Villarino v. Commissioner: Social Security Administration

Filing 5

ORDER DISMISSING CASE with prejudice; ORDER DIRECTING the Clerk to enter Judgment against: Plaintiff Robert John Villarino II and in favor of Defendants Commissioner of Social Security, signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on 8/03/2012. CASE CLOSED (Martin-Gill, S)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11
ROBERT JOHN VILLARINO II,

CASE NO. CV F 12-1225 LJO BAM

12
Plaintiff,
13
14

ORDER TO DISMISS
(Doc. 4.)

vs.
COMMISSIONER: SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,

15
Defendant.
16
/
17
18

INTRODUCTION

19

Pro se plaintiff Robert John Villarino (“Mr. Villarino”) receives Supplemental Security Income

20

(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1382c, and has brought this

21

action and another dismissed action to complain of “withholding of welfare monies.” Defendant United

22

States of America (“Government”) seeks to dismiss this action as barred by res judicata and failure to

23

invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. This Court sua sponte DISMISSES this action and VACATES the

24

September 6, 2012 hearing on the Government’s motion to dismiss.

25

BACKGROUND

26

Dismissed Action

27

On February 3, 2012 in Fresno County Superior Court, Mr. Villarino filed his pro se action

28

against the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) using a California Judicial Council form
1

1

complaint to allege “withholding of welfare monies (SSI Disability).” The Government removed the

2

action to this Court as Case No. CV F 12-0425 LJO BAM (“Case No. 12-0425"). This Court issued its

3

April 18, 2012 order to dismiss with prejudice Case No. 12-0425 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

4

and failure to state a cognizable claim given Mr. Villarino’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

5

Current Action

6

On December 2, 2011 in Fresno County Superior Court, Mr. Villarino had filed this action

7

against the Commissioner and proceeded on a California Judicial Council form complaint (“complaint”)

8

to allege “withholding of welfare monies.” Mr. Villarino recently accomplished service of process for

9

this action, which the Government removed to this Court. This Court surmises that Mr. Villarino

10

brought Case No. 12-0425 and this action to address problems in his receipt of SSI benefits.

11

DISCUSSION

12

Sua Sponte Dismissal

13
14

The Government seeks to dismiss this action based on res judicata and lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and a viable claim.

15

“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). . . . Such dismissal

16

may be made without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.” Omar v. Sea-Land Service,

17

Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987); see Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361-362 (9th Cir. 1981). Sua

18

sponte dismissal may be made before process is served on defendants. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.

19

319, 324 (1989) (dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) are often made sua sponte); Franklin v. Murphy,

20

745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984) (court may dismiss frivolous in forma pauperis action sua sponte

21

prior to service of process on defendants).

22

“When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any

23

evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether

24

a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

25

claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco Development

26

Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either

27

a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

28

theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); Graehling v. Village of
2

1

Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1995).

2

In addressing dismissal, a court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

3

the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine whether plaintiff

4

can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80

5

F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, a court is not required “to accept as true allegations that

6

are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead

7

Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court “need not

8

assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations,” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v.

9

Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643, n. 2 (9th Cir.1986), and a court must not “assume that the [plaintiff] can

10

prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated . . . laws in ways that have not been

11

alleged.” Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,

12

459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897 (1983). A court need not permit an attempt to amend if “it is clear that

13

the complaint could not be saved by an amendment.” Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney,

14

Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005).

15

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than

16

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

17

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted).

18

Moreover, a court “will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to

19

plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action.” Student Loan Marketing

20

Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, a complaint “must contain either

21

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under

22

some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.

23

Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).

24
25
26
27
28

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court
explained:
. . . a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . . The plausibility standard is not
akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
3

1

defendant has acted unlawfully. (Citations omitted.)

2

After discussing Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized: “In sum, for a complaint

3

to survive [dismissal], the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content,

4

must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572

5

F.3d 962, 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949).

6

The U.S. Supreme Court applies a “two-prong approach” to address dismissal:

7

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in
a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . Second,
only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . .
. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense. . . . But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can
choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

15
16

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950.

17

Moreover, “a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when its own allegations indicate

18

the existence of an affirmative defense.” Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069

19

(11th Cir. 1984). “Res judicata challenges may properly be raised via a motion to dismiss for failure to

20

state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 253 (2nd Cir.1994).

21

As discussed below, the complaint is subject to dismissal based on res judicata and lack of

22

subject matter jurisdiction and a viable claim.

