Daniels v. Reed et al
Filing
10
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND signed by Chief Judge Ralph R. Beistline on 11/14/2014. Amended Complaint due by 12/22/2014. (Jessen, A)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CURTIS DANIELS,
Case No. 1:13-cv-00416-RRB
Plaintiff,
vs.
DISMISSAL ORDER
S. REED, Chief Deputy Warden, et al.,
Defendants.
Curtis Daniels, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil
rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against several correctional officers.1 Curtis’
Complaint arises out of his incarceration by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) at the California Correctional Institute, Techachapi (“CCI”).
I.
SCREENING REQUIREMENT
This Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.2 This Court
must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
1
In addition to S. Reed, the Chief Deputy Warden, Daniels has named: P. Matzen
(Facility Captain), T, Haak (Facility Lieutenant), M. Dailo (Correctional Lieutenant), B.
Skaggs (Correctional Lieutenant), B. Wedertz (Correctional Sergeant); M. Wurtz
(Correctional Officer); G. Eberle (Correctional Officer), T. Turmezl (Institutional Gang
Investigator); I. Alomari (Appeals Coordinator); K. Sampson (Appeals Coordinator); the
Warden, CCI; the Director, CDCR; and Does 1 to 25.
2
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
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“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that
“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”3 Likewise, a
prisoner must exhaust all administrative remedies as may be available,4 irrespective of
whether those administrative remedies provide for monetary relief.5
In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court looks to the pleading
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”6 “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”7 Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard
applied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), including the rule that complaints filed
by pro se prisoners are to be liberally construed, affording the prisoner the benefit of any
doubt, and dismissal should be granted only where it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can plead no facts in support of his claim that would entitle him or her to relief.8
3
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1126 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
4
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93–95 (2006) (“proper
exhaustion” under § 1997e(a) is mandatory and requires proper adherence to
administrative procedural rules); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (exhaustion
of administrative remedies must be completed before filing suit).
5
See Booth, 532 U.S. at 734.
6
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
7
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)).
8
Wilhelm v. Rotham, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).
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This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief.9 “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.’”10 Further, although a court must accept as true all factual allegations
contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true.11
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”12
II.
GRAVAMEN OF COMPLAINT
Daniels alleges that in May 2008 he was questioned about a name change and
identity theft and, when he refused to respond to the questions, was placed in
administrative segregation in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”).13 Subsequently, in October
2008, Daniels was again sent to the SHU because, according to Daniels, he was falsely
validated as an gang member.
In March 2012 Daniels was issued a CDC-115 Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) for
refusing to share a cell, the adjudication of which resulted in the loss of 90 days of good
time. Daniels further alleges that the RVR was issued because he refused to allow
9
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–69; see Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969
(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting and applying Iqbal and Twombly).
10
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
11
Id.
12
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
13
Although it is not entirely clear from the Complaint, it does not appear that
Daniels seeks relief in any form as a result of this SHU placement.
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Correctional Sergeant Wurtz to orally copulate him. Daniels also alleges that his
administrative appeals from the RVR adjudication were either lost or improperly processed,
resulting in a denial of due process.
Daniels also alleges in general terms without specifics that some of the Defendants
failed to curb a pattern of staging gladiator-style fights in the SHU. Notably, despite the fact
that Daniels has alleged significant details concerning his other allegations, Daniels has
not alleged that he was forced to engage in any of these so-called gladiator-style fights.
Finally, Daniels alleges that the acts of the Defendants were part of some grand
conspiracy.
Based upon those facts Daniels alleges fifteen (15) causes of action.
First Cause of Action: Violation of his First Amendment right of association.
Second Cause of Action: Violation of his First Amendment right of free speech.
Third Cause of Action: Violation of his First Amendment right by retaliation for
changing his name.
Fourth Cause of Action: Violation of his First And Fourteenth rights to associate with
member of his own racial group.
Fifth Cause of Action: Cruel and unusual punishment/deliberate indifference to risk
of retaliation in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Sixth Cause of Action: A general conspiracy among the Defendants to deprive him
of his constitutional protected rights.
Seventh Cause of Action: Misclassification as a member of gang and housing in a
SHU constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
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Eighth Cause of Action: A conspiracy to frame Daniels by false RVR’s and denial
of his proper avenues of appeal.
