Smith v. Munoz, et al.

Filing 12

SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING 6 First Amended Complaint and GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND; Thirty Day Deadline signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 11/14/2014. (Attachments: # 1 Amended Complaint Form)(Sant Agata, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL LENOIR SMITH,

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Plaintiff,
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C. MUNOZ, et al.,

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Defendants.

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1:13-cv-00387-BAM (PC)
SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
(ECF No. 6)
THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

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I.

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Plaintiff Michael LeNoir Smith (“Plaintiff”) is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se

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and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated

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this action on March 18, 2013. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on March 27, 2013, is

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currently before the Court for screening.

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Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §

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1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or

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malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary

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relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
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required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

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1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65

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(2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge

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unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009)

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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings

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liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,

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342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially

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plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each

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named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949

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(quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

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2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere

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consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

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678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff’s Allegations

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II.

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Plaintiff is currently housed at the Sacramento County Main Jail. The events alleged in

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the complaint occurred while Plaintiff was housed at Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff names the

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following defendants: (1) C. Munoz, Lieutenant; (2) A. Perez, Correctional Sergeant; (3) Bueno,

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Correctional Sergeant; (4) R. Broomfield, Correctional Captain; (5) C. Gipson, Warden; (6)

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Karen Cribbs, Appeals Coordinator; (7) N. Pana, Appeals Coordinator; (8) S. Shelby,

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Correctional Guard; (9) J. Almaguer, Correctional Guard; (10) J. R. Alfaro, Correctional Guard;

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(11) Lt. F. Munoz, Lieutenant; and (12) Podsakoff, Correctional Guard.

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Plaintiff’s complaint concerns three separate incidents occurring at different times during

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his incarceration at Corcoran State Prison. Given the lengthy nature of Plaintiff’s complaint, the

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Court summarizes Plaintiff’s allegations.

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The first incident occurred on July 20, 2012. Plaintiff alleges that he was “speared” by
Inmate Prado while being escorted to his cell by Defendants Almaguer and Alfaro. Plaintiff had
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no prior incident with Inmate Prado. Although Plaintiff was seen by two nurses, and treated by

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one, he complains that Defendant Bueno failed to ensure his medical care. Plaintiff also

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complains about the investigation of the incident and the placement of Inmate Prado after the

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incident in a cell with a perforated door. Plaintiff asserts a claim against Defendants Almaguer

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and Alfaro for violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights for failure to protect

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him. He asserts a claim against Defendant Bueno for violation of his Due Process rights. He

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also asserts a claim against Defendants Munoz, Broomfield and Cavazos for failure to properly

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investigate the incident and failure to protect him.

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The second incident occurred on November 21, 2012. While Plaintiff was participating

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in outdoor recreation, Inmate Benjamin Quiroz yelled, “Watch out!” He pointed in the direction

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of Inmate Sandoval. Plaintiff saw Inmate Sandoval holding a half-pint milk carton. Inmate

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Sandoval then threw the container, which was full of an unknown liquid, at Plaintiff, striking him

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in the face and dousing him with liquid that smelled like urine. Inmate Sandoval then walked to

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the toilet and dipped the empty milk carton into it. Plaintiff immediately called out to the

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Recreation Officer, Defendant Shelby. Defendant Shelby continued to watch as Inmate

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Sandoval threw the contents of the milk carton at Plaintiff as Plaintiff ran around the inside of

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the cage. Defendant Shelby watched Inmate Sandoval throw urine and toilet water at Plaintiff

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approximately five or six times. Plaintiff then filled his hands with water from the faucet and

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threw it at Inmate Sandoval. Inmate Garcia, who was next to Inmate Sandoval, threw water at

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Inmate Sandoval. Defendant Shelby did not issue any orders to stop until Plaintiff retaliated.

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When Plaintiff said something to Defendant Shelby, Defendant Shelby then called for two

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correctional officers, Defendants Podsakoff and Hernandez, to escort the three inmates back to

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their housing unit.

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After the incident, Defendant Shelby wrote an RVR CDC 115 for “behavior that could

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lead to violence.” Defendant Shelby reported the incident in such a way that it gave the

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impression that only Plaintiff was involved. When Plaintiff attended his disciplinary hearing,

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Plaintiff admitted to retaliating by throwing water, but attempted to explain that he was not guilty

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of the alleged violation. Defendant Munoz, the hearing officer, imposed sanctions against
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Plaintiff, including loss of TV/radio, loss of personal property, loss of yard and solitary yard.

