Mattson v. California Deparment of Corrections, et al.

Filing 53

ORDER GRANTING Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 40 , signed by Chief Judge Ralph R. Beistline on 1/14/15: Plaintiff's in forma pauperis status is REVOKED; The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment of dismissal, with prejudice, which states that the dismissal counts as a "strike" under 42 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (CASE CLOSED)(Hellings, J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
STEVE MATTSON,
Case No. 1:13-cv-00567-RRB
Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[DOCKET 40]

vs.
S. LOPEZ, et al.,
Defendants.

I.

PENDING MOTION
At Docket 40 Defendants S. Lopez, L. DiLeo, and M. Biter have moved for summary

judgment in their favor. Plaintiff Steve Mattson has opposed the motion1 and Defendants
have replied.2 The Court, being fully advised in the premises, submits this matter for
decision on the moving and opposing papers without oral argument.3
II.

BACKGROUND/ISSUES PRESENTED
In his Amended Complaint, Mattson contends that Defendants have denied him

adequate pain management medication and refused to order appropriate diagnostic testing
(an MRI). In response, Defendants contend that Mattson has been provided with all
medically necessary treatment. Because the parties are familiar with the facts underlying

1

Docket 48.

2

Docket 52.

3

LR 230(l).

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Mattson v. Lopez, 1:13-cv-00567-RRB – 1

this case and they are for the most part undisputed, the Court recites them herein only to
the extent necessary to understand this decision.
According to his medical records, Mattson suffers from several medical conditions,
including hepatitis C, upper gastrointestinal symptoms, hypertension, and chronic low back
pain (a narrowing of the L4-5 disc and mild scoliosis). Prior to his transfer to Kern Valley
State Prison (“KVSP”), Mattson was housed at Corcoran State Prison. While housed at
Corcoran, Mattson’s back pain was treated with methadone and morphine. After his
transfer to KVSP Mattson’s pain was treated with Nortrlptyline, Carbrunazepine, Trileptal,
Tegretol, Meloxicam, and Tylenol. In addition, Mattson was provided a ground floor cell
with a bottom bunk, a walker, orthopedic shoes, a mobility vest, and limitations were placed
upon his work assignments and other activities.4
In his opposition to the motion, Mattson submits five issues he contends are issues
of material fact.
1. Whether the plaintiffs past drug use is sufficient enough to deny adequate
pain medication for his serious back pain. State records will show Plaintiff
has not had a dirty drug test in 15 years. No drug test has been given to the
plaintiff to support the defendants claim of drug addiction.
2. Whether the pain medication provided to plaintiff Mattson is sufficient
enough to subdue the chronic lower back pain he suffers from daily.
3. Whether Dr. DiLeo used sound perfessional [sic] medical judgment when
he rescinded the permanent chrono for orthopedic shoes 92 days after he
approved it.
4. Whether Dr. DiLeo use[d] medical professional judgment when he
increased the length of time for "no prolonged sitting” from 1 hour to 2 hours
knowing the pain the plaintiff suffers from prolonged sitting.
4

Contrary to Mattson’s contentions, the record reflects that the pyschotropic
medications were prescribed as treatment for Mattson’s psychiatric condition by medical
providers other than Dr. DiLeo, not as a substitute f or pain management.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Mattson v. Lopez, 1:13-cv-00567-RRB – 2

5. Whether Dr. DiLeo intentionally disregarded the risk of harm and injury to
plaintiff Mattson by denying appropriate accommodations, such as a back
brace for added support and othopedic [sic] shoes as plaintiff has requested
numerous times and was denied as indicated on all the 602 appeal
responses included as Exhibit D 1-4.5
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if, when viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.6 Support and opposition
to a motion for summary judgment is made by affidavit made on personal knowledge of the
affiant, depositions, answers to interrogatories, setting forth such facts as may be
admissible in evidence.7 In response to a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.8 The issue of material fact required to be present to entitle a party to proceed
to trial is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of the party asserting its
existence; all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual
dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the
truth at trial. In order to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists a nonmoving

5

Id., pp. 1-2.