Ninth Cause of Action: Deliberate indifference to inhumane conditions in the SHU
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Tenth Cause of Action: Denial of equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Eleventh Cause of Action: Denial of equal protection in violation of state law.
Twelfth Cause of Action: Violation of an undefined state law liberty interest in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thirteenth Cause of Action: Retention in the SHU beyond the initial 90 days violated
his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fourteenth Cause of Action: Violation of the mandatory duties imposed by California
state law.
Fifteenth Cause of Action: Failure to properly train and supervise.
Daniels asks for: (1) declaratory relief that the acts of the Defendants violated his
rights under the Constitution and state law; (2) a preliminary and permanent inunction
prohibiting retaliation and reprisals for his refusal to accept the cell assignment;
(3) compensatory damges of $500/day for the loss of good time; (4) compensatory
damages for mental anguish and stress; (5) punitive damages; and (6) costs of suit.
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III.
DISCUSSION
Daniels’ claims can be grouped into five (5) categories: (1) the RVR; (2) the
retaliation claim; (3) his validation as a gang member; (4) his confinement to a SHU; and
(5) state-law claims. These will be addressed in seriatim.
A.
Rules Violation Report
Although it appears in the body of the Complaint that Daniels may contend that the
RVR resulted in his continued confinement in the SHU, the RVR itself imposed a loss of
good-time credits, not a further period of incarceration in the SHU. Thus, with respect to
the RVR the Court must first address the question of whether this action is properly brought
under § 1983. For the following reasons, the Court holds that it is not.
Persons subject to state custody generally “have two potential avenues to remedy
violations of their federal constitutional rights: a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
and a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 14 In Preiser, the Supreme Court addressed “the
extent to which § 1983 is a permissible alternative to the traditional remedy of habeas
corpus,”15 and held that § 1983 implicitly excludes from its coverage claims that lie “within
the core of habeas corpus.”16 Thus, a person who is in state custody may not use § 1983
to challenge “the very fact or duration of . . . confinement” by seeking “a determination that
he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment”—for
14
Osborne v. Dist. Attorney's Office, 423 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.2005) (citing
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994)).
15
Prieser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
16
Id. at 487–88.
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example, an injunction requiring prison officials to grant good-time credits that would
shorten his prison term.17 In Heck, the Court elaborated on the exception set forth in
Preiser, holding that a state prisoner may not maintain a § 1983 claim for damages if “a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence” with respect to a prior judgment that has not been nullified previously.18
One of the preconditions to bringing a federal habeas petition is that this Court may
not consider claims that have not been fairly presented to the state courts.19 Unexhausted
claims must be dismissed.20 Exhaustion of state remedies requires the petitioner to fairly
present federal claims to the state courts in order to give the state the opportunity to pass
upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.21 Thus, Daniels has
failed to fully exhaust his state court remedies by presenting his claim to the highest state
court,22 i.e., the California Supreme Court.
17
Id. at 499–500; Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2002) (“it has been
clear for over thirty years that a state prisoner seeking injunctive relief against the denial
or revocation of good-time credit must proceed in habeas corpus, and not under § 1983.”).
18
Heck, 512 U.S. at 484; see Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644, 646–48
(1997) (holding that a due process claim challenging disciplinary proceeding that
necessarily implies the invalidity of the deprivation of good time credits is not cognizable
under § 1983).
19
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (citing
cases).
20
See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 275-78 (2005); Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S.
107, 125 n.28 (1982); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982).
21
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995).
22
See Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1155-56 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Picard
v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) and O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845
(1999)).
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Because Daniels is proceeding pro se and this Court must liberally construe pro se
pleadings,23 normally this Court would simply dismiss with leave to amend providing
Daniels the opportunity to cure the defect, i.e., refile as a petition for habeas relief. In this
case, however, it is obvious from the Complaint that Daniels has not sought relief in any
form in the California State Courts. Thus, as a petition for federal habeas relief, because
he has not exhausted any of his claims, it is premature and must be dismissed.24
Dismissal will, however, be without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a petition for federal habeas
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2241, as appropriate.
B.
Retaliation Claim
Daniels contends that the RVR was in retaliation for his refusal to orally copulate
Correctional Sergeant Wurtz. The insurmountable problem that Daniels faces with respect
to this claim is that, as a threshold issue, Daniels must establish that the RVR was false.
