Martinez v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 25

ORDER GRANTING Petitioner's 24 Motion for Attorney Fees, signed by Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone on 5/11/2015. (Kusamura, W)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JEFFREY MARTINEZ,

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Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01101-SAB
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 42
U.S.C. § 406(b)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,

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Defendant.
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Petitioner Young Cho (“Counsel”), attorney for Plaintiff Jeffrey Martinez (“Plaintiff”),

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filed the instant motion for attorney fees on March 26, 2015. Counsel requests fees in the amount

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of $6,800.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Plaintiff has not objected to the request.

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I.

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BACKGROUND

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On July 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed this action challenging the denial of Social Security

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benefits. On July 29, 2013, the Court granted in part and remanded the action for further

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proceedings.

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payment of $4.500.00 in attorney fees and $60.00 in costs pursuant to the EAJA.

On October 29, 2013, the Court granted the parties’ stipulation and ordered

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On October 21, 2014, the Commissioner issued a decision granting Plaintiff’s application

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for benefits. Plaintiff received $48,518.00 in retroactive benefits. (Declaration of Young Cho, ¶
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4, attached to Motion, ECF No. 24.) The Commissioner withheld $12,129.50 from the past-due

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benefit for attorney fees. This amount equals 25 percent of the retroactive benefit award. (Notice

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of Award, attached to Motion, ECF No. 24-3.)

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In the instant motion, Petitioner seeks $11,300.001 for 21.5 hours of attorney time and 4.3

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hours of paralegal time. After crediting $4,500.00 received previously pursuant to the EAJA,

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Counsel requests a net fee of $6,800.00 from the past-due award.

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II.

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LEGAL STANDARD

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In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides that when a federal court “renders a

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judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney,” the

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court may allow reasonable attorney fees “not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due

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benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” The payment of such

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award comes directly from the claimant’s benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).

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The Supreme Court has explained that a district court reviews a petition for section 406(b)

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fees “as an independent check” to assure that the contingency fee agreements between the

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claimant and the attorney will “yield reasonable results in particular cases.”

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Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). The district court must respect “the primacy of lawful

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attorney-client fee agreements,” and is to look first at the contingent-fee agreement, and then test

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it for reasonableness.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009). Agreements

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seeking fees in excess of twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits awarded are not

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enforceable. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148. The attorney has the burden of demonstrating that the

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fees requested are reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808; Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148.

Gisbrecht v.

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In determining the reasonableness of an award, the district court should consider the

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character of the representation and the results achieved. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 800. Ultimately,

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an award of section 406(b) fees is offset by an award of attorney fees granted under the EAJA.

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Although Petitioner states that he is seeking $6,800.00 in fees, this is the net amount that he is
seeking. Therefore, the Court analyzes the reasonableness of the fee based upon the gross amount
of $11,300.00.
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28 U.S.C. § 2412. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.

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The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors that a district court can examine under

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Gisbrecht in determining whether the fee was reasonable. In determining whether counsel met

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his burden to demonstrate that the requested fees are reasonable, the court may consider (1) the

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standard of performance of the attorney in representing the claimant; (2) whether the attorney

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exhibited dilatory conduct or caused excessive delay which resulted in an undue accumulation of

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past-due benefits; and (3) whether the requested fees are excessively large in relation to the

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benefits achieved when taking into consideration the risk assumed in these cases. Crawford, 586

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F.3d at 1151.

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III.

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DISCUSSION

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The Court has conducted an independent check to insure the reasonableness of the

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requested fees in relation to this action. Gisbrecht, 122 S.Ct. at 1828. Here, the fee agreement

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between Plaintiff and Petitioner provides for a fee consisting of “25 % of the backpay awarded

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upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the Social Security

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Administration.” (Fee Agreement, attached to Motion, ECF No. 24-1.) In this action, Plaintiff

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was awarded substantial disability benefits as the benefits covered the period from October 2009

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through March 2015. In determining the reasonableness of the fees requested, the Court is to

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apply the test mandated by Gisbrecht.

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There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted for substandard performance.

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Counsel is an experienced, competent attorney who secured a successful result for Plaintiff.

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There is no indication that Counsel was responsible for any substantial delay in the court

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proceedings. Counsel is requesting slightly less than the 25 percent contingent-fee. Plaintiff

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agreed to a 25 percent fee at the outset of the representation and Petitioner is seeking $11,300.00

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which is which is 23.29 percent of the backpay award. The $11,300.00 fee ($6,800.00 net fee

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after subtracting the previously awarded EAJA fee) is not excessively large in relation to the past-

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due award of $48,518.00. In making this determination, the Court recognizes the contingent

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nature of this case and Counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated. Hearn v.
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Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003).

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Finally, the Court finds that the requested fees are reasonable when compared to the

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amount of work Counsel performed in representing Plaintiff in court. As a result of Petitioner’s

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representation in this action, claimant’s appeal was granted and remanded for further proceedings.

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The representation resulted in the action being remanded for an award of benefits. Counsel has

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also submitted a detailed billing statement which supports his request. (ECF No. 24-4.)

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VI.

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

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For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the fees sought by Petitioner pursuant to
Section 406(b) are reasonable. Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1.

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Petitioner’s motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the
amount of $11,300.00 is GRANTED; and

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2.

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Petitioner’s award shall be offset by $4,500.00 for the EAJA fees previously
awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

May 11, 2015
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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