Jones v. Lehigh Southwest Cement Company, Inc.

Filing 109

ORDER on 107 Order to Show Cause and ORDER Forbidding Filings or Communication, signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 7/20/2015. (Rooney, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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WILLIAM RAY JONES, SR.,
Plaintiff

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v.

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CASE NO. 1:12-CV-633 AWI JLT

LEHIGH SOUTHWEST CEMENT
COMPANY, INC.,

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
AND ORDER FORBIDDING
FILINGS OR COMMUNICATION

Defendant

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This was an employment related dispute between Plaintiff and his former employer. On
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July 9, 2015, the undersigned issued an order to show cause to Plaintiff William Ray Jones, Sr.
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(“Mr. Jones”) and his wife, Helene Jones (“Mrs. Jones”), (collectively “the Joneses”). The order

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to show cause ordered the Joneses to show cause why they should not be sanctioned under the
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Court’s inherent authority with respect to numerous communications from the Joneses that

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accused Court personnel of fraud and forging orders. (Doc. 107). The Court also ordered Mr.
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Jones to show cause why Rule 11 sanctions should not be imposed against him for filing a second
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motion for reconsideration that alleged court personnel had unlawfully colluded and forged orders.
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(Doc. 107). Hearing on the order to show cause was held on July 20, 2015, before the
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undersigned. Neither Mr. Jones or Mrs. Jones were present at the hearing and the court is aware
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of no communication or attempted communication from the Joneses to explain their failure to
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attend the hearing. This order memorializes the findings and order of the Court that occurred at
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the hearing.
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Legal Standards

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In pertinent part, Rule 11(b) reads:

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By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper--whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it--an attorney or unrepresented party
certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

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(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
....
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery;
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11(b)(1), (3). Thus, Rule 11 imposes a duty on litigants to certify that (1) they

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have read the pleadings or motions they file, and (2) the pleading or motion is grounded in fact,
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has a colorable basis in law, and is not filed for an improper purpose. See Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d
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1478, 1488 (9th Cir.1994). A court considering whether to impose sanctions under Rule 11
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should consider whether the position taken was “frivolous,” “legally unreasonable,” or “without

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factual foundation, even if not filed in subjective bad faith.” Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780
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F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir.1986).
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Furthermore, courts are “endowed with inherent powers which are necessary to the
conduct of their business, including the power to sanction.” Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d

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622, 628 (9th Cir. 1993). A court has the inherent authority to issue sanctions against parties and
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non-parties to an action based on their conduct. In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc., 77 F.3d 278, 282
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(9th Cir. 1996); Corder v. Howard Johnson & Co., 53 F.3d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1995); Eleanora J.
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Dietlein Trust v. Am. Home Mortg. Inv. Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143237, *4 (D. Nev. Oct.
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7, 2014); Bartos v. Pennsylvania, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43937, *14-*15 (M.D. Pa. May 5, 2010);
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Adams v. Penn Line Servs., 620 F. Supp. 2d 835, 839 (N.D. Ohio 2009). A court’s inherent
powers are “governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). In order to impose sanctions under the court’s

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inherent powers, the court must make a specific finding of “bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad

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faith.” Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001); Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 994

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(9th Cir. 2000). “Under this standard, although recklessness, of itself, does not justify the

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imposition of sanctions, sanctions are available when recklessness is combined with an additional

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factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an improper purpose. Sanctions, then, are justified

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when a party acts for an improper purpose -- even if the act consists of making a truthful statement

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or a non-frivolous argument or objection.” Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1134; Fink, 239 F.3d at 992, 994.

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Sanctions through inherent powers “must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Chambers,

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501 U.S. at 44. “District courts have broad discretion in fashioning sanctions.” Molski v.

