Edison v. United States of America et al
Filing
74
ORDER GRANTING Plaintiff's 68 Motion for Entry of Final Judgment, signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 3/6/2014. CASE CLOSED. (Marrujo, C)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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GREGORY EDISON,
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1:12-cv-02026-AWI-JLT
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE
GEO GROUP, INC., MANAGEMENT &
TRAINING CORPORATION, AND
JOHN DOES 1-50,
(Doc. 68)
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Defendants.
__________________________________/
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I.
INTRODUCTION
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20 Plaintiff Gregory Edison has filed a Motion for Entry of Final Judgment pursuant to Federal
21 Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b). For reasons discussed below, the motion is GRANTED.
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II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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2 The Court refers the parties to previous orders for a complete chronology of the proceedings. On
3 December 13, 2012, plaintiff Gregory Edison (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”) filed his
4 complaint against defendant United States of America, (“USA”) for negligence under the Federal
5 Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and for breach of duty of care under 18 U.S.C.
6 § 4042(a). Within the same complaint, Plaintiff also alleged claims against The Geo Group, Inc.
7 (“GEO”) and Management & Training Corporation (“MTC”) for negligence. In the complaint,
8 Plaintiff alleged as follows:
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“Coccidioidomycosis (commonly known as „Valley Fever‟ or „San
Joaquin Valley Fever‟ or simply as „cocci‟) has long been known
as a serious infectious disease which is contracted by the inhalation
of an airborne fungus, Coccidioides immitis, which is endemic in
the soil of various areas of the Southwest.”
Plaintiff further alleged:
“Preventative measures that can effectively combat the spread of
cocci have been known of in the medical and other communities
since the 1940s… These measures include watering down dusty
areas, planting grass or shrubs over dusty areas, and keeping
individuals inside during windy conditions.”
Plaintiff further alleged:
“The Defendants…were on notice of the risk of harm from cocci
and failed to take actions to protect Plaintiff from that harm.”
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Plaintiff further alleged:
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“The Defendants…failed to provide and maintain safe and
habitable housing for inmates at Taft C.I. [Taft Correctional
Institution] (including Plaintiff).”
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Plaintiff further alleged:
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“No measures were implemented at Taft C.I. by Defendants to
protect Taft C.I. inmates from infection at the times relevant to this
Complaint.”
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Plaintiff further alleged:
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“Defendants provide no health-care services that assist those
infected with Cocci while incarcerated at Taft, C.I. after their
departure or release from custody, leaving these individuals to fend
for themselves.”
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Plaintiff further alleged:
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“[T]he defendants had indisputable knowledge that this disease
was potentially deadly, and that any federal inmate assigned to
Taft C.I. was in danger of contracting the disease due to its
physical location in the San Joaquin Valley amidst desert and
agricultural terrain that generated the dust-borne spores of
Coccidioides immitis.”
Plaintiff further alleged:
“Upon entering federal custody, Plaintiff had not previously been
exposed to the disease Coccidioidomycosis.”
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Plaintiff further alleged:
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“While the Plaintiff was incarcerated at Taft C.I., the defendants
failed to take any particular measures to protect the inmates at Taft
from inhaling the naturally occurring airborne dust generated by
the desert winds and nearby agricultural activities. Plaintiff was not
provided any special protective breathing masks or other devices,
and to his knowledge there was no special air conditioning
equipment employed by the facility to filter out the dust occurring
in the local environment. Nor was there any prohibition of outdoor
activities during dusty conditions. Nor was anything done to keep
the dust that forms that basis of the facility covered with grass or
shrubs. Nor was that dust ever watered down or oiled down. Nor
were inmates kept inside during windy conditions. As a result of
these errors, Plaintiff contracted Cocci.”
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Plaintiff further alleged:
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“Plaintiff was diagnosed with Valley Fever on or about October
30, 2010. Plaintiff‟s very high Complement Fixation indicated a
high likelihood of dissemination… There are no medical services
that will be provided to his [sic] as a result of his acquisition of his
cocci infection.”
