Jones v. Lehigh Southwest Cement Company, Inc.

Filing 106

ORDER DENYING plaintiff's second motion for relief from judgment, document 104 . Order signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 6/30/2015. (Rooney, M)

1
2
3
4
5
6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

8
9

WILLIAM RAY JONES, SR.,
Plaintiff,

10
11

vs.

12
13
14

1:12-CV-0633 AWI JLT

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S SECOND
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT

LEHIGH SOUTHWEST CEMENT
COMPANY, INC., a California Corporation; Doc. # 104
And DOES 1-50,

15

Defendant.

16
17
On May 16, 2014, the court issued a memorandum opinion and order granting the motion

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

of defendant Lehigh Southwest Cement Co., Inc. (“Defendant”) for summary judgment on the
second amended complaint of plaintiff William Ray Jones, Sr. (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff’s second
amended complaint (“SAC”) alleged a single claim for relief pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The court’s order of May 16 (hereinafter, the
May 16 Order”) granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff
had failed to produce evidence to show that his termination of employment by Defendant was
the result of unlawful racial discrimination. On July 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for relief
from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. # 102.
That motion was denied by the court’s order filed on September 30, 2014. Doc. # 103.

28

A

1
On June 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration, again pursuant to

2
3
4

Rule 60(b). The legal standard for determination of a motion for relief under Rule 60 was set
forth in the court’s order of September 30, 2014, and need not be repeated here.
As has been the case with prior pleadings by Plaintiff, it is somewhat difficult to discern

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

precisely the alleged grounds for reconsideration. It appears to the court that Plaintiff’s second
motion for reconsideration alleges two bases for relief. The first appears to be a collection of
complaints about how the court ignored certain facts pertaining to the conduct of Defendant after
Plaintiff’s termination, including the firing of a number of former employees who were
participants and/or witnesses in Plaintiff’s termination, and ignored Plaintiff’s request for a
hearing after taking the prior motion for relief under submission. An additional complaint,
expressed for the first time in the current motion for reconsideration, is that Plaintiff only had
three days to file an opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
The first two “complaints” were dealt with in the court’s prior order denying

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

reconsideration. In summary, the court did not ignore the additional facts proffered by Plaintiff;
the court simply found those facts not relevant to the determination of whether Plaintiff was
terminated as a result of unlawful discrimination. With regard to not providing a hearing, the
court has explained that it considers most matters, including motions for consideration, suitable
for decision without oral argument. Plaintiff’s prior motion for reconsideration was no
exception. In any event, the court must assume that by now Plaintiff has articulated all the facts
available to him to support his request for reconsideration on the merits. It remains the case that
the court can find no factual basis warranting reconsideration.
The complaint regarding the lack of time for preparation of an opposition to Defendant’s

23
24
25
26
27
28

motion for summary judgment appears to have been a result of a misunderstanding regarding the
local rules of procedure. Plaintiff alleges that the Scheduling Order in effect at the time required
that all dispositive motions be filed by March 4, 2014. Plaintiff alleges Defendant filed its
opposition on February 28, 2014, leaving Plaintiff only three days to file an opposition. Since an
opposition to a motion is not the motion itself, it need not be filed by the deadline established by

-2A

1
2
3
4
5

the scheduling order but may be filed anytime within the fourteen days allowed by Local Rule
78-230. The court regrets Plaintiff’s misunderstanding of the rules but must conclude that, given
the absence of any fact or allegation of any fact that would tend to show that Plaintiff suffered
unlawful discrimination, the misunderstanding was harmless.
The final ground for relief asserted by Plaintiff is new. It is Plaintiff’s contention that

6
7
8
9
10

Judge Ishii did not sign or file an order granting summary judgment to Defendant; but that the
order that was filed was written by opposing counsel and/or that Judge Ishii’s chambers staff
colluded to forge the Judge’s electronic signature on a document that was not reviewed or
approved by the Judge. This contention is untrue and lacks merit.

11
The court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to show that he is entitled to

12
13
14
15
16
17

relief under Rule 60 from the court’s May 16 Order granting summary judgment to Defendant.
Plaintiff’s second motion for relief from judgment is therefore DENIED. The case remains
CLOSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 30, 2015
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

-3A