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After the hearing, Plaintiff was put in a holding cage, while Defendant Hood and an unknown

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officer entered Plaintiff’s cell and began ransacking it. Defendant Perez reportedly instructed the

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officers to take everything, including Plaintiff’s legal work. When Plaintiff was placed back in

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the cell, he was left with two sheets, a blanket and a mattress.

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The third incident began with an appeal/grievance submitted by Plaintiff on January 3,

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2013 complaining that Defendant Munoz had imposed unauthorized sanctions. The grievance

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was converted to a staff complaint. On February 4, 2013, Lt. Munoz had custody staff bring

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Plaintiff out of his assigned cell and taken to the rotunda. Lt. Munoz was there to interview

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Plaintiff about the staff complaint. During the last week of February or first week of March

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2013, Defendant Podsakoff appeared at Plaintiff’s assigned cell with Officer Vasquez.

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Defendant Podsakoff asked Plaintiff if he wanted to speak with the Captain, but Plaintiff

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declined. When Defendant Podsakoff later identified the Captain as Defendant Broomfield,

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Plaintiff did not believe he had any reason to speak with Defendant Broomfield. Plaintiff alleges

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that Defendant Broomfield allowed his staff to take unauthorized actions against Plaintiff,

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including Sgt. Perez threatening to place a knife in Plaintiff’s mattress on February 21, 2013.
On February 21, 2013, Lt. Munoz appeared at Plaintiff’s cell and said that he should have

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had Plaintiff sign a form when he interviewed Plaintiff. Plaintiff signed the form and dated it

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that day.
On March 7, 2013, Lt. Munoz appeared at Plaintiff’s cell. There was no need to

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participate in any interview with Defendant Broomfield.

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On March 22, 2013, at mail call, Plaintiff received a response to his staff complaint,

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which was cancelled because Plaintiff allegedly refused to be interviewed by Defendant

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Broomfield. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Broomfield fabricated that he was the interviewer

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and supports Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Broomfield encouraged the misconduct by other

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defendants.

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III.

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Plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 18 and 20.

Deficiencies of Complaint

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Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint. To assist Plaintiff, the Court

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provides the pleading and legal standards that appear applicable to his claims. Plaintiff should

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amend only those claims that he believes, in good faith, are cognizable in this action.

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A.

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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

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of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

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(citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

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at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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Plaintiff has not provided a short and plain statement of his claims. Plaintiff’s complaint

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exceeds thirty-five pages and concerns multiple incidents spanning nearly one year. If Plaintiff

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elects to amend his complaint, he must set forth a short and plain statement of the allegations

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against each defendant.

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B.

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Plaintiff is raising numerous claims based on different events. Plaintiff may not bring

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20

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unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2);

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Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th

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Cir. 2007). Plaintiff may bring a claim against multiple defendants so long as (1) the claim

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arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences, and

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(2) there are commons questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); Coughlin v. Rogers,

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130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America,

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623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). Only if the defendants are properly joined under Rule

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20(a) will the Court review the other claims to determine if they may be joined under Rule 18(a),

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which permits the joinder of multiple claims against the same party.

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Plaintiff may not assert multiple claims against unrelated defendants in this action. That

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the defendants all work at the same facility is not sufficient to support joinder of claims. Indeed,

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Plaintiff may not bring a single action for unrelated incidents occurring while he was housed at

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Corcoran State Prison. For example, Plaintiff may not pursue a failure to protect claim arising

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out of an incident on July 12, 2012, while simultaneously pursuing another failure to protect

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claim arising out of an unrelated incident in November 2012. In his amended complaint,

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Plaintiff shall choose which claims he wishes to pursue in this action. If Plaintiff does not do so

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and his amended complaint sets forth unrelated claims which violate joinder rules, the Court will

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dismiss the claims it finds to be improperly joined.

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C.

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To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Gibson and Broomfield (or any other

Supervisory Liability

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defendant) liable based upon their supervisory positions, he may not do so. Liability may not be

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imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the

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theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609

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F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir.

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2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Supervisors may be held liable

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only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act

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to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652

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F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009);

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Preschooler II v. Clark County School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007);

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Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

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D.

