Williams v. Cates et al

Filing 50

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATION Denying Defendants' 22 MOTION to DISMISS, signed by Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck on 09/10/14. Referred to Judge O'Neill. 21-Day Deadline. (Gonzalez, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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HORACE MANN WILLIAMS,

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Case No. 1:12-cv-00730 LJO DLB (PC)

Plaintiff,

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v.

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. RULE
12(B)(6)

MARISOL, et al.,

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[ECF No. 22]
Defendants.

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Plaintiff Horace Mann Williams (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner in the custody of the California

18 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in
19 forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
20 I.

Procedural History

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Plaintiff filed this action on May 4, 2012.

On May 13, 2013, the Court screened

22 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and found cognizable claims against 1)
23 Defendants Valdivia, Agu, Lopez, and Trimble for retaliation in violation of the First
24 Amendment; and 2) Defendants Marisol, Sica, Agu, Valdivia, and Lopez for failure to protect
25 Plaintiff from serious harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court dismissed all other
26 claims and Defendants.
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On October 9, 2013, Defendants Agu, Valdivia, Sica and Trimble filed a motion to

28 dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the FAC fails to state a claim upon

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1 which relief may be granted, and under the unenumerated provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) on
2 the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies before he filed suit. On
3 March 26, 2014, Defendant Lopez filed a motion to dismiss under the unenumerated provisions
4 of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative
5 remedies before he filed suit.
On April 16, 2014, following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d

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7 1162 (9th Cir. 2014), the Court issued an Order converting the exhaustion portion of Defendants’
8 motions to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Still pending before the Court is the
9 motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the FAC fails to state a
10 claim upon which relief may be granted by Defendants Agu, Valdivia, Sica, and Trimble.
11 Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss on January 27, 2014, and Defendants Agu,
12 Valdivia, Sica, and Trimble filed a reply on February 3, 2014. The motion is deemed submitted
13 pursuant to Local Rule 230(l).
14 II.

Summary of First Amended Complaint

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Plaintiff was incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) in Delano, California,

16 where the events giving rise to this action occurred. Plaintiff names as Defendants: associate
17 warden Marisol; correctional counselor Garza1; correctional sergeant Sica; and correctional
18 officers Valdivia, Lopez, Agu, and Trimble.
Plaintiff alleges the following. On December 9, 2009, Plaintiff was initially moved to

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20 Facility C, Building 6, Cell 114. FAC ¶¶ 1, 6. Plaintiff overheard Defendant Valdivia telling
21 inmate Tamayo, Plaintiff’s new cell mate, that Tamayo did not want Plaintiff in his cell as he
22 was a homosexual and had a bad case. FAC ¶ 7. Inmate Tamayo later aggressively entered the
23 cell and demanded to know why Plaintiff did not inform Tamayo that he is a homosexual. FAC ¶
24 11. Plaintiff told Tamayo that he was not a homosexual. FAC ¶ 12. Inmate Tamayo showed
25 Plaintiff several CDCR documents which indicated Tamayo’s history of violence, especially
26 against those who were homosexual. FAC ¶ 18. Between December 9 and December 15,
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Correctional counselor Garza was dismissed from the action on May 9, 2013.

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1 Plaintiff was subject to threats of violence by inmate Tamayo. FAC ¶ 20. Several inmates also
2 approached Plaintiff to solicit sexual acts and demand that drugs be brought into the institution
3 via Plaintiff’s wheelchair. FAC ¶ 21. On December 14, 2009, Plaintiff approached Defendant
4 Agu to inform him of the threats. FAC ¶ 21. Defendant Agu warned Plaintiff that Defendants
5 Valdivia and Lopez do not like blacks, whether inmates or officers. FAC ¶ 23.
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On December 15, 2009, Plaintiff exited his cell with his property and approached