As explained in the previous section, that question is not only not properly before this
Court, but has not yet been resolved in favor of Daniels. Accordingly, Daniels’ retaliation
claim is premature and must be dismissed without prejudice.
23
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Porter v. Ollison, 620
F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010).
24
As a habeas petition it would consist of solely unexhausted claims, not both
exhausted and unexhausted claims. Thus, the stay and abey procedure under which the
court dismisses the unexhausted claims and holds the exhausted claims in abeyance
pending exhaustion is inapplicable. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982); Pliler
v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 230 (2004) (citing Rose).
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C.
Validation as a Gang Member
Daniels appealed from his classification as a gang member. Daniels’ request that
the classification be looked into was granted at the Second Level of administrative review.
APPEAL ISSUE: CUSTODY/CLASSIFICATION
The appellant documents that he does not agree with the Institutional
Classification Committee's action dated September 12, 2012. The appellant
was retained in the Security Housing Unit (SHU) under falsified
documentation conducted by California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation's (CDCR) staff. The appellant states he has advised CDCR
staff that he is not an associate of any gang.
The appellant is requesting an investigation into him being retained in SHU
under false documents.
The appellant is requesting compensation for pain, suffering, and mental
anguish.
APPEAL RESPONSE:
All relevant documents and information submitted in writing have been
carefully reviewed and considered. A thorough review has been conducted
and evaluated in accordance with departmental policies and institutional
procedures.
On October 16, 2012, the appellant was interviewed by T. Miner,
Correctional Counselor II (CC-II).
The appellant had nothing new to add to his appeal.
The appellant's request for an investigation into him being retained in SHU
under false documentation was reviewed by CC-II Miner; this portion of the
appeal is GRANTED. It was revealed that the appellant has been validated
as an associate of the Black Guerilla Family per the CDCR-128B-2, Chrono,
dated February 17, 2009.
As stated in the CDCR-128G, Classification Chrono, dated September 12,
2012, appellant's Central File contains a CDCR-128B-2 dated February 17,
2009, validating the appellant as a prison gang member. The date of the
most recent source document listed on the CDCR-128-B2, which was used
in the validation process is within the past six years indicating that appellant
is currently an active associate of the Black Guerilla Family Prison Gang.
The appellant's inactive/active review date is August 18, 2014. Upon that
date, the Institutional Gang Investigator will conduct a review and submit a
finding to Office of Correctional Safety to determine if the appellant is
inactive or active within the prison gang. If the appellant is determined to be
active another six year review period will begin. If the appellant is determined
to be inactive with the prison gang the appellant's case factors will be
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Daniels v. Reed, 1:13-cv-00416-RRB – 9
presented to the Departmental Review Board (DRB) to determine the
appellant's placement according to his case factors, could be released to
General Population (GP).
In accordance with California Code of Regulations (CCR), Title 15, Section
3378 (d,) which states in part, an inmate house in the GP as a gang member
or associate may be considered for review for inactive status when the
inmate has not been identified as having been involved in the gang for a
minimum of two year. The appellant is not on a GP Facility and falls under
CCR, Title 15, Section 3341.5 (c) (A) (2), which states in part, a validated
prison gang member or associate is deemed lo be a severe threat to the
safety of others or the security oft he institution and will be placed in a SHU
for an indeterminate term.
Additionally, CCR, Title 15, Section 3023, Gang Activity, which states in part:
(a)
Inmates and parolees shall not knowingly promote, further or
assist any gang as defined in Section 3000.
(b)
Gangs, as defined in Section 3000, present a serious threat lo
the safety and security of California prisons.
(c)
For the purpose of specific gang participant
identification. the department categorizes gangs into
prison gangs and disruptive groups as defined in
Section 3000.
The appellant can debrief to be released from SHU, or wait until his inactive
review and if it is determined that he was inactive in the prison gang for six
years and the DRB releases him from his indeterminate SHU term, then he
will be released from SHU.
The appellant has not proven any of the documentation used for his
validation is false; therefore, the appellant will remain Indeterminate SHU.
The appellant's request for monetary compensation for his alleged pain and
suffering or mental anguish will not be addressed as it is not within the scope
of the appeal process.
Based on the above, this appeal is GRANTED.25
The Ninth Circuit has made clear that due process requires that validation as a gang
member by prison authorities must be supported by “some evidence.”26
Some evidence review requires us to ask only whether there is any
evidence in the record that could support the conclusion. This test is
25
Docket 1, pp. 53–54 (emphasis in the original).
