Riddle v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 26

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES signed by Magistrate Judge Sandra M. Snyder on March 29, 2016. [Doc. 24] (Munoz, I)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ROSE RIDDLE,

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Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. 1:12-CV-1680-SMS
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Doc. 24

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Defendant.

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I.

BACKGROUND

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In August 2013, this Court entered an order reversing the Agency’s denial of benefits and

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remanding the case for further proceedings. Doc. 20. Judgement was entered in favor of Plaintiff

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against Defendant. Doc. 21. The parties then entered into a stipulation for the award of $5,019.80

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in attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. §

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2412(d), which the Court granted. Docs. 22-23.

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On remand, the Social Security Administration (SSA) found that Plaintiff was eligible for

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past-due benefits of $179, 287.00. The SSA withheld $6,000.00 of the past-due benefits for

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payment of attorney’s fees.

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Plaintiff’s instant motion requests $25,140.20 in attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b),

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which would equal a combined fee of $30,160.00 when considered in conjunction with the EAJA

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award. Doc. 24. The government filed a statement of non-opposition. Doc. 25.

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II.

DISCUSSION
The award of attorney’s fees in social security cases is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 406. 42

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U.S.C. § 406(b) imposes a 25% cap on the amount that can be awarded to an attorney for the

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representation of a claimant before the court. “Because the SSA has no direct interest in how much

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of the award goes to counsel and how much to the disabled person, the district court has an

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affirmative duty to assure that the reasonableness of the fee is established.” Crawford v. Astrue,

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586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009). In assessing the reasonableness of a fee request, the district

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court should not start with the lodestar calculation, but with the contingent-fee agreement, and

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consider “‘the character of the representation and the results the representative achieved.’” Id. at

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1151 (quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002)). The lower court “may properly

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reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, or benefits that are not in proportion to the time

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spent on the case.” Id. (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808).

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Here, Plaintiff has attached 1) a valid contingency fee agreement between Plaintiff and her

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attorneys indicating that fees totaling up to 25% of past-due benefits would be sought; 2) a Notice

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of Award from SSA; and 3) a time sheet indicating 37.7 hours spent on this matter. The 25%

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contingency fee agreement is within the statutory limit and is reasonable considering the character

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of the representation and the results achieved. Plaintiff has requested a combined total of

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$30,160.00, which is less than 25% of her past-due benefits, which would be $44.821.75. There is

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no evidence of substandard performance – Plaintiff's counsel obtained a remand of the case. There

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is also no evidence of undue delay in litigating the case. Lastly, there is no evidence that the

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benefits are not in proportion to the time spent on the case. Although the amount results in a very

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high effective hourly rate of $800.00, the Court respects the “primacy of lawful attorney-client fee

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agreements.” See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793. “Lodestar fees will generally be much less than

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contingent fees because the lodestar method tends to under-compensate attorneys for the risk they

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undertook in representing their clients and does not account for the fact that the statute limits

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attorneys’ fees to a percentage of past-due benefits and allows no recovery from future benefits,

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which may far exceed the past-due benefits awarded.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1150. The rate takes

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into account the inherent risk of contingent-fee cases. Hence, the Court finds that counsel’s request

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for $30,160.00 is reasonable. Because counsel was previously awarded $5,019.80 in attorney’s

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fees under the EAJA, the Court will award $25,140.20 in attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
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406(b).

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III.

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ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court awards $25,140.20 in attorney’s fees pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

March 29, 2016

/s/ Sandra M. Snyder
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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