Hicks v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 25

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES signed by Magistrate Judge Sandra M. Snyder on March 29, 2016. [Doc. 22] (Munoz, I)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MISTY MARIE HICKS,

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Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. 1:13-CV-0374-SMS
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Doc. 22

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Defendant.

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I.

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BACKGROUND
In January 2014, this Court granted the stipulation of the parties seeking a sentence four

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remand of this Social Security action and entry of judgment. Doc.18. The parties then entered into

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a stipulation for the award of $2,350.00 in attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to

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Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), which the Court granted. Docs. 20-21.

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On remand, the Social Security Administration (SSA) found that Plaintiff was eligible for

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past-due benefits of $37,143.80. Doc. 22, Exh. 3. Plaintiff’s counsel’s instant motion requests

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$6,935.00 in attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b),1 which would equal a combined fee of

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$9,285.00 when considered in conjunction with the EAJA award. Doc. 22. Plaintiff was advised

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that she could file a response to the motion, but she did not file a response. See Doc. 22. The

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government filed a response to the motion, neither in assent nor objection, offering an analysis to

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Plaintiff brings this motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2)(B), which governs awards of fees for work done
before the agency, not the district court. Plaintiff seeks an award of fees for work done before the district court; hence, 42 U.S.C. §
406 is the appropriate provision. Plaintiff’s analysis is not affected by this substitution. The Court addresses Plaintiff’s motion
under 42 U.S.C. § 406.

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assist the Court. Doc. 23.
II.

DISCUSSION
The award of attorney’s fees in social security cases is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 406. 42

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U.S.C. § 406(b) imposes a 25% cap on the amount that can be awarded to an attorney for the

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representation of a claimant before the court. “Because the SSA has no direct interest in how much

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of the award goes to counsel and how much to the disabled person, the district court has an

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affirmative duty to assure that the reasonableness of the fee is established.” Crawford v. Astrue,

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586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009). In assessing the reasonableness of a fee request, the district

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court should not start with the lodestar calculation, but with the contingent-fee agreement, and

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consider “‘the character of the representation and the results the representative achieved.’” Id. at

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1151 (quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002)). The lower court “may properly

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reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, or benefits that are not in proportion to the time

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spent on the case.” Id. (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808).

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Here, Plaintiff has attached 1) a valid contingency fee agreement between Plaintiff and her

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attorneys indicating that fees of 25% of past-due benefits would be sought upon successful judicial

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review; 2) a notice of favorable decision from SSA; 3) a notice of award from SSA, indicating the

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total back payments due and the monthly payments amounts; and 4) a time sheet indicating 18.4

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attorney hours and 3.4 paralegal hours spent preparing this case before the district court. The 25%

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contingency fee agreement is within the statutory limit and is reasonable considering the character

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of the representation and the results achieved. Plaintiff has requested a combined total of

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$9,285.00, which represents 25% of her past-due benefits.

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There is no evidence presented which requires a reduction in the contingency fee amount.

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Although the government notes that the favorable decision at the administrative level was based

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on new testimony and not based on evidence Plaintiff presented, Plaintiff's counsel obtained a

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remand of the case for further proceedings, and there is no evidence of substandard performance.

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There is also no evidence of undue delay in litigating the case. Lastly, there is no evidence that the

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benefits are not in proportion to the time spent on the case. Although the amount results in a high

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effective hourly rate of $426.00, the Court respects the “primacy of lawful attorney-client fee
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agreements.” See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793. “Lodestar fees will generally be much less than

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contingent fees because the lodestar method tends to under-compensate attorneys for the risk they

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undertook in representing their clients and does not account for the fact that the statute limits

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attorneys’ fees to a percentage of past-due benefits and allows no recovery from future benefits,

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which may far exceed the past-due benefits awarded.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1150. The rate takes

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into account the inherent risk of contingent-fee cases.

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Therefore, the Court finds that counsel’s request for $9,285.00 is reasonable. Because

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counsel was previously awarded $2,350.00 in attorney’s fees under the EAJA, the Court will

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award $6,935.00 in attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). No refund of EAJA fees to

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Plaintiff will be required.
III.

ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court awards $6,935.00 in attorney’s fees pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

March 29, 2016

/s/ Sandra M. Snyder
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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