7 Defendant Lopez, telling him that he could not remain in the cell and that he felt his life was in
8 jeopardy. FAC ¶ 25. Inmate Tamayo was subsequently moved out of the cell. FAC ¶ 28. On
9 December 20, 2009, Plaintiff completed an inmate appeal and submitted it to Defendant Agu.
10 FAC ¶¶ 29-30. Defendant Agu accepted it and walked away, but then returned twenty minutes
11 later, informing Plaintiff that the appeal box was missing. FAC ¶¶ 30-33. Plaintiff requested that
12 Defendant Agu forward it to the appeals coordinator, but he refused, stating that he had to work
13 with the racists. FAC ¶¶ 34-35.
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On December 21, 2009, Plaintiff submitted the inmate appeal to Defendant Trimble for

15 forwarding. FAC ¶ 37. Defendant Trimble also refused, stating that he did not want to get
16 involved with Plaintiff’s issue with Defendant Valdivia. FAC ¶¶ 38-39. Plaintiff during evening
17 mail presented the inmate appeal to Defendant Agu, this time for processing as legal mail. FAC ¶
18 41. Defendant Agu accepted the envelope, looked through it, passed it back to Plaintiff for him
19 to seal, and the envelope passed back to Defendant Agu. FAC ¶ 42.
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Plaintiff the next day approached Defendants Agu and Lopez, and asked Defendant Agu

21 if the inmate appeal had been processed. FAC ¶¶ 45-46. Defendant Agu stated that it had not.
22 FAC ¶ 48. Later, at Plaintiff’s cell, Defendant Agu stated that it was not processed and told
23 Plaintiff that Defendant Lopez took his appeal to Defendant Valdivia, who then tore it up. FAC ¶
24 50.
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Plaintiff rewrote his appeal, and on December 23, 2009, during a medical appointment,

26 presented the appeal to Defendant Garza, the acting correctional counselor II, describing
27 Plaintiff’s problems with Defendant Valdivia and other inmates. FAC ¶¶ 51, 54, 55. Defendant
28 Garza refused to process it and stated that he would instruct the floor officer of the housing unit

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1 to accept it. FAC ¶¶ 57, 58. Defendant Trimble was the floor officer. FAC ¶ 60. When Plaintiff
2 presented the appeal, Defendant Trimble stated that he did not realize Plaintiff was the one, and
3 refused to accept the appeal. FAC ¶¶ 61. Plaintiff instead placed the 602 appeal into the ADA
4 appeals box with Defendant Trimble witnessing. FAC ¶ 64.
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On December 26, 2009, Plaintiff received a visit from his wife, and told her of his

6 problems. FAC ¶¶ 67-68. Defendant Marisol entered the visiting room. FAC ¶ 70. Plaintiff and
7 his wife approached Defendant Marisol to tell her about Plaintiff’s safety concerns and his
8 problems with the appeals process. FAC ¶¶ 72-73. Defendant Marisol stated that she would look
9 into the matter and call Plaintiff’s wife. FAC ¶ 75. On January 1, 2010, Plaintiff’s wife informed
10 Plaintiff that she had not received a phone call. FAC ¶ 76.
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On January 7, 2010, Plaintiff went out to medical, and upon his return to Building 6, saw

12 Defendant Sica at the tower entrance. FAC ¶ 82. Plaintiff informed Defendant Sica that he was
13 having extreme difficulties submitting an appeal and that he was being threatened by inmates.
14 FAC ¶¶ 82-83. Defendant Sica criticized Defendant Lopez directly for failing to run his unit
15 properly, and noted to Plaintiff that his inmate appeal was still in the ADA appeals box. FAC ¶¶
16 86, 87.
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On January 15, 2010, following Plaintiff complaining separately to the Investigative