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Plaintiff alleged Defendant USA failed to provide Plaintiff with a safe and habitable
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3 prison in which to reside, failed to operate and maintain the prison facility in a safe and habitable
4 condition, and breached their duty of care under 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a).
On April 10, 2013, Defendant USA filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint pursuant to
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6 the independent contractor exception to the FTCA.
On June 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed his
7 opposition to Defendant USA‟s Motion to Dismiss.1 On September 9, 2013, the court granted
8 Defendant USA‟s Motion to Dismiss. As of the date of this order, Defendant MTC remains a
9 party to this matter.
On September 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Final Judgment of the
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11 USA‟s dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). On October 11, 2013, USA filed an opposition
12 to Plaintiff‟s Motion for Entry of Final Judgment. Plaintiff filed his reply to USA‟s opposition
13 on October 16, 2013.
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III.
LEGAL STANDARD
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17 Federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction over only appeals from “final decisions” of federal
18 district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Ordinarily, an order which terminates fewer than all claims,
19 or claims against fewer than all parties, does not constitute a „final‟ order for purposes of appeal
20 under 28 U. S.C. § 1291.” Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 343 (3rd Cir. 1999). Rule
21 54(b) creates an “exception to the finality rule.” Ortho–McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Kali Labs., Inc.,
22 Nos. 02–5707, 04–0886, 06–3533, 2007 WL 1814080, at *2 (D.N.J. June 2, 2007). The rule
23 provides that in actions involving multiple parties or more than one claim for relief, “the court
24 may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only
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On July 17, 2013, the court granted Defendant GEO‟s Motion to Dismiss.
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2 if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).2 “It
3 is left to the sound judicial discretion of the district court to determine the „appropriate time‟
4 when each final decision in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal.” Curtiss-Wright Corp.
5 v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437
6 (1956); Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2005).
The Eastern District of California has interpreted Rule 54(b) to require the presence of
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8 three conditions: (1) multiple claims or multiple parties; (2) at least one claim or the rights and
9 liabilities of one party have been finally decided; and (3) and there is no just reason for any delay
10 in entering judgment and allowing an appeal. Estate of Kligge v. Fidelity Mortg. of Cal., 2006
11 WL 3649340, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2006).
When determining whether there is a “just
12 reason for delay” a court must “take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the
13 equities involved” and “may consider factors such as „whether the claims under review were
14 separable from the other remaining to be adjudicated.‟” Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8. The
15 district court must preserve “the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals.” Id.; Sears,
16 Roebuck, 351 U.S. at 438; Wood, 422 F.3d at 878-79. There exists “a long-settled and prudential
17 policy against the scattershot disposition of litigation,” and “entry of judgment under [Rule
18 54(b)] should not be indulged as a matter of routine or as a magnanimous accommodation to
19 lawyers or litigants.” Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts Coll., 843 F.2d 38, 42 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations
20 omitted).
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) provides: Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When an action presents
22 more than one claim for relief--whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim--or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or
23 parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other
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decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry
of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.
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IV.
DISCUSSION
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5 Plaintiff‟s Motion for Entry of Final Judgment is built upon the argument that the Court‟s Order
6 granting Defendant USA‟s Motion to Dismiss resolves all claims brought by Plaintiff against
7 USA. Plaintiff also argues that there is no just reason to delay an entry of final judgment
8 because he anticipates no challenge by Defendant to the court‟s subject matter jurisdiction-based
9 ruling. Additionally, Plaintiff argues there is a slim likelihood of piecemeal appeals because the
10 independent contractor exception to the FTCA would not be applicable to MTC (the sole
11 remaining defendant in the matter). Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that an entry of final judgment
12 at this time can help to avoid future judicial inefficiency by seeking clarification from the
13 Appellate Court regarding the independent contractor exception‟s confines to the FTCA, sooner
14 rather than later.
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Defendant argues that certification under Rule 54(b) is not proper at this time because
16 there is just reason for the court to delay entry of final judgment.
To support this argument,
17 Defendant first alleges the facts of the claims against USA and MTC overlap and are, thus,
18 inseparable.