6

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1989).
7

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

8

Id.; Henderson v. City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2002).

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Mattson v. Lopez, 1:13-cv-00567-RRB – 3

plaintiff must introduce probative evidence that establishes the elements of the complaint.9
Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case.10 A dispute as to a
material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a
verdict for the non-moving party.11 "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge, [when] he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment."12 The evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are drawn in his favor.13 The
moving party has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact;
therefore, he bears the burden of both production and persuasion.14 The moving party,
however, has no burden to negate or disprove matters on which the non-moving party will
have the burden of proof at trial. The moving party need only point out to the Court that
there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case.15 There is no
genuine issue of fact if, on the record taken as a whole, a rational trier of fact could not find
in favor of the party opposing the motion.16

9

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986).

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 255.

13

Id.

14

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–323 (1986).

15

Sluimer v. Verity, Inc., 606 F.3d 584, 586 (9th Cir. 2010); see Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 325.
16

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Mattson v. Lopez, 1:13-cv-00567-RRB – 4

In general, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court may not weigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses.17 Instead, it generally accepts as true
statements made under oath.18 However, this rule does not apply to conclusory statements
unsupported by underlying facts,19 nor may the court draw unreasonable inferences from
the evidence.20
IV.

DISCUSSION
As noted above, the sole issue before this Court is whether the refusal to continue

treatment of Mattson’s pain with narcotic-based pain relievers and refusal to order a MRI
constituted deliberate indifference. The Supreme Court, holding that the infliction of
unnecessary suffering on prisoners violated the Eighth Amendment, stated:
[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison
doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally
interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced,
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause
of action under § 1983. 21

17

Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dept., 424 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005).

18

Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005).

19

Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 387 (9th Cir. 1990).

20

See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001);
McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1207–1209 (9th Cir. 1988).
21

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–105 (1976) (footnotes, internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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In Estelle the Supreme Court distinguished “deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners,” from “negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treating a medical condition,”
holding that only the former violates the Constitution.22 In short, Eighth Amendment liability
requires “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.”23
In determining deliberate indifference, the court scrutinizes the particular facts and
looks for substantial indifference in the individual case, indicating more than mere
negligence or isolated occurrences of neglect.24 The Ninth Circuit has spoken to the subject
of the appropriate test under Estelle:
In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts.
First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by demonstrating that
failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury
or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, the plaintiff must
show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This
second prong — defendant’s response to the need was deliberately
indifferent — is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond
to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the
indifference. Indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay or
intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way
in which prison physicians provide medical care. Yet, an inadvertent [or
negligent] failure to provide adequate medical care alone does not state a
claim under § 1983. A prisoner need not show his harm was substantial;
however, such would provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that
the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs. If the harm is an
isolated exception to the defendant’s overall treatment of the prisoner [it]
ordinarily militates against a finding of deliberate indifference.25

22

Id. at 106.

23

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).

24

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).

25

Jett v. Penner, 429 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. A showing of medical malpractice
or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth
Amendment.”26 A mere difference of medical opinion regarding the course of medical
treatment is “insufficient as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference.”27
With respect to Dr. Lopez and Warden Biter, Mattson does not refute the evidence
(their declarations) that they had no direct involvement in his treatment.28 To impose liability
on a supervisor, the supervisor’s wrongful conduct must be sufficiently causally connected
to the constitutional violation.29 That is, the official must “implement a policy so deficient
that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the
constitutional violation.”30
A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the
meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in
another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally
required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].”
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978) (Johnson) (emphasis
added). The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the
duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or
26

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F. 3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004); see Hallett v. Morgan,
296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Wood, 900 F.2d at 1334 (stating that even
gross negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation).
27

Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1059–60 (citing Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th
Cir. 1996)).
28

Dr. Lopez’s involvement appears to be limited to her status as the second-level
reviewer with respect to Mattson’s April 2010 Inmate/Parolee Health Care Appeal, DCR
602-HC. Plaintiffs Seperate [sic] Statement of Disputed Factual Issues, Exh. D, Docket
51, pp. 42–43.
29

See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (abrogated in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).
30

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Mattson v. Lopez, 1:13-cv-00567-RRB – 7

omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation. [Citations
omitted.]31
At most, Mattson’s allegations against Dr. Lopez and Warden Biter are that they
failed to properly supervise Dr. DiLeo. This is insufficient as a matter of law to state a viable
claim under § 1983. 32 Accordingly, the Complaint as against them must be dismissed.
Reduced to its essence, Mattson’s claim against Dr. DiLeo is that the prescribed
course of treatment was inadequate. In support of this contention, Mattson proffers no
evidence other than his own opinion. This is insufficient as a matter of law to establish
“deliberate indifference.”33
The Court further notes that the record reflects that during the time period in
question, Mattson: (1) refused to take his medications, including his prescribed pain
medications, on numerous occasions; (2) occasionally refused to allow diagnostic testing;
(3) refused to participate in physical therapy; and (4) refused examination during the

31

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoted with approval in
Tennison v. City and County of San Francisco., 570 F.3d 1078, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009)).
32

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009); OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699
F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002); see
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–95 (1978) (rejecting the concept of
respondeat superior in the context of § 1983, instead requiring individual liability for the
violation); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Liability under [§] 1983
arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. A supervisor is only
liable for the constitutional violations of . . . subordinates if the supervisor participated in
or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.”
(Citations omitted)).
33

Franklin v. State of Oregon, State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.
1981) (noting that a disagreement between a prisoner and a medical professional over the
most appropriate course of treatment cannot give rise to a viable claim of deliberate
indifference).
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Mattson v. Lopez, 1:13-cv-00567-RRB – 8

course of his administrative appeal proceeding.34 Mattson does not controvert these facts.
It is somewhat incongruous for Mattson to complain that he was denied a particular course
of treatment when at the same time he was refusing medically prescribed treatment.
The Court has considered all of the other arguments and points raised by Mattson
in this proceeding and finds them to be unpersuasive or inapposite. In particular, the Court
finds implausible Mattson’s contention that Dr. DiLeo should not have relied on the
documented non-medical history of Mattson’s request to be placed in solitary confinement
for protection resulting from an alleged drug debt owed a prison gang. Mattson’s position
is predicated primarily on an argument that his “admission” was false and that he should
have been subjected to drug tests instead; which, according to Mattson, would have been
“clean.” There is simply no basis in either the law or sound medical practice for the novel
proposition that a treating physician may not rely on statements made by the patient
outside the course of medical treatment in making a diagnoses and prescribing treatment.
Furthermore, the Court also finds notable that, although he refers to his clean drug tests,
nowhere does Mattson contend that the notations in his medical records that he has a
history of intravenous use of heroin is false.
V.

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket

40 is GRANTED.

34

Declaration of Dr. DiLeo, Docket 40-6, p. 3, ¶ 10.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Mattson v. Lopez, 1:13-cv-00567-RRB – 9

The Complaint on file herein is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety as against all
Defendants.
This Court, having fully considered the matter finds that reasonable jurists could not
disagree with this Court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could
conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.
The Court has determined that in this case an appeal would be frivolous or taken in bad
faith.35 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status is hereby REVOKED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment of dismissal, with prejudice,
which states that the dismissal counts as a “strike” under 42 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of January, 2015.
S/ RALPH R. BEISTLINE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

35

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); see Hooker v. American Airlines, 302 F.3d 1091, 1092
(9th Cir. 2002).
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Mattson v. Lopez, 1:13-cv-00567-RRB – 10