Haley v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation et al

Filing 16

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS to Dismiss Case, with Prejudice, for Failure to State a Claim, signed by Magistrate Judge Gary S. Austin on 4/7/15. Referred to Judge Ishii; 30-Day Deadline. (Verduzco, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DONOVAN L. HALEY,

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Plaintiff,

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vs.

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CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION, et al.,

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1:13-cv-00226-AWI-GSA-PC
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO DISMISS CASE, WITH PREJUDICE,
FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
(Doc. 15.)

Defendants.

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS

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I.

BACKGROUND

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Donovan L. Haley (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil rights

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action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on

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February 13, 2013. (Doc. 1.) On March 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint.

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(Doc. 12.)

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The court screened the First Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and entered

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an order on May 15, 2014, dismissing the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim,

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with leave to amend. (Doc. 14.) On June 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended

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Complaint, which is now before the court for screening. (Doc. 15.)
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II.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a).

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The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

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legally Afrivolous or malicious,@ that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

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that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

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' 1915A(b)(1),(2). ANotwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

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paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or

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appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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A complaint is required to contain Aa short and plain statement of the claim showing

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that the pleader is entitled to relief.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

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not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

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conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

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1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955

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(2007)). While a plaintiff=s allegations are taken as true, courts Aare not required to indulge

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unwarranted inferences.@ Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009)

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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual

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matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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at 678. While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

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To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual allegations to

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state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969

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(9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility

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standard. Id.

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III.

SUMMARY OF SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

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Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Sierra Conservation Center (SCC) in

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Jamestown, California, in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

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Rehabilitation (CDCR). The events at issue in the Second Amended Complaint allegedly

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occurred at North Kern State Prison (NKSP) in Delano, California, and SCC. Plaintiff names
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as defendants the CDCR, C. Williams (Correctional Counselor, NKSP), J. Thompson

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(Correctional Counselor, SCC), and Heidi M. Lackner (Warden, SCC) (collectively

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“Defendants”). Defendants Williams, Thompson, and Lackner were all employed by the CDCR

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at NKSP or SCC at the time of the events at issue. Plaintiff’s factual allegations follow.

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Plaintiff entered the custody of state prison officials on July 27, 2012, as a non-street-

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gang member or associate.

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defendant Thompson handed him a piece of paper which stated that Plaintiff had 46

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classification security points.

On October 11, 2012, while Plaintiff was housed at NKSP,

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On January 4, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred to SCC into the custody of defendant

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Warden Heidi Lackner. On January 16, 2013, Plaintiff went before the Initial Classification

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Committee with defendant Williams officiating. Williams stated, “Inmate Haley is assessed 46

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classification score points.” (Second Amended Cmp (2ACP) at 4 ¶13.) Plaintiff replied that he

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believed the score was wrong, and defendant Williams said he would review the file to check

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on it.

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On January 18, 2013, Plaintiff received a CDCR 839 Classification Score Sheet which

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listed Plaintiff as a member or associate of “a Black Street Gang/Disruptive Group.” (2ACP at

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4 ¶16.)

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characterizing Plaintiff as a “Current Active Member and/or Associate “of the Street Terrorist

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Tree Top Piru Blood Gang.” (Id. ¶17.) On January 23, 2013, defendant Williams sent Plaintiff

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a CDCR 128G, summarizing the January 16, 2013 committee hearing, in which defendant

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Williams wrote, “I/M Haley agrees with the findings.” (Id.) Plaintiff is not a gang member or

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associate of any gang. Plaintiff is a Christian man.

On January 16, 2013, defendant Williams typed an official state document

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Defendants used twenty-year-old documents to classify Plaintiff as a gang member,

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without affording him due process under his current CDCR number, violating the California

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Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. California regulations mandate prison officials to

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follow specific due process, which Defendants ignored.

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Defendant CDCR failed to properly train its employees concerning gang designations,

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violating Plaintiff’s civil right to be free of defamatory characterization. Defendants violated
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laws protecting Plaintiff’s liberty interest against erroneous and defamatory classification, by

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introducing false information into Plaintiff’s case file and acting on the false information.

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As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff suffers injury because he must wear a GPS

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ankle bracelet and submit to a tracking program. Plaintiff is also subject to maximum security

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high-power custody, parole supervision which severely limits Plaintiff’s travel and housing

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options, and more physical restrictions than non-gang-member designated inmates.