18 Services Unit (“ISU”), Plaintiff was interviewed by Sergeant Sells of ISU. FAC ¶ 91. Plaintiff
19 informed sergeant Sells of his problems created by Defendant Valdivia’s false allegation. FAC ¶
20 92. Sergeant Sells stated that as soon as Plaintiff’s issue crossed her desk she would look into the
21 matter. FAC ¶ 93. On January 19, 2010, as Plaintiff exited his cell, Defendant Valdivia stated
22 that Plaintiff was a black snitch, and that Plaintiff was going to be “fixed.” FAC ¶¶ 94, 95. On
23 January 22, 2010, Defendant Lopez stated that Plaintiff had “fucked up” and declared Plaintiff to
24 be nothing but a child molester who would get beat. FAC ¶ 97. Defendant Lopez had a
25 newspaper article concerning Plaintiff’s arrest and conviction. FAC ¶ 99.
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On January 23, 2010, Defendant Lopez had Plaintiff moved from Facility C Building 6 to

27 Building 7, with collusion between Defendants Sica and Valdivia. FAC ¶ 101. Plaintiff stated to
28 Defendant Lopez that he had an enemy in Building 7, to which Defendant Lopez indicated that

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1 he did not care. FAC ¶ 102. Plaintiff was forced to move to Building 7. FAC ¶ 104. On January
2 28, 2010, inmate Beck, an inmate in Building 7 who had previously threatened Plaintiff,
3 assaulted Plaintiff, causing further spine injuries to Plaintiff as he was thrown out of his
4 wheelchair. FAC ¶ 105.
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On January 29, 2010, several inmates came to Plaintiff’s cell and threatened Plaintiff

6 with stabbing if he left his cell. FAC ¶ 114. Plaintiff observed several inmates looking at the
7 article pertaining to his case, which was previously in Defendant Lopez’s possession. FAC ¶
8 115. On February 4, 2010, Plaintiff filed an appeal requesting removal from the yard for safety
9 concerns. FAC ¶ 117. Plaintiff returned to the program office and met with Defendant Sica,
10 informing Defendant Sica of the threats. FAC ¶ 119. Defendant Sica initially refused to move
11 Plaintiff, merely informing building staff to put a cap on Plaintiff’s cell. FAC ¶ 120. On several
12 occasions, however, inmates would attempt to get into the cell to harm Plaintiff. Plaintiff was
13 then escorted back to Defendant Sica, who asked for information on the threatening inmates.
14 FAC ¶ 121. Plaintiff was then transferred to administrative segregation for safety reasons. FAC ¶
15 123.
16 III.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6)

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A.

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To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

Legal Standard

19 accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
20 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct.
21 1955 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted); Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42
22 (9th Cir. 2011); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court must
23 accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
24 the non-moving party. Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010);
25 Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007); Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465
26 F.3d 992, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2006); Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir.
27 2000). Further, although the pleading standard is now higher, the Ninth Circuit has continued to
28 emphasize that prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their

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1 pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman,
2 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012);
3 Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).
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B.

Prior Screening Order

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On May 13, 2013, the Court issued an Order indicating that it had screened Plaintiff’s

6 complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and found that it stated numerous causes of action.
7 The Court’s conclusion was based upon the same legal standards as this Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
8 and the screening order may not be ignored or disregarded. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108,
9 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Ingle v. Circuit City, 408 F.3d 592, 594 (9th Cir. 2005).
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To the contrary, the existence of a screening order which utilized the same legal standard

11 upon which a subsequent motion to dismiss relies necessarily implicates the law of the case
12 doctrine, and as a result, Defendant is expected, reasonably so, to articulate the grounds for his
13 Rule 12(b)(6) motion in light of a screening order finding the complaint stated a claim. Ingle,
14 408 F.3d at 594; Thomas v. Hickman, No. CV F 06-0215 AWI SMS, 2008 WL 2233566, at *2-3
15 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2008).
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If the defendant, in a case which has been screened, believes there is a good faith basis

