64, 7:7-8. Without deciding the scope of the class, Judge Thurston has

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found broad discovery covering all Castlerock workers “relevant and discoverable.” Soto, Doc.

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110, 13:26. Whether Silvestre Soto can represent all workers of Castlerock or only a subset

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associated with Golden Grain Farm Labor has not yet been determined. The question will be

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answered in the order granting or denying class certification.

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If the class in Soto is certified as narrow, then the Moreno Plaintiffs can move forward to

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represent all other workers at Castlerock facilities. Indeed, all pre-class certification discovery

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received by Silvestre Soto could be directly given to the Moreno Plaintiffs to save time and effort

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in that circumstance. If the class certified in Soto is wide, then Moreno would probably be

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considered duplicative and subject to dismissal. If class certification is denied for some other

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reason not having to do with Silvestre Soto’s status, then Moreno may or may not be able to

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proceed depending upon the specific circumstance. But see Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct.

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2368, 2380 (2011) (“Neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may bind

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nonparties”). This is a determination that can not yet be made. A stay in Moreno pending class

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certification in Soto would appear to be the equitable solution.

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The other potential course of action is to consolidate the two cases as the Moreno

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Plaintiffs wish. Silvestre Soto has consented to this proposal. Moreno, Doc. 10, Part 1, Martha

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Gomez Declaration, 2:19-24. Castlerock does not consent. In the circumstances, consolidation

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of the two cases would act as a collateral method to overturn Judge Thurston’s order in Soto

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denying leave to amend. The court will not allow that order to be circumvented by other means.

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See Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Adams filed her

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present complaint in an attempt to avoid the consequences of her own delay and to circumvent

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the district court’s denial of her untimely motion for leave to amend her first complaint....the

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district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Adams’s later-filed complaint with
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prejudice”); Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 102 (9th Cir. 2011) (in reversing

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dismissal, the Ninth Circuit noted “this was not a case where a plaintiff was, in effect, attempting

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to avoid an unfavorable prior ruling in one case by filing essentially the same claims in a new

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case”). The two cases should proceed separately. Nevertheless, it may very well be easier for all

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parties if they were consolidated. Should Castlerock (and other defendants in Moreno) consent

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to consolidation, the court will not stand in the way.

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IV. Order

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Defendants’ motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for stay, is GRANTED. This case is

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STAYED pending resolution of a class action motion in Soto v. Castlerock, Civ. Case No. 09-

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0701. Plaintiffs are directed to file a status update every six (6) months. Should Plaintiffs wish

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to argue that some subset of this case is not duplicative of Soto and should proceed in the

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interim, they are granted leave to make a motion to lift the stay on that basis.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:
0m8i78

March 29, 2013
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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