23
24
25

Res Judicata
The Government contends that dismissal with prejudice of Case No. 12-0425 warrants dismissal
of this action under res judicata.

26

“Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their

27

privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Allen v. McCurry,

28

449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411 (1980). “Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits lawsuits on ‘any
4

1

claims that were raised or could have been raised’ in a prior action.” Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d

2

953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir.

3

2001) (emphasis in original)).

4

Res judicata serves “the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an

5

identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing

6

needless litigation.” Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645 (1979). Res

7

judicata “relieve[s] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources,

8

and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage[s] reliance on adjudication.” Allen, 449 U.S. at 94,

9

101 S.Ct. 411.

10

The U.S. Supreme Court has further explained the “general rule of res judicata”:

11

The general rule of res judicata applies to repetitious suits involving the same cause of
action. It rests upon considerations of economy of judicial time and public policy
favoring the establishment of certainty in legal relations. The rule provides that when a
court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of
action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound ‘not only as to every
matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as
to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.’ . . . The
judgment puts an end to the cause of action, which cannot again be brought into litigation
between the parties upon any ground whatever, absent fraud or some other factor
invalidating the judgment.

12
13
14
15
16
17

C.I.R. v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S.Ct. 715 (1948) (citation omitted).

18

“[F]or res judicata to apply there must be: 1) an identity of claims, 2) a final judgment on the

19

merits, and 3) identity or privity between parties.” Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Glickman, 123

20

F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir.1997) (citing Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,

21

323-24, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1439-40 (1971)).

22

An action is barred by res judicata when it arises out of the “same transactional nucleus of fact”

23

as a prior action. See International Union of Operating Engineers-Employers Const. Industry Pension,

24

Welfare, etc. v. Karr, 994 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1993); Sidney v. Zah, 718 F.2d 1453, 1459 (9th

25

Cir.1983) (citing with approval transactional approach of Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 and

26

noting that whether the claim “arise[s] out of the same transactional nucleus of facts [is] the criteria most

27

stressed in our decisions”). “The central criterion in determining whether there is an identity of claims

28

between the first and second adjudications is ‘whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional
5

1

nucleus of facts.’” Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Costantini

2

v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir.1982)).

3

The record reveals the common gist of this action and Case No. 12-0425 is that Mr. Villarino did

4

not receive SSI payments because of mail delivery problems. For res judicata purposes, the parties,

5

issues and claims of this action and Case No. 12-0425 are identical to warrant dismissal of this action.

6

Failure To Satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 8

7

The complaint is subject to global attack for failure to satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 8, which requires a

8

plaintiff to “plead a short and plain statement of the elements of his or her claim, identifying the

9

transaction or occurrence giving rise to the claim and the elements of the prima facie case.” Bautista

10

v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2000).

11

F.R.Civ.P. 8(a) requires “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”

12

and “of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” F.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1) requires each

13

allegation to be “simple, concise, and direct.” This requirement “applies to good claims as well as bad,

14

and is the basis for dismissal independent of Rule 12(b)(6).” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179

15

(9th Cir. 1996). “Something labeled a complaint but written more as a press release, prolix in evidentiary

16

detail, yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs,

17

fails to perform the essential functions of a complaint.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1180. “Prolix, confusing

18

complaints . . . impose unfair burdens on litigants and judges.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179.

19

Moreover, a pleading may not simply allege a wrong has been committed and demand relief.

20

The underlying requirement is that a pleading give “fair notice” of the claim being asserted and the

21

“grounds upon which it rests.” Yamaguchi v. United States Department of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475,

22

1481 (9th Cir. 1997). Despite the flexible pleading policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a

23

complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v.

24

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). A plaintiff must allege with at least some

25

degree of particularity overt facts which defendant engaged in to support plaintiff’s claim. Jones, 733

26

F.2d at 649. A complaint does not suffice “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

27

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct.

28

1955). The U.S. Supreme Court has explained:
6

1
2
3
4
5

While, for most types of cases, the Federal Rules eliminated the cumbersome
requirement that a claimant “set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim,”
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (emphasis added),
Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a “showing,” rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant
could satisfy the requirement of providing not only “fair notice” of the nature of the
claim, but also “grounds” on which the claim rests.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, n. 3, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

6

The complaint in this action fails to satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 8. The complaint makes references to

7

“professional negligence,” “withholding of welfare monies,” and several federal statutes. The complaint

8

offers only naked assertions lacking necessary factual enhancement. The complaint lacks cognizable

9

facts of the Commissioner’s purported wrongdoing to provide fair notice as to what the Government is

10

to defend. The complaint lacks cognizable claims or legal theories upon which to support liability. The

11

complaint lacks specific, clearly defined allegations to give fair notice of claims plainly and succinctly

12

to warrant dismissal of this action. See North Star Intern. v. Arizona Corp. Com'n, 720 F.2d 578, 583

13

(9th Cir. 1983) (“Because the complaint is vague, conclusory, and general and does not set forth any

14

material facts in support of the allegations, these claims were properly dismissed.”)