17 for revisiting a prior determination made in a screening order, they must identify the basis for
18 their motion, be it error, an intervening change in the law, or some other recognized exception to
19 the law of the case doctrine. Ingle, 408 F.3d at 594 (“A district court abuses its discretion in
20 applying the law of the case doctrine only if (1) the first decision was clearly erroneous; (2) an
21 intervening change in the law occurred; (3) the evidence on remand was substantially different;
22 (4) other changed circumstances exist; or (5) a manifest injustice would otherwise result.”). The
23 duty of good faith and candor requires as much, and frivolous motions which serve only to
24 unnecessarily multiply the proceedings may subject the moving parties to sanctions. Pacific
25 Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). Parties are
26 not entitled to a gratuitous second bite at the apple at the expense of judicial resources and in
27 disregard of court orders. Ingle, 408 F.3d at 594 (The law of the case “doctrine has developed to
28 maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a

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1 single continuing lawsuit.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Thomas, 2008 WL
2 2233566, at *3 (for important policy reasons, the law of the case doctrine disallows parties from
3 a second bite at the apple).
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Therefore, Rule 12(b)(6) motions which fail to acknowledge the prior procedural history

5 and screening orders, and which fail to articulate the reasons for the motion in light of the prior
6 relevant orders, implicate the law of the case doctrine, unnecessarily multiply the proceedings,
7 and fall well below the level of practice which is expected in federal court.
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With this standard in mind, the Court will now address Defendant’s arguments.

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C.

Analysis

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1.

Eighth Amendment

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a.

Legal Standard

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The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and

13 from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.
14 2006). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide
15 prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Farmer v.
16 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) (quotations omitted). Prison officials
17 have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
18 prisoners because being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that
19 criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-34 (quotation
20 marks omitted); Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2009); Hearns v. Terhune, 413
21 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005).

However, prison officials are liable under the Eighth

22 Amendment only if they demonstrate deliberate indifference to conditions posing a substantial
23 risk of serious harm to an inmate; and it is well settled that deliberate indifference occurs when
24 an official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.
25 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 841 (quotations omitted); Clem, 566 F.3d at 1181; Hearns, 413 F.3d at
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b.

Discussion

Plaintiff’s complaint was screened and the Court determined that it stated an Eighth

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1 Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendants Valdivia, Lopez, Agu, Marisol, and Sica.
2 Defendants Valdivia, Agu, Marisol, and Sica contend that dismissal is warranted because
3 Plaintiff did not suffer actual injury as a result of their actions. Defendants further contend that
4 they did not act with deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment because they
5 did not know of facts from which an inference could be drawn that they knew of a serious harm
6 to Plaintiff concerning an attack by inmate Beck. Finally, Defendants argue that there is no
7 causal relationship between their actions and the resulting assault by inmate Beck.
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Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical

9 abuse. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir.1982). To
10 establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were
11 “deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the inmate’s safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The
12 question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with deliberate
13 indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial ‘risk of serious damage to his future
14 health . . . .’” Id. at 843 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125
15 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993)). The deliberate indifference standard involves both an objective and a
16 subjective prong.

First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently

17 serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Second, subjectively, the prison official must “know of and
18 disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837.
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Here, there is evidence that Defendant Valdivia told inmate Tamayo that Plaintiff was a

20 homosexual whereupon Plaintiff was subjected to threats of violence by Tamayo and other
21 inmates. Defendants contend that Plaintiff's failure to protect claim fails because there is no
22 evidence Plaintiff was actually assaulted by inmate Beck because of Defendants’ actions. Where
23 an inmate's claim is based on alleged failure to prevent harm, the inmate may satisfy the
24 “sufficiently serious” requirement by showing the existence of “conditions posing a substantial
25 risk of serious harm” to him. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling, 509 U.S. at 33-34. Plaintiff need
26 not establish actual injury to sufficiently state an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect.
27 Farmer, 511 U.S. 825 (Plaintiff need not wait for a “tragic event” such as an actual assault before
28 obtaining relief); see, e.g., Radillo v. Lunes, 2008 WL 4209824 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2008);

