Shepard v. Clark et al

Filing 16

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION for Failure to State a Claim signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe on 1/5/2015. CASE CLOSED. (Jessen, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DEANDRE SHEPARD,

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Plaintiff,
v.

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NATALIE CLARK, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-00462-BAM (PC)
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM
(ECF No. 15)

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I.

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Plaintiff Deandre Shepard (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

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pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On August 11, 2014, the Court

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dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend within thirty days. (ECF No. 12.) Following

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extensions of time, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on December 24, 2014, is currently

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before the Court for screening.

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Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §

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1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or

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malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. §

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1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

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entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

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do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s

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allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v.

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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted).

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To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient

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factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v.

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United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant

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acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the

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plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572

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F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff’s Allegations

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II.

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Plaintiff is currently housed at Kern Valley State Prison. The events alleged in the complaint

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occurred while Plaintiff was housed at California State Prison-Corcoran (“CSP-Cor”). Plaintiff names

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the following defendants: (1) K. Alexander, Jobsite Supervisor; (2) Natalie Clark, Correctional Food

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Manager II; (3) Scott Folks, Supervising Correctional Cook;(4) John Doe, Correctional Jobsite

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Supervisor; and (5) Connie Gibson, Warden. Plaintiff sues Defendants in their individual and official

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capacities.

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Plaintiff alleges: On June 10, 2012, Plaintiff was assigned to CSP-Cor’s Security Housing

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Unit main kitchen. Defendant John Doe was Plaintiff’s supervisor and was aware of his duty to

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instruct and train Plaintiff on how to use and operate equipment in the prison’s scullery in a safe

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manner.

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On June 20, 2012, Defendant John Doe gave Plaintiff old/used rubber boots lacking in traction.
In July 2012, Plaintiff told Defendant John Doe that the boots lacked traction and caused Plaintiff to
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constantly lose his footing. Defendant John Doe told Plaintiff that he was going to place an order for

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new boots.

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In July 2012, Plaintiff informed Defendants John Doe, Alexander, Scott and Folks of the

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constant flooding of water on the floors due to blockage in the drainage located throughout the main

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kitchen. Each of the defendants claimed to have submitted a work order, but failed or refused to do so.

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Plaintiff believes that several kitchen workers complained about the unsafe conditions from the

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slippery floors. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Gibson was put on notice of the unsafe

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conditions, but refused to correct them. Plaintiff believes that Defendant Gibson shut down the

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kitchen months after Plaintiff’s injury due to unsafe conditions in March 2013.

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On July 30, 2012, while working, Plaintiff slipped on the wet floor and landed on the right side

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of his back. The fall caused immediate pain that traveled from the point of impact through his neck,

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back of his head and spread to his right leg. After the fall, Plaintiff could not move. He was taken by

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ambulance to the prison infirmary. He was provided medication for pain, which did not help.

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Approximately one week after falling, Plaintiff was taken to Mercy Hospital and evaluated. Upon

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examination, it was discovered that Plaintiff suffered from a non-displaced fracture of the L-1 region

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of his spine. Plaintiff had to use a wheelchair and walker. Plaintiff continues to suffer pain, which has

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altered his lifestyle and resulted in increased depression medication.

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Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, along with declaratory relief.

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III.

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A. Eleventh Amendment and Official Capacity

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To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a damages claim against defendants in their official

Discussion

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capacities, he may not do so. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits for monetary damages against

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a State, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities. Aholelei v. Dep’t of Public

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Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir.2007). As such, the Eleventh Amendment bars any claim for

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monetary damages against defendants in their official capacities.

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B. Supervisory Liability

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To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring suit against Warden Gibson based on the role of

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supervisor, he may not do so. Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under section 1983 for the
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actions of subordinate employees based on respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Crowley v.

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Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab.,

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726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir.

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2012) (en banc). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the

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constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s

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wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Snow v.

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McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 989) (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire, 726

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F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915-16. “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even

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without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so

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deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of a

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constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th

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Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Plaintiff has not alleged that Warden Gibson was personally involved the constitutional
deprivation or instituted a deficient policy.

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C. Eighth Amendment

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The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners

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not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of confinement.

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Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

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847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981))

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(quotation marks omitted). While conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and

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harsh, they must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045

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(citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, conditions which are devoid of

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legitimate penological purpose or contrary to evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of

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a maturing society violate the Eighth Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and

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citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346.

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Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food,

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clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir.

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2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains while in
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prison represents a constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks omitted). To

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maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials were deliberately

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indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Thomas

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v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir.

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2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th

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Cir. 1998).
Generally, claims regarding slippery floors, without more, do not state a claim for cruel and

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unusual punishment. See Thompson v. McMahon, 2013 WL 5220748, *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013)

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(negligence claim arising from prisoner’s fall at work not elevated into a federal cause of action). The

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Ninth Circuit has declared that “slippery prison floors . . . do not state even an arguable claim for cruel

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and unusual punishment.” LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir.1993) (internal quotation

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marks and citation omitted). Rather, there must be exacerbating conditions such that the water posed a

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serious, unavoidable threat to the safety of Plaintiff and other inmates. See Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d

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934, 938 (9th Cir. 1996) (prisoner must plead exacerbating conditions which render him unable to

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provide for his own safety such that he could not avoid the faulty condition or was unable to perceive

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it).

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Plaintiff alleges he slipped in water and fell while working in the SHU kitchen and Defendants

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failed to provide him adequate training and boots. However, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts or

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exacerbating circumstances to state a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Thompson, 2013 WL

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5220748 at *3 (allegations that prisoner fell while working in the dining room and that defendants

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failed to provide him with skid safe shoes did not state a claim for deliberate indifference); Andrillion

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v. Stoic, 2011 WL 2493655, *2-4 (D. Ariz. Jun. 23, 2011) (failure to provide prisoner with work boots

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when assigning him to work in wet and slippery conditions in the kitchen and who was injured failed

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to state a constitutional violation); Aronian v. Fresno County Jail, 2010 WL 5232969, *3 (E.D. Cal.

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Dec. 16, 2010) (jail inmate who complained of water leak and later slipped and fell failed to state a

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cognizable constitutional claim). Although Plaintiff alleges a safety issue, he has not alleged any facts

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or circumstances to suggest that he was unaware of the slippery conditions or that he could not take

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care to avoid them. Further, the failure to provide better work boots does not rise to the level of a

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constitutional violation.

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IV.

Conclusion and Order

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Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable section 1983 claim. Despite being provided

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with the relevant pleading and legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure the deficiencies in his

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complaint. Therefore, further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130

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(9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is HEREBY DISMISSED for failure to state a

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cognizable claim. All pending motions, if any, are terminated.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

/s/ Barbara

January 5, 2015

A. McAuliffe

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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