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Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1065 n.8 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Findings

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In his June 19, 2015 motion for reconsideration, Mr. Jones stated inter alia: the

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undersigned never “gave” Defendant summary judgment, that defense counsel committed fraud

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upon the Court with the knowledge of court staff (including a former and current court room

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deputy), that Plaintiff views the conduct of court employees as “beyond contemptible,” that the

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conduct of court employees is “criminal,” that he feels “victimized” by court employees, that each

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time he tried to bring this improper conduct to the attention of the court he was met with contempt

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by court employees, that court employees have turned the Court into a “pay for play”

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environment, that documents were tampered with and not presented to the court, that defense

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counsel committed crimes along with court employees, that court staff submitted forged

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documents to cause the termination of this case, that the poor grammatical structure of the

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summary judgment order shows that it was not actually authored by the undersigned, and that

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October 12, 2012 was the last time that the undersigned issued any rulings or viewed any

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documents pertaining to this case. (Doc. 104).

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On June 30, 2015, the Court denied Mr. Jones’s second Rule 60 motion. (Doc. 106) The

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Court noted Mr. Jones’s contention that the undersigned did not sign various orders and that the

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orders were forged through collusion between court personnel and defense counsel. See id. The
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Court responded, “This contention is untrue and lacks merit.” Id.
Plaintiff and Mrs. Jones have sent numerous e-mails to court personnel.1 The e-mails

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accuse court personnel of colluding with defense counsel and issuing forged orders, including an

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order granting Defendant summary judgment and orders denying reconsideration.

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Some e-mails accuse court personnel of engaging in criminal conduct, violations civil
rights, racism, and harassment.

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Some e-mails make threatening remarks regarding the careers of court personnel, state that
court personnel are corrupt, and state that the court personnel require therapy.

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The Joneses have sent a copy of an e-mail that they sent to the Department of Justice to a

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chambers staff member. The e-mail complains about the staff member engaging in harassment,

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fraud, and forgery.

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The Joneses sent e-mails to: the undersigned, to members of Chief Judge England’s staff,

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members of the undersigned’s staff, members of Magistrate Judge Thurston’s staff, and the Clerk

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of the Court.

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Mrs. Jones sent an e-mail on July 2, 2015, to a family member of chambers staff that inter

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alia accused the staff member of collusion and forging orders. Mrs. Jones’s e-mail encouraged the

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family member to exert more influence over the staff member than the alleged influence of

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defense counsel.

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The Jones have left messages with members of the Clerk’s office and spoken with

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members of the Clerk’s office accusing court personnel, including personnel in the undersigned’s

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chambers, of causing forged orders to be issued.

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Based on the nature of the messages and communications from the Joneses, the United

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States Marshal Service attempted to contact the Joneses. It is the function of the United States

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Marshals to make contact with individuals who send irregular, abnormal, abusive, threatening,

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and/or harassing messages that are directed at court personnel.

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The Joneses responded to these attempts by labeling them in e-mails as acts of intimidation

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and harassment.

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The Court has ordered e-mails from the Joneses to be filed as exhibits. Each e-mail post-dates June 30, 2015.

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The undersigned personally reviewed each motion and electronically signed each order in

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this case that bears his name, including the order on summary judgment and the orders for

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reconsideration. Thus, the Joneses’ allegations of fraud, forgery, collusion, racism, and

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harassment by Court personnel are completely false.

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The Court personnel identified by Plaintiffs, including the law clerk and courtroom

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deputies of this chambers, did not engage in any fraudulent conduct and had nothing to do with the

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review, disposition, and signing of the summary judgment order and orders on Mr. Jones’s

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motions for reconsideration.

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Conclusions
Despite the June 30, 2015 order, the Joneses have doubled down on their allegations of

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fraud and forgery, do not accept orders issued after October 2012 as legitimate, and have initiated

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the communications described above.

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The various communications sent by the Joneses to Court personnel are improper ex parte

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communications, consume limited judicial resources, and interfere with the functioning and

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operations of the Court.

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The e-mail communication to a family member of the undersigned’s chambers staff is

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harassing, an improper attempt to influence proceedings in this case, and causes the diversion of

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court resources.

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The Joneses’ continued challenge to every order that has issued from the Court in this case

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post-October 2012 as “forgeries” interferes with the Court’s ability to resolve this and other cases.