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Plaintiff requests monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief and costs of suit.
IV.

PLAINTIFF=S CLAIMS
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

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Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.

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42 U.S.C. ' 1983. ASection 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

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Constitution and laws.@ Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

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(internal quotations omitted). ATo the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

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deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal

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Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress.@ Id.

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A.

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Plaintiff names the CDCR as a defendant. Plaintiff is advised that he may not sustain

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an action against a state agency. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from

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hearing suits brought against an unconsenting state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec.

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Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.

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Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,

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Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir.

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1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies as well as those where the

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state itself is named as a defendant. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Dep=t

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of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

Defendant CDCR

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1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989 (concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons was a state agency

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entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College

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Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). Because the CDCR is a state agency, it is entitled to

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Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against

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defendant CDCR.

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B.

Defendant Warden Heide M. Lackner – Supervisory Liability and Personal
Participation

Plaintiff names as defendant Warden Heide M. Lackner, who holds a supervisory
position.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally

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participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.

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2002) (emphasis added). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant, through his or her

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own individual actions, violated Plaintiff=s constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-67.

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Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under section 1983 on the theory of

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respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id.; Ewing

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v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009). A supervisor may be held liable only

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if he or she Aparticipated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act

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to prevent them.@ Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th

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Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark

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County School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126

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F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating that Warden

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Lackner personally participated in or directed constitutional violations or knew of the violations

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and failed to prevent them. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Warden Lackner.

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C.

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The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff from being deprived of life, liberty, or

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property without the procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wolff v.

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McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); also see Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125

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S.Ct. 2384 (2005). To state a claim, Plaintiff must first identify the interest at stake. Id.

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Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause or from state law. Id. The Due

Due Process

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Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding more adverse

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conditions of confinement, id. at 221-22 (citations and quotation marks omitted), and under

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state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by

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focusing on the nature of the condition of confinement at issue, id. at 222-23 (citing Sandin v.

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Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995)) (quotation marks omitted). Liberty

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interests created by prison regulations are generally limited to freedom from restraint which

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imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

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prison life. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221 (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484) (quotation marks

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omitted); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007). If a protected interest is

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identified, the inquiry then turns to what process is due. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224.

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Plaintiff alleges that he has a protected interest against being defamed, having false

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information in his case file, and the effects of gang classification such as being subjected to

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higher level of custody, being required to wear a GPS ankle bracelet and participate in a

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tracking program, and being limited in his travel and housing when on parole.

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Plaintiff has no protected liberty interest in his future rights on parole that he does not

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presently possess as a convicted prisoner. See Bagley v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921, 924 (9th Cir.

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1983).

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bracelet and participate in a tracking program, or against limitations in his travel and housing

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on parole.

Thus, Plaintiff has no protected interest against being required to wear a GPS ankle

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The falsification of disciplinary reports does not state a standalone constitutional claim.

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Canovas v. California Dept. of Corrections, 2014 WL 5699750, n.2 (E.D. Cal. 2014); see e.g.,

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Lee v. Whitten, 2012 WL 4468420, *4 (E.D. Cal. 2012). There is no constitutionally

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guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the

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deprivation of a protected liberty interest.” Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir.

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1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986)). “Specifically, the fact that a

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prisoner may have been innocent of disciplinary charges brought against him and incorrectly

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held in administrative segregation does not raise a due process issue.

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demands due process, not error-free decisionmaking.” Id. (citing Ricker v. Leapley, 25 F.3d
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The Constitution

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1406, 1410 (8th Cir. 1994); McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 1983)). Therefore,

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Plaintiff has no protected liberty interest against being defamed or having false information in

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his file.

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As for the effects of gang classification, “[i]t is clear . . . that prisons have a legitimate

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penological interest in stopping prison gang activity.” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th

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Cir. 2003). To that end, California has developed procedures to identify and segregate gang

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members. See Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3378. To comply with due process, prison officials

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must provide the inmate with “some notice of the charges against him, and the opportunity to

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present his views to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to

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administrative segregation. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287. Here, Plaintiff was notified of the

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charges against him, was informed of the evidence indicating his status as a gang member, and

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was given an opportunity to respond. That procedure satisfied due process. Barnett v. Centoni,

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31 F.3d 813, 815 (1994). Plaintiff alleges that he appeared before the ICC on January 16, 2013.