15
16
17
18

Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The record indicates that Mr. Villarino failed to exhaust necessary administrative remedies to
invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.
F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) Motion To Dismiss Standards

19

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fundamentally,

20

federal courts are of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114

21

S.Ct. 341 (1994). A “court of the United States may not grant relief absent a constitutional or valid

22

statutory grant of jurisdiction.” U.S. v. Bravo-Diaz, 312 F.3d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 2002). “A federal court

23

is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock

24

West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F. 2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). Limits on federal jurisdiction

25

must neither be disregarded nor evaded. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374,

26

98 S.Ct. 2396 (1978). “When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Federal Rule of Procedure

27

12(b)(1), the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion.” Tosco

28

Corp. v. Communities for Better Environment, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001).
7

1

When addressing an attack on the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, a court “is not

2

restricted to the face of the pleadings.” McCarthy v. U.S., 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). In such a

3

case, a court may rely on evidence extrinsic to the pleadings and resolve factual disputes relating to

4

jurisdiction. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct.

5

541 (1989); Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987); Augustine v. United States, 704

6

F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983); Smith v. Rossotte, 250 F.Supp.2d 1266, 1268 (D. Or. 2003) (a court

7

“may consider evidence outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes apart from the pleadings”).

8

No presumptive truthfulness attaches to a plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed

9

material facts does not preclude evaluation of the merits of jurisdictional claims. Thornhill Pub. Co.,

10

Inc. v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). On a factual attack of a

11

complaint with affidavits or other evidence, “the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or

12

other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Savage v.

13

Glendale Union High School, 343 F.3d 1036, 1040, n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003).

14

When a court considers “items outside the pleading” on a F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) motion, the court

15

resolves “all disputes of fact in favor of the non-movant.” Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 847

16

(9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit explains that “where the district court has properly considered items

17

outside the complaint in considering a motion to dismiss, the standard we apply upon de novo review

18

of the record is similar to the summary judgment standard that the district court purported to apply.”

19

Drier, 106 F.3d at 847.

20

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to whether Mr. Villarino exhausted administrative

21

remedies necessary to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction and in turn to purse his complaint in this action.

22

Social Security Exhaustion

23
24

Mr. Villarino has failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to potential Social Security
benefits claims.

25

Judicial review of SSI claims is limited to final decisions of the Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C.

26

§ 405(g). 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) “limits judicial review to a particular type of agency action, a ‘final

27

decision of the Secretary made after a hearing.’” Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108, 97 S.Ct. 980

28

(1977). “A claimant's failure to exhaust the procedures set forth in the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
8

1

§ 405(g), deprives the district court of jurisdiction.” Bass v. Social Sec. Admin., 872 F.2d 832, 833 (9th

2

Cir. 1989).

3

The record reveals the absence of administrative review of Mr. Villarino’s claim culminating in

4

a final Commissioner decision subject to judicial review. Mr. Villarino’s failure to exhaust Social

5

Security procedures deprives this Court of jurisdiction to further warrant dismissal of this action.

6
7

Other Federal Claims
The complaint further fails to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction to address other federal claims.

8

Absence Of Immunity Waiver

9

“The United States can be sued only to the extent that it has waived its sovereign immunity.”

10

Baker v. U.S., 817 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1204, 108 S.Ct. 2845 (1988).

11

“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”

12

F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996 (1994). “A party bringing a cause of action against

13

the federal government bears the burden of showing an unequivocal waiver of immunity. Baker, 817

14

F.2d at 562. “Thus, the United States may not be sued without its consent and the terms of such consent

15

define the court's jurisdiction.” Baker, 817 F.2d at 562. A waiver of traditional sovereign immunity is

16

not implied but must be unequivocally expressed. See U.S. v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948,

17

953-954 (1976).

18

“The question whether the United States has waived its sovereign immunity against suits for

19

damages is, in the first instance, a question of subject matter jurisdiction.” McCarthy, 850 F.2d 558, 560

20

(1988). “It is incumbent upon the plaintiff properly to allege the jurisdictional facts . . .” McNutt v.