USA further argues that clarification from the Appellate Court regarding the
19 independent contractor exception‟s interpretation is needless and would not be helpful at this
20 time. Defendant argues additional just reasons for delay, chief of which is that there are no
21 pressing needs that cannot wait for a final resolution regarding the remaining claim against
22 MTC, and that denial of certification will not harm Plaintiff.
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2 A. Multiple Claims or Parties – Rule 54(b) allows the district court to certify at least one but
3 fewer than all claims for final judgment when an action presents more than one claim for relief
4 or when multiple parties are involved. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). In the instant case, Plaintiff filed his
5 original complaint against three individual defendants (USA, GEO, and MTC) alleging multiple
6 different claims (violation of FTCA, breach of duty under federal law, and common law
7 negligence). Here, because both multiple claims and multiple parties are present and because
8 Plaintiff‟s Motion for Entry of Final Judgment regards only his claims against Defendant USA,
9 the first requisite element under Rule 54(b) is met.
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11 B. Final Decision – The court must next determine whether it is dealing with a final judgment
12 that is “an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims
13 action.” Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S at 7. A judgment is final “if it „ends the litigation on the merits
14 and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment‟” as to that party or claim. Ariz.
15 State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Miller, 938 F.2d 1038, 1039 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting
16 Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v Mayacamos Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 275, (1988). Here, the Motion
17 to Dismiss in favor of Defendant USA is final. Nothing remains for the court to do with respect
18 to Plaintiff‟s claim against USA except to enter judgment. Thus, there has been a final decision
19 on a separate and distinct legal claim.
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21 C. No Just Reason for Delay - Having found a final decision against a separate claim and
22 defendant, the court must determine if there is any just reason to delay the entry of judgment. In
23 doing so, “[T]he trial court [should] marshal the competing considerations and state the ones
24 considered to be most important [when making a Rule 54(b) certification]....” Schwartz v.
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2 Compagnie General Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270, 275 (2nd Cir. 1968). The court should then
3 “make a brief reasoned statement in support of its determination that, „there is no just reason for
4 delay.‟” Gumer v. Shearson, Hammell & Co., Inc., 516 F.2d 283, 286 (2nd Cir. 1974); see also
5 Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 431, 441 (3rd Cir. 2003); Carter v.
6 City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 347 (3rd Cir. 1999).
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i. Clarification of the Independent Contractor Exception to the FTCA
Plaintiff contends that there are differing opinions among courts within the Ninth Circuit
9 as to the application of the independent contractor exception to the FTCA. Plaintiff argues that
10 post-appeal finality on the jurisdictional issues would help resolve current and future potential
11 conflict on this issue. Defendant asserts “no case law is cited by Plaintiff that a difference of
12 opinion by two district court judges in different lawsuits… necessitates entry of judgment under
13 Rule 54(b).”
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It is unnecessary for Plaintiff to cite case law in order for this Court to recognize that not
15 all district courts interpret and apply the law in the same way, and that this can lead to less than
16 optimal judicial administration.
Different courts that rule differently can result in judicial
17 resource exhaustion as cases are remanded for reconsideration consistent with higher court
18 rulings. At times, clarification on a legal issue is needed. If the issue is one that can be resolved
19 and clarified on appeal, and if that resolution serves to promote judicial efficiency, there is scant
20 reason to delay that clarification. See In re Saxman, 325 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003)
21 (quoting North Slope Borough v. Barstow (In re MarkAir, Inc.), 308 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2002) (If
22 the issue concerns “primarily factual issues about which there is no dispute, and the appeal
23 concerns primarily a question of law, then the policies of judicial efficiency and finality are best
24 served by our resolving the question now.”)); see also In re Indian Wells Estates, Inc., 96 F.3d
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2 1451 (9th Cir. 1996); In re DeMarah, 62 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1995). There are numerous
3 cases before courts in the Eastern District of California --- originating from multiple correctional
4 institutions within the San Joaquin Valley --- that address inmates‟ exposure to Valley Fever.
5 The majority of these cases implicate the United States and question whether the government
6 must bear liability, and conversely, to what extent the independent contractor exception shields
7 liability to the FTCA.