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Although Plaintiff disagrees with the finding of the ICC, he does not allege any facts

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suggesting that he was not afforded due process as that term is defined above.

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D.

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The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated

Equal Protection

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alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249

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(1985); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal protection claim may

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be established by showing that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff based

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on his membership in a protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of

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Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 702-03 (9th Cir. 2009); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071,1082 (9th

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Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly

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situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a

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legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601-02, 128

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S.Ct. 2146 (2008); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073

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(2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC

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v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating that he was intentionally discriminated

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against on the basis of his membership in a protected class, or that he was intentionally treated

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differently than other similarly situated inmates without a rational relationship to a legitimate

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state purpose. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief for violation of his right to

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equal protection.

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E.

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Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.

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Constitution when they illegally classified him as a gang member or associate. The Eighth

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Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane

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conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and only

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those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life=s necessities are sufficiently

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grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,

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9, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). AAn Eighth Amendment claim that

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a prison official has deprived inmates of humane conditions of confinement must meet two

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requirements, one objective and the other subjective.@ Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th

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Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1065 (1995). First, the alleged deprivation must be, in

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objective terms, Asufficiently serious.@ Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970

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(1994). Second, subjectively, the prison official must Aknow of and disregard an excessive risk

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to inmate health or safety.@ Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th

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Cir. 1995). The objective requirement is met if the prison official=s acts or omissions deprived

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a prisoner of Athe minimal civilized measure of life=s necessities.=@ Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087

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(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (1994)). To satisfy the subjective prong, a plaintiff must

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show more than mere inadvertence or negligence. Neither negligence nor gross negligence will

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constitute deliberate indifference. Farmer at 833, & n. 4; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

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(1976). The Farmer court concluded that Asubjective recklessness as used in the criminal law is

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a familiar and workable standard that is consistent with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments

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Eighth Amendment Violation

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Clause@ and adopted this as the test for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment.

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Farmer at 839-40.

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Plaintiff’s gang validation does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.

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Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that any of the Defendants acted or failed to

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act while knowing about and deliberately disregarding a substantial risk of serious harm to

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Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

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F.

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To state a claim against defendants under section 1983, Plaintiff must allege some facts

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indicating that defendants either personally participated in the alleged deprivation of

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constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or

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Aimplemented a policy so deficient that the policy >itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights=

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and is >the moving force of the constitutional violation.=@ Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646

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(9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Here, Plaintiff alleges

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that a statewide policy exists “which illegally classifies inmates, including Plaintiff, as

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members and/or associates of street terrorist gangs and known civil disruptive groups.” (2ACP

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at 1:23-25.) However, Plaintiff has not identified such a policy or alleged that any of the

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Defendants promulgated or implemented the policy. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim

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based on an unconstitutional state policy.

Unconstitutional Policy

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G.

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Plaintiff brings claims against defendants for negligence, state civil rights, defamation,

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failure to train and supervise employees, and violation of state regulations and the state

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constitution. Plaintiff is informed that violation of state law is not sufficient to state a claim for

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relief under ' 1983. To state a claim under ' 1983, there must be a deprivation of federal

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constitutional or statutory rights. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Although the court

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may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff must first have a

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cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1367. In this instance, the court

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fails to find any cognizable federal claims in the Second Amended Complaint. Therefore,

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Plaintiff=s state law claims fail.

State Law Claims

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V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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The Court finds that Plaintiff=s Second Amended Complaint fails to state any cognizable

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claim upon which relief may be granted under ' 1983. The Court previously granted Plaintiff

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leave to amend the complaint, with ample guidance by the Court. The Court finds that the

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deficiencies outlined above are not capable of being cured by amendment, and therefore further

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leave to amend should not be granted. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

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1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Accordingly, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

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1.

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This action be DISMISSED in its entirety, with prejudice, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; and
This dismissal count as a STRIKE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(g).

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2.

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(l). Within

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thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file

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written objections with the Court.

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Magistrate Judge=s Findings and Recommendations.@ Plaintiff is advised that failure to file

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objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v.

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Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394

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(9th Cir. 1991)).

The document should be captioned AObjections to

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

April 7, 2015

/s/ Gary S. Austin
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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