21

General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 182, 56 S.Ct. 780 (1936). “Where a suit

22

has not been consented to by the United States, dismissal of the action is required.” Gilbert v.

23

DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985).

24

The terms of the United States’ “consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction

25

to entertain the suit.” U.S. v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767 (1941). Waivers of immunity

26

must be “construed strictly in favor of the sovereign,” McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27, 72

27

S.Ct. 17, 19, 96 L.Ed. 268 (1951), and not “enlarge[d] . . . beyond what the language requires,” Eastern

28

Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686, 47 S.Ct. 289, 291, 71 L.Ed. 472 (1927); see Hodge v.
9

1

Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Any waiver of immunity must be ‘unequivocally expressed,’

2

and any limitations and conditions upon the waiver ‘must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are

3

not to be implied.”)

4

Federal Tort Claims Act

5

The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, is a “limited waiver

6

of sovereign immunity, making the Federal Government liable to the same extent as a private party for

7

certain torts of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.” United States v.

8

Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1971 (1976). “The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for tortious

9

conduct by the United States, and it only allows claims against the United States.” Federal Deposit Ins.

10

Corp. v. Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998). The FTCA waives the federal government’s sovereign

11

immunity when its employees are negligent within the scope of their employment. Faber v. United

12

States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 1995). The FTCA “vests the federal district courts with exclusive

13

jurisdiction over suits arising from the negligence of Government employees.” Jerves v. U.S., 966 F.2d

14

517, 518 (9th Cir. 1992).

15

The FTCA requires a government tort plaintiff, prior to filing a district court action, to present

16

a “claim to the appropriate Federal agency” and the agency’s claim denial. 28 U.S.C. § 2675. The

17

FTCA “provides that an ‘action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money

18

damages’ unless the claimant has first exhausted his administrative remedies.” McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S.

19

106, 107, 113 S.Ct. 1980 (1993) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)); see Jerves, 966 F.2d at 518 (“before an

20

individual can file an action against the United States in district court, she must seek an administrative

21

resolution of her claim”). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), a claimant must file a district court action within

22

six months of an agency’s claim denial or expiration of six months within which the agency must act,

23

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).

24

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:

25

The requirement of an administrative claim is jurisdictional. . . . Because the requirement
is jurisdictional, it “must be strictly adhered to. This is particularly so since the FTCA
waives sovereign immunity. Any such waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the
United States.”

26
27
28

Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted.); see Vacek v. U.S. Postal
10

1

Service, 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We have repeatedly held that the exhaustion requirement

2

is jurisdictional in nature and must be interpreted strictly.”)

3

“[I]n the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements

4

specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.” Mohasco

5

Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 2497 (1980). “The FTCA bars claimants from

6

bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies.” McNeil, 508 U.S.

7

at 113, 113 S.Ct. at 1984.

8
9

Moreover, a district court lacks jurisdiction if a civil action is filed prior to an agency’s six
months for review. In McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111, 113 S.Ct. 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:

10

13

. . .Congress intended to require complete exhaustion of Executive remedies before
invocation of the judicial process. Every premature filing of an action under the FTCA
imposes some burden on the judicial system and on the Department of Justice which
must assume the defense of such actions. Although the burden may be slight in an
individual case, the statute governs the processing of a vast multitude of claims. The
interest in orderly administration of this body of litigation is best served by adherence to
the straightforward statutory command.

14

“A tort claimant may not commence proceedings in court against the United States without first filing

15

her claim with an appropriate federal agency and either receiving a conclusive denial of the claim from

16

the agency or waiting for six months to elapse without a final disposition of the claim being made.”

17

Jerves, 966 F.2d at 519 (dismissal proper in that plaintiff had “not met the jurisdictional requirements”

18

by commencing action before receiving the final agency denial of claim and “without allowing six

19

months to elapse from the date of her initial administrative filing”).

11
12

20

To the extent the complaint seeks tort relief, Mr. Villarino’s failure to satisfy FTCA exhaustion

21

bars such relief. The record reveals the Mr. Villarino has failed to pursue a necessary administrative

22

claim prior to seeking judicial relief to further warrant dismissal of this action.

23

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

24

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

25

1.

DISMISSES with prejudice this action; and

26

2.

DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment against plaintiff Robert John Villarino II and in

27

///

28

///
11

1

favor of defendants Commissioner of Social Security and the United States of America

2

and to close this action.

3
4

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
66h44d

August 3, 2012

/s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
12