Clarke v. State of California et al

Filing 10

ORDER Denying Petitioner's Amended Motion to Disqualify District Judge 9 , signed by District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill on 3/6/13. (Gonzalez, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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STANLEY CLARKE,
Petitioner,

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v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, MADERA
COUNTY PROBTION DEPARTMENT,

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Respondent.
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Case No.: 1:13-cv-00049-JLT
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S AMENDED
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DISTRICT JUDGE
(Doc. 9)

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Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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The instant petition was filed on January 11, 2013. After a preliminary review of the petition

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indicated that the petition contained no claims that have been exhausted in state court, the Magistrate

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Judge, on January 23, 2013, issued an Order to Show Cause why the petition should not be dismissed

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as unexhausted. (Doc. 3). On February 22, 2013, apparently in response to the Order to Show Cause,
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Petitioner filed a motion to amend the petition to include exhausted claims, a motion to stay

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proceedings in order to exhaust further claims, and a motion to disqualify the United States District

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Judge assigned to this case. (Docs. 6, 7, & 8). On March 4, 2013, before the Court could rule on

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those motions, Petitioner filed an amended motion to disqualify the District Judge. (Doc. 9).1
DISCUSSION

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Here, as grounds for disqualification or recusal, Petitioner contends that the District Judge
presided over two previous cases involving Petitioner, i.e., civil rights actions against the City of
Madera Police Department. (Doc. 9, p. 3). Petitioner contends that because the District Judge

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dismissed both cases, because he “has knowledge of the facts concerning the Petitioner’s Petition for

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Habeas Corpus,” and because the District Judge’s dismissal of those two cases was an expression of

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“his opinion against Petitioner about the underlying facts of Petitioner’s Habeas Corpus petition,”

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Petitioner reasons that the District Judge “has a bias against Petitioner and a prejudice for government

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entities, specifically the City of Madera Police Department.” Id. Petitioner concludes that he cannot

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obtain a “fair trial” because of the District Judge’s purported bias and prejudice. Id.

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Disqualification is required if a party demonstrates that that the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), or the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning
a party, 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). Recusal is required only if the judge’s bias is 1) directed against a
party; 2) stems from an extrajudicial source; and 3) is such as a reasonable person knowing all the
facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 545-546 (1994); United States v.Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Bell, 79 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1173 (E.D. Cal. 1999). A judge’s rulings while presiding
over a case do not constitute extra-judicial conduct. Nilsson, et al., v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d
1538, 1548 (9th Cir. 1988). A motion to disqualify a judge pursuant to § 455 is decided by the judge

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The only difference between the original motion and the amended motion is that, in Petitioner’s attached declaration, the
amended motion contains a statement that the declaration is made under penalty of perjury, something omitted from the
original motion.

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whom the moving party wishes to disqualify. In re Bernard v. Coyne, 31 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir.
1994).

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Here, Petitioner has not met the requirements of for recusal or disqualification. First, the
alleged bias and prejudice does not stem from an extrajudicial source, but rather from Petitioner’s own
history as a litigant before this particular District Judge. Second, and more significantly, the mere fact
that the District Judge’s rulings in other cases went against Petitioner’s interests does not reflect either
bias or prejudice. Petitioner has not alleged that the two previous dismissals were legally incorrect;
indeed, Petitioner makes no reference to the merits of the District Judge’s rulings in those cases at all.
Rather, Petitioner argues that the simple fact of dismissal, standing alone, is proof of prejudice. The
Court, however, simply cannot make the leap in logic required to find bias or prejudice solely on the
basis of legal rulings to which Petitioner does not take exception and regarding which Petitioner has
failed to identify any legal error. In Petitioner’s logic, any party who returns to federal court following
an unfavorable result in an earlier case is entitled to have a different judge solely because the result in
the earlier case was unfavorable. This is not, and has never been, the law regarding recusals and
disqualifications. The Court is unaware of any case that imputes bias or prejudice from the mere fact
of an earlier unfavorable result. Finally, based on the foregoing, no reasonable person knowing all of
the above facts would conclude that the District Judge’s impartiality could be reasonably questioned.
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 545-546.

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ORDER

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For the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s amended motion to
disqualify the District Judge (Doc. 9), is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

/s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill

March 6, 2013

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DEAC_Signature-END:

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