Hines v. Yousseff, et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER on defendants' 10 Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's claim for Violation of Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Rights, signed by District Judge Anthony W. Ishii on 10/30/2013. (Kusamura, W)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DARNELL T. HINES,
Plaintiff,

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1:13 – CV – 0357 AWI JLT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR
VIOLATION OF FOURTEENTH
ASHRAFE E. YOUSSEF, M.D., GODWIN
C. UGUEZE, M.D., JOSHUA GARZA, RNP, AMENDMENT SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS
LYNN CARMICHAEL, R.N., BARBARA
NEWKIRK, L.V.N. and DOES 1-10,
inclusive,
vs.

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Defendants.

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This is an action for damages by plaintiff Darnell T. Hines (“Plaintiff”) against individual

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medical care personnel (collectively, “Defendants”) who were employed by the California

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Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) at the Wasco State Prison-Reception

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Center during the time relevant to this action. Plaintiff‟s complaint alleges a single claim for

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relief – that Plaintiff suffered deprivation of rights “guaranteed under the [Eighth] and

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[Fourteenth] Amendments to the United States Constitution, to wit; protection against cruel and

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unusual punishment; and, deprivation of life and liberty without due process of law.” Doc. # 1 at

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5:23-26. Currently before the court is Defendants‟ motion to dismiss Plaintiff‟s Fourteenth

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Amendment claim. Both claims are pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Federal subject matter

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jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper in this court.

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//

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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The events giving rise to this action occurred during the time Plaintiff was an inmate at

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the CDCR Reception Center at Wasco State Prison. Plaintiff is an African-American male who
suffers from asthma since childhood. Plaintiff‟s complaint alleges that as such, Plaintiff was
known to be in a population of persons who are particularly susceptible to coccidiomycosis,
commonly called “valley fever,” a disease caused by inhalation of fungal spores that are endemic
to California‟s Central Valley. Defendants are medical services providers employed by CDCR
at the WASCO Reception Center who evaluated Plaintiff and are alleged to have been aware of
his susceptibility to Valley Fever. Plaintiff‟s complaint alleges that CDCR officials were aware
of the particular risk of certain ethnic groups, primarily persons of African-American descent, to
contract valley fever and that CDCR put in place a policy that directs that such susceptible
inmates not be housed in the areas of California where the fungus that causes valley fever is
endemic. Defendants are alleged to have authorized Plaintiff‟s transfer to the Substance Abuse
Treatment Facility located at Corcoran State Prison, which is located in an area where the fungal
spores that cause valley fever are endemic. Plaintiff ultimately contracted valley fever while
housed at the Corcoran facility.
LEGAL STANDARD

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A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

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can be based on the failure to allege a cognizable legal theory or the failure to allege sufficient
facts under a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530,
533-34 (9th Cir.1984). To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint
must set forth factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Twombly”). While a court
considering a motion to dismiss must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,
Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), and must construe the
pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve factual
disputes in the pleader's favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied, 396 U.S.

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869 (1969), the allegations must be factual in nature. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“a
plaintiff‟s obligation to provide the „grounds‟ of his „entitlement to relief‟ requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do”). The pleading standard set by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “does not
require „detailed factual allegations,‟ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“Iqbal”).
The Ninth Circuit follows the methodological approach set forth in Iqbal for the

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assessment of a plaintiff‟s complaint:
“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

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Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.

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at 1950).
DISCUSSION

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Defendants‟ motion to dismiss presents a single issue: may an inmate bring an action for

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violation of rights guaranteed by the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment where the same conduct is alleged to violate rights guaranteed by the Eighth
Amendment? For the following reasons, the answer in the context of this action is “no.”
The protections of the Eighth Amendment attach once an individual has been subject to

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criminal prosecution that conforms to the rights associated therewith; that is, an individual who
has suffered a conviction following a lawful criminal proceeding and is incarcerated for that
reason comes under the protections of the Eighth Amendment. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 671, n.40 (1977). Generally, “[w]here a particular Amendment „provides an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection‟ against a particular sort of government behavior, „that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for

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analyzing these claims.‟” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
“Deliberate indifference to a prisoner‟s serious medical needs is cruel and unusual

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punishment” which places Plaintiff‟s claim of deliberate indifference to his elevated medical
susceptibility within the ambit of eighth amendment claims. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986); see also, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105 (1976) (deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs or the deliberate denial of care are sufficient to state a claim for violation
of constitutional protections). The Whitley Court recognized that, in the context of prison
security and claims arising out of the application of force on inmates for security purposes, the
elements of claims under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments have no practical differences
and that such claims are to be decided using traditional Eighth Amendment analyses. A similar
approach has been used by district courts in this circuit where the same facts are alleged to
support claims for denial of medical care under both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In
Scofield v. Ball, 2012 WL 667112 (S.D. Cal. 2012), the District Court relied on the analysis in
Albright to conclude that where the factual bases for the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims were the same, the analysis of constitutional violation was to proceed under the more
specific protections of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at *6. The Scofield court concluded that the
plaintiff‟s Fourteenth Amendment claim in that action was duplicative of the Eighth Amendment
claim. This court concludes the same.
Plaintiff‟s opposition seeks to differentiate Albright and Connor on factual grounds but

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this misses the point. Albright and Connor set forth a rule of general applicability; where the
same facts are used to assert claims under Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and under a more specific constitutional source of protection such and the Fourth,
Fifth or Eighth Amendments, the analysis under the more specific amendment is controlling. As
illustrated in Scofield, the court faced with claims under both the Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendments looks to the facts alleged to determine if there is anything in those facts that takes
the claim out of the protections of the more specific Eighth Amendments. Where, as in this case

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and in Scofield, no such differentiating facts are apparent, the Fourteenth Amendment claim is
considered duplicative of the Eighth Amendment claim and is subject to dismissal on that
ground.

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THEREFORE, pursuant to the foregoing discussion, it is hereby ORDERED that

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Defendant‟s motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED. Any claim in Plaintiff‟s FAC that alleges
violation of rights under the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
hereby DISMISSED as duplicative of Plaintiff‟s Eighth Amendment claim,.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 30, 2013
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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