26
Castro v. Terhune, 712 F.3d 1304, 1313–14 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Daniels v. Reed, 1:13-cv-00416-RRB – 10
minimally stringent. Accordingly, we do not examine the entire record,
independently assess witness credibility, or re-weigh the evidence. Evidence
only must bear some indicia of reliability to be considered some evidence.
Moreover, evidence may qualify as some evidence, even if it does not
logically preclude[ ] any conclusion but the one reached. 27
Without describing that evidence, Daniels alleges that the evidence supporting his
classification as a gang member was unreliable and exaggerated. These conclusory
allegations standing alone are insufficient.28 On the other hand, the evidence referred to
in the Second Level Appeal Response upon which the result depended, i.e., the CDCR128G, Classification Chronos, is not before the Court. Accordingly, at this point in the
proceedings the Court cannot conclusively determine whether the “some evidence”
standard has been met.29
Although it is highly unlikely that Daniels can truthfully plead facts sufficient to
warrant a finding that his classification as a gang member is invalid, at this stage of the
pleadings the Court cannot definitely and unequivocally hold that he cannot.30 Accordingly,
Daniels will be granted leave to file an amended complaint. In so doing, however, Daniels
is reminded that he has a high hurdle to surmount.31 The Court also notes that Daniels’
27
Id. at 1314 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in the
original); see Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2003).
28
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
29
Resolution of this issue is further complicated by the fact that, while Daniels
denies being a member of the BGF, he does apparently admit that he is a “Blood,” also a
gang.
30
See Hartman v. California Dept. of Corr. and Rehab., 707 F.3d 1141, 1130 (9th
Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.”).
31
See Castro, 712 F.3d at 1314–15. In particular, the Court notes that Daniels
alleges that the evidence relied upon was false or fabricated. In amending his complaint,
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gang classification was scheduled for review in August 2014. In amending his Complaint,
Daniels should also address the effect, if any, that this review has.
D.
SHU Confinement
The Due Process Clause, standing alone, does not confer a liberty interest in
prisoners being confined in the general prison population instead of administrative
segregation.32 With respect to liberty interests arising under state law, the liberty interest
by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation.33 Liberty
interests affected by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint that “imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.”34
The Court notes that, with the exception of the unique conditions existing at the
Pelican Bay Prison as applied to mentally ill inmates or those inmates at a particularly high
risk for suffering very serious or severe injury to their mental health,35 no federal court has
held that administrative segregation in a California prison SHU imposes an atypical or
significant hardship on a prisoner sufficient to violate the Eighth Amendment.
Daniels is reminded that this Court will not re-weigh the evidence nor assess its validity.
The sole issue before this Court is whether the evidence, accepted as true, is sufficient to
support Daniels’ validation as a gang member; nothing more.
32
See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466–68 (1983).
33
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–84 (1995).
34
Id. at 484.
35
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1155, 1228–29 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see
Griffin v. Lopez, 741 F.3d 10, 13–14 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing Madrid).
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The claims attacking Daniels’ confinement in the SHU must be dismissed.
E.
State Law
To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that the actions of Defendants violated state law,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for those claims.36 In addition, with
respect to his state-law claims a plaintiff must show compliance with the presentment
requirements of the California Tort Claims Act.37 It is clear from the Complaint that Daniels
has not presented his claims to the California courts as required. Consequently, those
claims must also be dismissed.
IV.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1.
To the extent that Daniels challenges the Rules Violation Report, it is
DISMISSED without prejudice to bringing that claim in a habeas corpus proceeding under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 or 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as appropriate.
2.
To the extent that Daniels is challenging his validation as a gang member,
that claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend. In amending, Daniels must limit his action
to the official(s) responsible for making the decision validating him as a gang member. In
addition, if in his possession, custody, or control, Daniels must attach to his complaint the
36
Loftis v. Almagar, 704 F.3d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991).
37
See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t., 839 F.2d 621, 627 n.4 (9th Cir.
1988).
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applicable CDCR-128G, Classification Chronos addressing his validation as a gang
member.
3.
All other claims are hereby DISMISSED, without leave to amend.
4.
Daniels must file his Amended Complaint consistent with this Order on or
before December 22, 2014.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of November, 2014.
S/ RALPH R. BEISTLINE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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