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Inasmuch as this action has been resolved on its merits by means of summary judgment

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and inasmuch as the undersigned has personally reviewed, approved and signed each and every

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order issued by this court in this action, the Joneses have no legitimate basis to continue to contact

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court personnel, or family members of court personnel, and make accusations of criminal,

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fraudulent, and collusive behavior in this case.

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The allegations in the various communications and filings regarding improper conduct by
court personnel, including allegations of fraud, forgery, and racism, are not based in fact, are based
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at best on bare speculation, are harassing, abusive, frivolous, and fanciful, and were made with

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recklessness. That is, the Joneses’ allegations and communications to the Court/court personnel

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constitute “bad faith.” Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1134.

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The allegations made by Mr. Jones in his June 19, 2015 motion for reconsideration

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regarding improper and fraudulent conduct by court personnel is unreasonable and without

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foundation. Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831.

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The proper method to challenge rulings that are perceived to be incorrect are either a type

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of reconsideration motion (per local rules or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 or 60) or an

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appeal to the Ninth Circuit.

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The Court has denied two reconsideration motions on the merits. (Docs. 103, 104)

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The Joneses’ primary contention for reconsideration is collusion, fraud, and forgery by

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court and chambers personnel. As explained above, this contention is completely false.
Because the bases for reconsideration urged by Mr. Jones either have been addressed on

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the merits or (as explained above) are false and have no legitimate basis, the Court will not accept

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any further motions for reconsideration by Mr. Jones.

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With one exception, the Court also will not accept any further filings from Mr. Jones in

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this closed case. The only exception will be filings necessary to perfect an appeal to the Ninth

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Circuit Court of Appeals.

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Filings by Mr. Jones in this case that do not involve perfecting an appeal to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals will not be accepted.
Because of the Joneses’ numerous improper communications, and in order to stop their

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inappropriate communications and conduct, an order forbidding the Joneses from contacting court

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personnel or the family members of any court personnel about this case (directly or indirectly and

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by any means, including but not limited to telephone and e-mail communications), is appropriate.

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However, Mr. Jones may communicate with members of the Clerk’s office (and only

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members of the Clerk’s office) with respect to perfecting an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of

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Appeals. Clerk’s office personnel need not engage the Joneses in any communications about this

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case that do not relate to the perfecting of an appeal.
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This order is not issued due to Mr. and Mrs. Jones’s race or Mr. Jones’s status as a pro se

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litigant, rather this order is issued solely due to the unique conduct of Mr. and Mrs. Jones in

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prosecuting this case. The undersigned has never experienced the type of communications and

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conduct by any litigant, pro se or otherwise, like that of the Joneses.

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Because the Joneses have failed to appear pursuant to the court’s order, a no-bail warrant

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shall issue for the arrest of Mr. Jones and Mrs. Jones immediately. The no-bail warrant for arrest

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shall be stayed until 9:00 a.m. Friday, July 24, 2015, or until the Joneses contact the Court’s

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Clerk’s Office to schedule an appearance, whichever occurs sooner.

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ORDER

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1.

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No further fillings will be accepted in this closed case (1:12cv633 AWI JLT) other than
filings that are necessary to perfect an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals;

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The Joneses are not to contact or communicate directly or indirectly, and by any means

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including but not limited to telephone calls or e-mail, any court personnel or the family

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members of any court personnel, regarding this case;

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3.

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perfecting an appeal to the Ninth Circuit of Appeals;
4.

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However, as discussed above, the Joneses may contact only the Clerk’s office with respect

A copy of the transcript of the July 20, 2015 hearing shall be filed on the docket, and the
Clerk shall send a copy of the transcript to the Joneses; and

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Execution of a no-bail warrant for the arrest of Mr. Jones and Mrs. Jones issued this date

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shall be stayed until such time as the Joneses contact the Court Clerk’s Office to schedule a

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hearing before Judge Ishii. The stay on the no-bail warrant shall expire as of Friday, July

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24, 2015, at 9:00 a.m.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 20, 2015
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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