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1 Martinez v. Lunes, 2007 WL 529831 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2007), report and recommendation
2 adopted, 2007 WL 1411743 (E.D. Cal. May 11, 2007), order corrected, 2007 WL 3232197 (E.D.
3 Cal. Oct. 31, 2007). The Eighth Amendment protects against future harm to inmates because
4 inmates must be furnished with basic human needs, one of which is “reasonable safety.” Helling,
5 509 U.S. at 33. In the case of failing to protect an inmate, a prisoner can show an Eighth
6 Amendment violation by providing evidence that prison officials, with deliberate indifference,
7 exposed him to a serious risk to his safety. Id. at 35.
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In this action, as noted above, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Valdivia informed inmate

9 Tamayo that Plaintiff was a homosexual and that he had a bad case. Thereafter, Plaintiff claims,
10 he was subjected to threats of violence by Tamayo and other inmates, that he was approached by
11 other inmates soliciting sexual acts and demanding he bring drugs into the prison via his
12 wheelchair, and that other inmates had attempted to enter his cell to harm him. Taking the facts
13 in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has shown that he was exposed to a serious risk
14 of being assaulted by Tamayo and other inmates based on Defendant Valdivia’s alleged
15 statement to Tamayo that Plaintiff was a homosexual.

Therefore, the Court stands by its

16 screening order in finding that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim that Defendant Valdivia
17 acted with deliberate indifference in exposing him to a serious risk to his safety. Helling, 509
18 U.S. at 35.
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With respect to Defendants Agu and Sica, Plaintiff alleges he informed Defendants of his

20 safety concerns as a result of Defendant Valdivia’s actions but Defendants ignored his concerns.
21 The Court stands by its screening order in finding that Plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim that
22 Defendants Agu and Sica failed to act to prevent serious harm.
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2.

First Amendment

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a.

Legal Standard

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Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to

26 petition the government may support a § 1983 claim. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1104
27 (9th Cir. 2011); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v.
28 Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995).

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1 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic
2 elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)
3 because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s
4 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a
5 legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord
6 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva, 658 at 1104; Brodheim v. Cry,
7 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).
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b.

Discussion

Defendants Agu and Trimble contend Plaintiff failed to state a claim of retaliation against
Defendants Agu and Trimble present no arguments which persuade the Court it

11 committed clear error in determining that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was cognizable, or
12 that any other grounds justifying relief from the screening order exist.
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Defendants’ argument is based on their contention that they did not hinder Plaintiff’s

14 attempts to submit his appeal in retaliation for Plaintiff having prepared the appeal. Defendants
15 contend that they actually attempted to assist Plaintiff in processing his appeal. However, taking
16 the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has shown that Defendant Agu was
17 aware of Plaintiff’s complaints and appeal concerning Defendant Valdivia. He has further
18 shown that Agu refused to accept the appeal on one occasion, and on another occasion he gave
19 the appeal to Lopez rather than deposit it in the legal mail. Plaintiff states Agu refused to
20 forward his appeal because he had “to work with these damn racist (sic).” Defendant Agu
21 therefore refused to submit the appeal because of Plaintiff’s issues with Valdivia. Thus, the
22 Court stands by its screening order in finding that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim against
23 Defendant Agu for retaliation.
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Plaintiff has also shown that Defendant Trimble refused to accept his appeal because of

25 Plaintiff’s issues with Valdivia. Plaintiff contends that Trimble refused the appeal stating he
26 didn’t want to get involved in Plaintiff’s issues with Valdivia. Therefore, the Court finds that
27 Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim of retaliation against Trimble.
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1 IV.

Conclusion and Recommendation

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

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1.

Defendants Agu, Valdivia, Sica and Trimble’s motion to dismiss under Fed. R.

4 Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the FAC fails to state a claim be DENIED; and
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2.

Defendants Agu, Valdivia, Sica and Trimble file a responsive pleading within

6 thirty (30) days of the date of service of the order adopting these Findings and
7 Recommendations.
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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

9 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty
10 one (21) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file
11 written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate
12 Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” A party may respond to another party’s objections by
13 filing a response within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of that party’s
14 objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may
15 waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th
16 Cir. 1991).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Dennis

September 10, 2014

L. Beck

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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