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Certain of Plaintiff’s claims arise from Defendants’ involvement in the inmate appeals

Claims Arising from Inmate Appeals

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process. Plaintiff cannot pursue any claims against staff relating to their involvement in the

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administrative review of his inmate appeals. The existence of an inmate appeals process does

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not create a protected liberty interest upon which Plaintiff may base a claim that he was denied a
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particular result or that the appeals process was deficient. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860

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(9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under

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section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate personal involvement in the underlying violation of his

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rights, Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934, and liability may not be based merely on

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Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the administrative process or a decision on a grievance, Ramirez,

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334 F.3d at 860; Mann, 855 F.2d at 640.
Eighth Amendment – Failure to Protect

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E.

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The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and

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from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.

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2006). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide

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prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Farmer v.

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Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) (quotations omitted). Prison officials

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have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical abuse. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

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833; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). The failure of prison officials to

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protect inmates from attacks by other inmates may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

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violation where prison officials know of and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to the

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plaintiff. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1040.

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July 2012 Incident

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Plaintiff has not stated a claim arising out of his alleged spearing by Inmate Prado.

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Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that Defendants Almaguer and Alfaro knew that he was

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at risk from harm at the hands of Inmate Prado prior to the incident.

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November 2012 Incident

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Plaintiff has not stated a claim arising out of his being doused with toilet water and urine

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by Inmate Sandoval. Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that Defendant Shelby knew of a

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risk of harm to Plaintiff prior to the incident.

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F.

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While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to

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Eighth Amendment - Medical Care

medical care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate
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indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th

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Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th

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Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d

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1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating

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that failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and

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wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately

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indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)).

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Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s

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pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at

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1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective

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recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation

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and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

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Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical need

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against Defendant Bueno. Plaintiff admits that he was seen by two nurses and treated by one.

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His allegations involving Defendant Bueno do not establish that Plaintiff failed to receive

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treatment or that Defendant Bueno was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.

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G.

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The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of liberty without the

Due Process-Disciplinary Proceedings

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procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,

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221, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005). To state a claim, Plaintiff must first identify the interest at stake.

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Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause or from

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state law. Id. The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in

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avoiding more adverse conditions of confinement, id. at 221-22 (citations and quotation marks

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omitted), and under state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is

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determined by focusing on the nature of the condition of confinement at issue, id. at 222-23

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(citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995)) (quotation marks

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omitted). Liberty interests created by prison regulations are generally limited to freedom from

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restraint which imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
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incidents of prison life. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221 (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484) (quotation

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marks omitted); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth no facts demonstrating that he was deprived of a protected

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liberty interest as a result of the disciplinary proceeding. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221; Sandin,

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515 U.S. at 484. Additionally, there are no facts describing what procedural protections Plaintiff

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was allegedly deprived of related to his disciplinary hearing.

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H.

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Plaintiff appears to complain about the deprivation of his legal property. While an

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authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process Clause,

Deprivation of Property

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neither a negligent nor intentional unauthorized deprivation of property by a prison official is

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actionable if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available for the loss. Hudson v. Palmer,

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468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524

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(9th Cir.1984).

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To the extent Plaintiff claims that his legal property was intentionally taken as a form of

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retaliation, this is an unauthorized, intentional deprivation. Due Process is therefore satisfied if

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there is a meaningful post-deprivation remedy available to Plaintiff. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.

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Plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation remedy available under California law. Barnett v.

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Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816–17 (9th Cir.1994) (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§ 810–895). Accordingly,

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Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for the alleged deprivation of his legal property.

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IV.

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Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Conclusion and Order

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8, 18 and 20 and fails to state a cognizable claim. As noted above, the Court will provide

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Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure the identified deficiencies.

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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Since Plaintiff must comply with Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 18, his amended complaint may not exceed twenty-five (25) pages.

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what

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each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal,

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556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations
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must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S.

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at 555 (citations omitted). Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by

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adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George, 507 F.3d at 607 (no

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“buckshot” complaints).

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Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.

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Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty, Ariz., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Therefore,

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or

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superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220.

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

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Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failure to comply with Federal Rules of

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Civil Procedure 8, 18 and 20;

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3.

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second amended complaint. Plaintiff’s amended complaint may not exceed twenty-five

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(25) pages; and

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4.

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this action will be dismissed for failure to obey a court order.

Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a

If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint in compliance with this order,

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

/s/ Barbara

November 14, 2014

A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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