Cranford v. Perryman et al

Filing 10

ORDER DISMISSING CASE signed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng on 9/27/2013. CASE CLOSED. (Lundstrom, T)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ARCHIE CRANFORD,

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ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF‟S FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM

Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. 1:13-cv-00581-MJS

v.
SAMANTHA PERRYMAN, et al.,

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(ECF NO. 9)

Defendants.

CLERK SHALL CLOSE THE CASE

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SCREENING ORDER

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I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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On April 22, 2013, Plaintiff Archie Cranford, a civil detainee proceeding pro se and

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in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.)

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Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 4.)

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On July 2, 2013, Plaintiff‟s Complaint was screened and dismissed, with leave to

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amend, for failure to state a cognizable claim. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff‟s First Amended

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Complaint (ECF No. 9) is now before the Court for screening.

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II.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must conduct an initial review of the

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Complaint for sufficiency to state a claim. The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion

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thereof if it determines that the action has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or
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malicious,” “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that seek

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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

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1915(e)(2)(B). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have

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been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . .

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the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

28 U.S.C. §

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Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the „deprivation of any rights,

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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws‟ of the United States.”

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Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass‟n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

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Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for

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vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

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(1989).

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III.

SUMMARY OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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The First Amended Complaint names the following officials at Coalinga State

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Hospital as Defendants: (1) Samantha Perryman, Unit Supervisor; (2) Senait Endile; (3)

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Stefeni Vally; and (4) Audrey King, Executive Director.

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Plaintiff alleges the following:

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On February 21, 2013, during morning medication distribution, Defendant Endile

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intentionally gave Plaintiff a drug that was not a normal part of his prescription. The new

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medication caused severe and painful side effects including an unusually rapid

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heartbeat. (Compl. at 4.) Defendant Endile provided the medication with the intent to

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cause harm; she acted on behalf of Plaintiff‟s victims, individuals who had not been

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avenged or compensated. (Id. at 5.)

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Defendant Vally assigned Defendant Endile to the medication window with

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knowledge of Endile‟s hostility towards Plaintiff. Defendant Vally also failed to provide

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medical care once Plaintiff began suffering side effects.

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grievance complaining of the mistreatment and of ongoing side effects. Defendant King

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reviewed Plaintiff‟s grievance at the final administrative level and took no remedial
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Plaintiff filed a detainee

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action. (Id.)

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IV.

ANALYSIS

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A.

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To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

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elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

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violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the

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color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda

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Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

Section 1983

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

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the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

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are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.

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1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

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Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim that is

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plausible on its face.‟” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility

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that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as

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true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 1949-50.

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B.

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As a civil detainee, Plaintiff is entitled to treatment more considerate than that

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afforded pretrial detainees or convicted criminals. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931-

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32 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff‟s right to constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement

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is protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. Youngberg v.

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Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).

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Failure to Protect

A determination whether Plaintiff‟s rights were violated requires “balancing of his

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liberty interests against the relevant state interests.”

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Plaintiff is “entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than

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criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish,” but the Constitution

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requires only that courts ensure that professional judgment was exercised. Youngberg,
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Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321.

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457 U.S. at 321-22. A “decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid;

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liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial

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departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to

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demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a

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judgment.” Id. at 322-23; cf. Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1243-

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44 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the Youngberg standard and applying the deliberate

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indifference standard to a pretrial detainee‟s right to medical care, and noting that pretrial

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detainees, who are confined to ensure presence at trial, are not similarly situated to

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those civilly committed). The professional judgment standard is an objective standard

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and it equates “to that required in ordinary tort cases for a finding of conscious

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indifference amounting to gross negligence.” Ammons v. Washington Dep‟t of Soc. &

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Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2379 (2012)

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(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

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The amended complaint asserts that Defendant Endile poisoned Plaintiff on

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behalf of Plaintiff‟s victims. The remaining Defendants allegedly either failed to prevent

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the poisoning or failed to take steps to mitigate the harm afterward.

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Plaintiff has a liberty interest in safe conditions of confinement protected

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substantively by the Due Process Clause. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315. Due process

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requires that he receive care that is professionally acceptable. Id. at 321. However,

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Plaintiff‟s allegations are not sufficient to state a claim.

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Pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint or

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amended complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

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the pleader is entitled to relief.” The pleading standard announced by Rule 8 “demands

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more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129

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S.Ct. at 1949.

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unsupported by factual allegations. Naked assertions devoid of factual enhancement do

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not suffice to state a claim. Id. Stated another way, while the Court is required to accept

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Plaintiff‟s allegations as to Defendant Endile‟s actions, it need not do the same with
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Plaintiff‟s attribution of animus to Defendant Endile‟s behavior is

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regard to his unsupported conclusion that Defendant Endile acted with the intent to harm

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as retribution for Plaintiff‟s offenses. Id. Speculative, conclusory allegations aside, the

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First Amended Complaint does not demonstrate that any of the Defendants exhibited a

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conscious indifference amounting to gross negligence. See Ammons, 648 F.3d at 1029.

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The Court previously identified the above-described pleading deficiency and

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advised Plaintiff of the need to provide sufficient factual allegations to enable the Court

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to evaluate whether there was a basis for his suppositions regarding Defendant‟s

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motivations. He has failed to do so or give any indication that he is capable of doing so.

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There is no reason to believe that re-instructing and giving further leave to amend would

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serve any useful purpose. Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s claims are dismissed with prejudice.

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V.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

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For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff‟s First Amended

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Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that leave to

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amend would be futile. See Noll v. Carson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987).

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Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for

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failure to state a claim. The Clerk shall close the case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

September 27, 2013

/s/

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UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DEAC_Signature-END:

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Michael J. Seng

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