At this time the Court finds that the exact legal confines of the
8 independent contractor exception, and how it is to be applied to the United States Government,
9 are evolving and should be explored by the Ninth Circuit at this stage of litigation. This serves
10 the best interests of the court and parties. A more clarified and comprehensible understanding as
11 to what claims may be asserted against the United States, in this context, would assist this and
12 other district courts.
Defendant USA contends “there are no „pressing needs‟ that cannot wait until [the
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14 remaining defendant‟s] trial is complete and a final judgment is entered.”
This Court
15 respectfully disagrees. Not only does the court find no just reason to delay an entry of final
16 judgment, there is, additionally, reason not to delay. That reason is simply to promote judicial
17 efficiency in a district that is already significantly overburdened so that the United States District
18 Court for the Eastern District of California may continue to stave off a crisis in the
19 administration of justice.3
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ii. Rule 54(b) as Certification of Defense
21 Defendant argues that Rule 54(b) does not allow for certification of a defense and alleges that
22 seeking entry of the judgment as to the United States‟ defense --- the independent contractor
23 exception to the FTCA --- is precisely an attempt by Plaintiff to certify USA‟s defense.
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Judges in the Eastern District of California carry the heaviest caseload in the nation, and currently operate with a
25 shortage of District Judges and staff.
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2 Defendant relies on Oklahoma Turnpike v. Bruner, 259 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Rule
3 54(b) does not allow for certification of a defense” (quoting W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Int’l
4 Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs., Inc., 975 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed.Cir. 1992)).
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Defendant‟s reliance on Oklahoma Turnpike is misplaced because the argument fails to
6 consider the language that follows “[D]oes not allow for certification of a defense.” The case
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“Rule 54(b) does not allow for certification of a defense. By its terms, Rule 54(b) allows
certification only of „one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties.‟
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b)… [M]oreover, Rule 54(b) does not come into play when mere
defenses are left unadjudicated, but only when additional claims, counterclaims, or thirdparty claims are left unadjudicated. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).” Gore, 975 F.2d at 863.
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In the instant case, Plaintiff invokes Rule 54(b) not to certify a “mere defense,” but to,
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12 indeed, certify “one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). In
13 this manner, Gore serves to support Plaintiff‟s Motion for Entry of Final Judgment on the claims
14 against the USA. The nature of Plaintiff‟s motion is precisely that which is allowed within the
15 langue of Rule 54(b), and the court is unpersuaded that the motion should be denied simply
16 because the reason USA was dismissed from the case can be considered a defense. Additionally,
17 Gore does not address a fact pattern that is similar to the instant case: In Gore, only defenses
18 remained to be adjudicated, whereas here, claims against other parties remain.
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Furthermore, this Court recognizes that the FTCA‟s independent contractor exception is a
20 legally sound defense. However, in the instant case, the independent contractor exception is
21 more than just a defense. The independent contractor exception proved to be, to the USA, an
22 avenue affecting a party‟s entire dismissal. It was the single mechanism that released Defendant
23 USA from all liability. Defendant‟s characterization of the independent contractor exception is
24 overall unpersuasive as a reason for this Court to not grant Rule 54(b) certification.
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Accordingly, for reasons stated above, the Court finds that there is no just reason for
3 delay. Thus, the Court finds the third and final requisite element for certification under Rule
4 54(b) is sufficiently met.
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V.
DISPOSITION
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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
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Plaintiff‟s request for certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) shall be granted;
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2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter final judgment in favor of Defendant USA;
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3.
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4. Plaintiff must file any appeal within (30) days of the date of this order;
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5. In light of a potential appeal on this matter, this case is temporarily stayed; and
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6. All parties shall notify the court within (15) days of an order by the Ninth Circuit
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Plaintiff may proceed with an appeal of the Court‟s September 9, 2013 decision;
Court of Appeals regarding this matter, or Plaintiff‟s failure to file an appeal.
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17 IT IS SO ORDERED.
18 Dated: March 6, 2014
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE
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